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ABSTRACT 
Navigating Musical Periodicities: Modes of Perception and Types of Temporal Knowledge 
Galen Philip DeGraf 
 
 This dissertation explores multi-modal, symbolic, and embodied strategies for navigating 
musical periodicity, or “meter.” In the first half, I argue that these resources and techniques are 
often marginalized or sidelined in music theory and psychology on the basis of definition or 
context, regardless of usefulness. In the second half, I explore how expanded notions of metric 
experience can enrich musical analysis. I then relate them to existing approaches in music 
pedagogy. 
Music theory and music psychology commonly assume experience to be perceptual, 
music to be a sound object, and perception of music to mean listening. In addition, observable 
actions of a metaphorical “body” (and, similarly, performers’ perspectives) are often subordinate 
to internal processes of a metaphorical “mind” (and listeners’ experiences). These general 
preferences, priorities, and contextual norms have culminated in a model of “attentional 
entrainment” for meter perception, emerging through work by Mari Riess Jones, Robert 
Gjerdingen, and Justin London, and drawing upon laboratory experiments in which listeners 
interact with a novel sound stimulus. I hold that this starting point reflects a desire to focus upon 
essential and universal aspects of experience, at the expense of other useful resources and 
strategies (e.g. extensive practice with a particular piece, abstract ideas of what will occur, 
symbolic cues) 
Opening discussion of musical periodicity without these restrictions acknowledges 
experiences beyond attending, beyond listening, and perhaps beyond perceiving. I construct two 
categories for various resources and strategies: those which involve dynamic symbolic encoding 
(such as conducting patterns and tala gestures) and those which utilize static theoretical 
information (such as score-based knowledge and calculation of abstract relationships). My 
primary means of revealing and exploring these additional resources involves instances of 
“metric multi-tasking,” in which musicians keep track of multiple non-nested periodicities 
occurring simultaneously. One of the reasons these situations work so well at revealing 
additional resources is that attentional entrainment offers no explanation for how one might be 
able to do such a thing (only that attention is insufficient for the task). I do not make these moves 
in an attempt to significantly alter the theory of attentional entrainment. Rather, I frame that 
model as but one mode of temporal perception among many. I also leave room for types of 
temporal knowledge which may not be perceptual at all, but are nonetheless useful in situations 
involving musical periodicity. Pedagogical systems already make use of dynamic symbols and 
theoretical knowledge to help with temporally difficult tasks, and generally not virtuosic feats of 
metric multi-tasking. With these ideas in mind, I return to more straightforward “mono-metric” 
contexts and reconsider what to do with the concepts of “meter” and “perception.” 
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 As a music scholar, I often come into contact with pieces by first reading about them in 
articles and books. An author conveys some noteworthy characteristics of a piece to me through 
her prose, often accompanied by clarifying diagrams and figures. I am likely to then find a 
recording of the piece, in order to hear whatever effect she describes. But if her point is subtle, 
difficult to hear, or simply occurs too quickly, my next step is likely to find a score (or lead 
sheet). That document gives a lot more information to peruse, and (unlike a recording) I can 
explore it at any pace. I can pause over each sixteenth-note, despite the fact that they might have 
quickly flown by on the recording. I can do this abstractly (i.e. “in my head”) or sit down at the 
keyboard and get a sense of the passage. By playing a piece through myself, I can hear relations 
at any pace I want. I also come into contact with physical and mental challenges required to play 
the piece, and those may be distinct from when I simply listen to the recording. 
Can reading an analysis of a piece of music you’ve never heard be a “musical” and 
“metrical” experience? Can studying a score? What about playing a piece at an electronic 
keyboard with the sound turned off? Because these interactions don’t involve sound, we might 
say they relate to music, but only indirectly. The analysis and score include information about 
music, perhaps, and the silent performance involves only physical mechanics. In music theory, I 
don’t think we give these non-sounding experiences much weight, or we sideline them on the 
grounds of being “unmusical.” That marginalization reflects the disciplinary history of appeals to 
musical experience for the validation of theoretical claims. With the expansion of post-tonal 
theory in particular, theorists justified an analysis of such-and-such a set class as not an arbitrary 
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group of pitches, but one which is (or can potentially be) experienced. The appeal to experience 
probably emerged out of some degree of paranoia that theorists—surrounded by books and 
scores—might not be finding relationships relevant to music sound. The charge might be “who 
cares whether you see such-and-such an aggregate if you cannot hear it!” Justin London takes on 
this sort of problem in his critique (2009) of “modern and post-modern music” from the 
perspective of musical psychology, in which he defines music perception as an experience of 
sounds unmediated by (for example) knowledge of a score. However, the fact that something is 
not heard does not preclude its being productive and meaningful in a particular musical situation. 
Sometimes to know about a relationship, without being able to hear it, may be an aesthetically 
meaningful experience. And some musical features can be better “heard” after being seen, done, 
felt, and abstractly calculated. Without an awareness of our many musical resources, we may fail 
to grasp our own potential. 
 To perceive a visual object, such as a painting, you can manipulate its distance by 
moving closer or stepping back. By contrast, when listening to music sounds, temporal relations 
are not so easily manipulated. Candace Brower’s “Memory and the Perception of Rhythm” 
(1993) notes how distinct forms of memory (echoic, short-term, and long-term) may be in 
operation for different rhythmic distances (i.e. timespans), and how tracking longer time-spans 
involves more counting and abstraction. Nonetheless, the temporal organization of a piece cannot 
be paused in time and still be heard. Two related passages (such as an exposition and 
recapitulation of a sonata) cannot be heard simultaneously for comparison without sonic 
interference between the two. These are all possibilities afforded by scores. Scores are atemporal 
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objects.1 You can view separate passages alongside each other, and pause upon individual pitch 
symbols regardless of how quickly they actually occur when sounded. 
 Digital and mechanical tools can also contribute to musical knowledge. In transcribing 
“exotic music,” ethnomusicologists Otto Abraham and Erich von Hornbostel noted the value of 
using a phonograph to capture things which the ear did not (Abraham and von Hornbostel 1994, 
446). Similarly, Nazir Jairazbhoy (1977) praised automatic transcription technology for being 
able to fill in items which we cannot hear, or which we cannot hear with adequate precision. 
Jairazbhoy argues that these details revealed through transcription machinery are musically 
meaningful despite the fact that they might be difficult to hear. More specifically, he argues that 
automatic transcription may help to avoid the distortions of a Western notational system and 
reveal nuances that that notation fails to capture. Modern technology has additional capabilities. 
Software can slow or speed up an example. When transcribing Brad Mehldau’s interpretation of 
“Anthropology” (discussed in Chapter 3) I could not hear every temporal relationship at the 
blistering tempo of the performance until artificially slowing it down in the program Transcribe!. 
With that program, on the other hand, specific durations can be precisely measured and 
compared even if they fall below “just noticeable difference” thresholds on perception as 
determined in laboratory experiments. Even if we consider the artificially slowed version as a 
different piece (though we need not), working with it nonetheless changes how I hear the 
recording at the original tempo. 
All these forms of engagement—studying a score, performing a passage, listening to a 
manipulated recording, and transcribing—contribute musical knowledge and rely on specific 
                                                 
1 Scores may signify a temporal object or an experience of that object, and the experience of 
a score may be temporal. Nonetheless, the score itself does not change in time. 
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practice time and effort with a piece of music. Having that time and effort to work with a piece 
develops expectations about what occurs later. It also readies optimal strategies which respond to 
specific challenging aspects. 
Discussions of meter typically explore engagement with musical periodicity as a form of 
perception, which occurs by listening for cyclical events. That perception is considered as a 
process of entrainment, in which one’s attention (or expectations, or neuronal oscillations) 
synchronize with regular events of a sounding object. Although a listener may be a performer, 
the activities and resources distinct to performers are not central. And motor behavior such as 
foot tapping, is treated as a reflection of some internal activity. 
This project has two goals. The first goal is to highlight how certain trends and norms in 
discussions of musical periodicity are unduly limited. The second goal is to discuss musical 
periodicity without those restrictions. This means identifying and exploring resources and 
strategies which are potentially useful for navigating musical periodicity as opposed to ones 
which are essential or universal components of experience. These activities are generally not 
considered to be part of listening—although some of them may be undertaken while listening—
but affect musical experience nonetheless. Accordingly, the assumption that meter must be a 
matter of listening is brought into question. Rather than reframe meter from the outset, I use 
“navigating musical periodicity” instead of “meter perception” to de-familiarize what we take for 
granted. Terms such as “meter” and “perception” carry with them baggage full of the very same 
trends and norms from which I attempt to break free, and some contexts I discuss might not be 
“perceptual” at all. I will use the terms “meter” and “perception,” but without any requirement 
that the terms always apply to the phenomena under discussion. Redefining meter is not at the 
absolute center of this project. Rather, I consider that task a corollary from the expanded contexts 
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and strategies for which I make room. To use the seafaring term “navigate” also brings out other 
fitting ideas, such as the use of instruments and maps, or the priority placed on not getting lost. 
 “Meter” not only has substantial baggage, its definitions are also inconsistent. Most usage 
involves temporal periodicity along with some degree of structural hierarchy.2 However, “meter” 
may refer to music-notational constructs, sound organization, or a particular kind of experience. 
The categories are entangled with each other, but also nonequivalent. On the one hand, 
notational conventions involve the representation of sound organizations which in turn may be 
experienced by a perceiver. On the other hand, there is “virtually unanimous agreement” that 
meter signatures are often not consistent with the ways in which rhythms are perceived and/or 
performed, and “the main disagreements have to do with how metric patterns are perceived or 
subjectively organized” (Russell Jones 1985, 54). Although pedagogical sources may be more 
likely to treat meter in terms of its notation, most definitions in music theory treat it as either an 
attributed property (which may be perceived) or as a way of perceiving itself. 
 Neutral, “objective” definitions of meter refer to hierarchy or periodicity in some object, 
usually sounds, though possibly also brain activity. “Psychological” definitions of meter consider 
it as a type of experience. Objective definitions do not prescribe any manner in which periodicity 
is experienced, but psychological definitions do. Psychological definitions may hold that it is a 
                                                 
2 There are two notable exceptions to the general concept of meter as involving hierarchy. 
William Benjamin states that his inclination “is to think of meter as not necessarily, although 
normally, hierarchic and to speak of a single level of pulsation as a metric level, as I have been 
doing” (Benjamin 1984, 371). Harald Krebs’ (1999) definition of meter is a bit more 
idiosyncratic. As he defines it, “meter” subsumes all periodicities of a work, including 
“interpretive layers” which do not need to align with each other. And yet, Krebs also seems to 
step away from his definition in actual usage. He refers to dissonance as involving interaction 
between “metrical” and “anti-metrical” layers, for example (Krebs 1999, 31). With this 
dichotomy, he implies meter is not just a union of all temporal layers. Clearly, some layers—the 
“metrical” ones which align with each other—have more to do with meter than the “antimetrical” 
layers which don't. 
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way of perceiving which responds to a periodic stimulus,3 that the way of perceiving is itself 
periodic,4 or both.5 An experiential requirement upon meter helps fundamentally align the term’s 
definition with its common usage. One fear might be that taking away conventional experiential 
requirements leaves open the possibility of regular sunrises and sunsets having “meter.” I think 
such a fear is unfounded, though I would also be open to such a possibility. Leaving experience 
out of a definition, does not remove experience or perception from discussion, however. There is 
also another option, to define meter “in the music,” but also require that periodic structure to be 
potentially experienced in some way. Ironically, music psychology generally defines meter in 
“objective” terms,6 whereas theory has recently shifted toward more “psychological” 
definitions.7 I prefer the objective definition of meter, because it seems to allow for both more 
freedom and more precision with it. Instead of defining meter as an experience which includes 
only certain contexts, the objective definition allows for distinct possibilities such as metric 
perception, unperceived meter, unperceivable meter, and metric knowledge. 
It can be easy to conflate the objective and psychological definitions of meter. Justin 
London, for example, defines meter as “a perceptually emergent property of a musical sound, 
                                                 
3 Claire McCoy and Mark Ellis define meter as “the perception of beat grouping caused by 
regular patterns of strong and weak beat accents” (McCoy and Ellis 1992, 37). 
4 Peter Keller and Denis Burnham define metric frameworks as “multiple levels of pulsation 
that are generated within an individual” (Keller and Burnham, 630). 
5 Justin London defines meter as “a stable, recurring pattern of temporal expectations, with 
peaks in the listener’s expectations coordinated with significant events in the temporally 
unfolding musical surface” (London 2002, 531). 
6 See for example, Patel et al (2005, 227) 
7 Roger Grant’s “Four Hundred Years of Meter: Theories Ideologies, and Technologies of 
Musical Periodicity since 1611” (2010, see especially 298-300) explains tension between these 
definitions as well the recent shift in music theoretical discussions toward perceptual definitions. 
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that is, an aspect of our engagement with the production and perception of tones in time” 
(London 2004, 4). He treats both definitions as equivalent, claiming meter is both objective (a 
property of sound) and psychological (an aspect of our engagement with it), although his 
objective definition requires it to be perceivable (i.e. “perceptually emergent”). There have been 
other, less trivial confusions, leading to distorted transmission of ideas, perhaps ultimately 
shifting the definition. Robert Gjerdingen’s article on “Meter as a Mode of Attending” has 
commonly been misrepresented as putting forth the idea that meter is a mode of attending.8 
However, Gjerdingen's article uses meter to mean periodicity. His precise point is that attention 
itself can also be periodic. That is, attention can—like the music it responds too—also have 
meter in the objective sense. His ideas were obviously attractive. Many researchers took his 
model as a given, and the meter definition shifted to reflect that starting point, at least in much 
music theory. 
 As Roger Matthew Grant (2010) traces in his dissertation—and Ève Poudrier's 
dissertation (2008) laments—there has been a disciplinary shift from talking about meter as a 
property of sound to a form of experience. However, the way that conversations have shifted 
does not necessitate a parallel shift in the term itself. They have both shifted, but the change in 
definition seems to be a byproduct of repeatedly restricting contexts of discussions. Poudrier, 
whose research explores meter from a psychological perspective, advocates against such 
“psychological” definitions for meter. She criticizes that “it is currently fashionable to define 
meter based on psychological models, and thus to regard meter as the cognitive product of the 
listener’s mode of attention,” and goes on to demand that “meter must be situated in the music 
(as a hybrid product of a score and its performance) as well as in the mind” (Poudrier 2008, 31). 
                                                 
8 For example, see Rundall 2011, 11 and London 2004, 4. 
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Neither Poudrier (2008) nor Jacob Rundall (2011) are very picky about permissible methods and 
contexts for perceiving meter. Both also (relatedly, I would argue) seek to explore issues 
surrounding polymeter. 
This project explores instances of “metric multi-tasking”—in which musicians keep track 
of multiple non-nested periodicities occurring simultaneously—because those examples motivate 
the use of alternative resources and strategies. With those possibilities in hand, I later return to 






 In the first chapter of this dissertation, I explore trends in music theory and music 
psychology which have given rise to a narrow notion of metrical experience. To do this, I will 
characterize several disciplinary assumptions, priorities, and dichotomies which may be easy to 
overlook as conceptual moves at all. Section 1.1 explores the assumption that metrical 
experience means not just perception but also listening. Section 1.2 considers music theory’s 
problematic dichotomy between the “internal” and “external,” and between metaphorical “mind” 
and “body.” Section 1.3 recognizes the complex relationships between musical notation and 
experience, and the frequent erasure of notation’s usefulness. Section 1.4 acknowledges the lack 
of specific training for participants in many psychological experiments and questions this as a 
desideratum. And Section 1.5 summarizes the dominant model of meter as attentional 
entrainment, which emerges from those various trends. Section 1.6 comments upon how the 
metrical mainstream reflects more general (and gendered) biases of music theory. I acknowledge 
these various trends and assumptions at the outset of this project to highlight many restrictions 
upon the discussion which might otherwise go without notice. 
 The latter part of this dissertation explores musical periodicity without these restrictions 
and assumptions in place. Chapter 2 expands the mainstream notion of temporal experience with 
two broad categories of temporal resource. Dynamic symbols and actions form one category and 
serve to tie events to a temporal structure. The second category involves static symbols and 
theoretical knowledge which provide useful (actionable) information about temporal structure 
without itself “happening” or changing in time. Chapter 3 offers analyses of several 
compositions and recordings which involve “metric multi-tasking,” in which musicians navigate 
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more than one temporal hierarchy at the same time. In these cases, extra resources and strategies 
are required for performance or offer some particularly meaningful experience of the piece 
which might otherwise be unavailable. Although the resources I detail are undervalued and often 
defined out of music theory and psychology, Chapter 4 explores how symbolic codes, embodied 
patterns, and other temporal resources already form part of pedagogy. The conclusion returns to 
fundamental theoretical concepts such as meter, perception, and attention in light of the 




CHAPTER 1: APPROACHING METER IN MUSIC THEORY AND PSYCHOLOGY 
1.1 Meter Perception and Listener-centrism 
 
The approach to meter being developed here is squarely based on the listener's 
perspective: more precisely, meter involves the perception of an occurrent musical 
passage. This is different from metric aspects of remembered musical experience (such as 
simply knowing that a particular song was in triple meter) or from the audiation of 
musical passages in “the mind's ear.” Moreover, it is presumed that listeners do not 
normally have access to other, non-auditory information, such as a score or the scansion 
of song lyrics. Metric audition requires only the musical sounds themselves and the 
listener's temporal capacities, both innate and learned. (London 2004, 23) 
 
Justin London’s words from Hearing in Time do well to encapsulate general trends, assumptions, 
and contextual restrictions in psychological accounts of meter. His approach focuses on the 
activity of perceiving as listening and cleans it up by eliminating “nonauditory information, such 
as a score.” Also, for London, listening must involve an occurrent musical passage. His 
perspective admits the experience of acoustic sound reverberating through the air to our ears, but 
not memories of sound. We can break this perspective apart into three “listener-centric” 
assumptions: (1) that music be limited to a sound object, (2) that musical experience be 
perceptual, and (3) that musical perception occur by listening (but not remembering). Such a 
starting point seems rather obvious and straightforward. After all, I would consider listening to 
sound the default, or perhaps the most important way of experiencing music. It is this seeming 
obviousness and straightforwardness that allows these “listener-centric” assumptions to be put 
forth casually or without discussion. The major point of this section is to point out that they are 
not such obvious givens. Such assumptions occur at a cost, ignoring or excluding other useful 
contexts and sources of temporal information on the basis that those contexts and sources do not 
involve listening or are not perceptual. Showing how music discourse is “listener-centric” may 
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seem like a rather banal exercise at first, but doing so will help lay out the conceptual norms and 
commitments of a complex discipline and better understand their ramifications. 
 In an early study of meter psychology from the 1980s, Longuet-Higgins and Lee take “the 
perception of musical rhythm” as their starting point, limiting their scope to the perceptions of a 
listener. They state that “there are any number of regularities to be found in a piece of music; 
here we are concerned only with those that are perceptually apparent to the listener” (Longuet-
Higgins and Less 1982, 117). This statement can be interpreted in two ways. It could mean that 
listening is a requirement for musical perception, in which case “perceptually apparent to the 
listener” simply underscores the identification of listening and perception. However, “to the 
listener” could further qualify what sort of perception Longuet-Higgins and Lee are referring to. 
Stating that something must be perceptually apparent to the listener would then imply that 
regularities could be perceptually apparent in another way, such as by looking, or by knowing 
something by drawing an inference from it, but that any other way isn’t important enough to 
merit discussion in their article—or at least is too different from perception by listening to be 
part of the same discussion. Whichever interpretation we take—of music perception as listening, 
or of listening as a more specific type of music perception, Longuet-Higgins and Lee limit music 
perception to the act of listening. 
 Clarke and Krumhansl’s study “Perceiving Musical Time” (1990) includes more or less the 
same type of restriction and a similar lack of discussion. However, Clarke and Krumhansl are 
more explicit about visual information being excluded from their concept of musical perception, 
and their proscription of visual information includes tacit acknowledgement that such 
information might be experientially meaningful. Their experimental design stipulates that 
participants perform temporal segmentation “without reference to the notated score, so that their 
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judgments were based as much as possible on auditory rather than visual information” (Clarke 
and Krumhansl 1990, 224). Evidently, the authors must have believed that visual information in 
a score could affect people’s judgments. Otherwise, there would be no need to forbid it. 
However, such an experimental restriction implies the stated topic “perceiving musical time” is 
likewise limited to judgments based on auditory information (i.e. listening). They provide no 
additional discussion about why visual information ought to be omitted. There could have been 
practical reasons for omitting visual information, but the authors don't mention any, leaving us to 
assume the restriction is a matter of definition. 
 The identification of perception with listening also emerges from distinctions between 
listening and performing. Mari Riess Jones’ work, for example, distinguishes between 
performing and listening, and then uses the term “perception” more or less synonymously with 
“listening.” Her “Temporal Perspective Model” assumes that “a performer (with the knowledge 
of meter) attempts to communicate to a listener a particular perspective from which melodic and 
rhythmic forms may be perceived” (Riess Jones 1987, 164). Jones’ model downgrades 
performance to a means of transmission to a listener, with the listener as the one who does the 
perceiving.9 This is a common set-up for the idea of music perception: the performer transmits 
music-sound to the listener, who perceives it.10 
 Joel Lester sets up a similar alignment of perception-as-listening with a clearly privileged 
status of listeners’ perspectives over performers’—even his own perspective as a performer. His 
                                                 
9 Interestingly, “meter” is something that both performer and listener both share. The 
performer also has “knowledge of meter,” but it isn’t clear what Riess Jones means by 
“knowledge” here, beyond the idea that it is distinct from a listener’s perceiving. Whatever 
knowledge the performer has remains peripheral to her project. 
10 See, for example, London (2004), 23, writing about meter, or Meyer (1994), who writes 
more generally about meaning in music. 
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article “Notated and Heard Meter” (1986) grapples with differences between a listener’s 
perspective on the one hand, and that of a performer, theorist, or composer on the other. The 
discussion there stems from personal experience as a violinist playing Milton Babbitt’s 
Composition for Four Instruments. Lester as a performer had practiced his part in relation to its 
notated metric framework and could hear the music with “a memorized silent click-track” to 
make it sound almost “jazzy.” Months later, however, he was struck by the fact that, without the 
score, or memorized version in his head, he couldn’t hear the notated meter. In his article, Lester 
could have considered his performer self’s knowledge to have more validity, but he does not. 
Instead, he subordinates his performer self to the later listener self.  
Are the metric calculations of the performer as unintelligible and irrelevant to the listener 
as some apian dance would be in helping us locate a particular wildflower in a meadow? 
Are the rhythmic-serial computations of the theorist (or the composer as well) equally 
irrelevant to the listener? (Lester 1986, 117-118) 
 
Posing this question reveals Lester’s priorities: the listener perspective trumps other ones. This is 
quite unusual, because in his anecdote being the listener actually involved knowing less than he 
had as a performer. To have the “listener” experience, Lester needed to forget about memorized 
aspects of the piece that gave rise to the silent click-track in his mind and the “jazzy” 
syncopations that went with it (Lester 1986, 117). This is the sort of way in which listener-
centrism can become restrictive. Being a listener, for Lester, meant having neither a physical 
score, nor some memorized version of it. Babbitt’s music in particular was deemed “not 
accurately perceptible” (Lester 1986, 117), because listeners who have never seen the score (or 
have forgotten it) would not be able to re-construct it—its meter as notated, that is—only by 
listening (Lester 1986, 226). Perceptibility, in other words, rests only on information scoreless 
listeners can gather. The critical issue is that a score (or some internalized memory of it) does 
 15 
provide information. It does not merely summarize what many scoreless hearings might 
construct, either. And, importantly, that information has a qualitative effect on experience: in this 
case, it gave the music its “jazziness.” 
 In this opposition between listeners and performers, Lester’s use of “perceptible” to mean 
“perceptible to the (scoreless) listener” launches a critique of modern compositions. However, if 
we set aside that skepticism, the article underscores how (post)modern music can highlight 
dramatic differences between the perspectives of listeners, performers, theorists, and composers. 
Babbitt’s notated metric layout may have been designed to do something for the performer (such 
as put beginnings of a new pitch-class aggregate on a downbeat), without an intention that such a 
metric hierarchy would correspond with a listener’s experience. I do not think that’s a problem, 
but the solution Lester offers is that “commonly-held conceptions of rhythm in this music need 
to be reassessed from the bottom up” (Lester 1986, 117). It isn’t clear if he issues that solution 
half-heartedly, as a rhetorical jab, but that idea will stand very much in line with the aims of this 
project. Aspects of modern music can make us reassess our commonly-held conceptions. 
However, Lester doesn’t seem to loosen his grip on the commonly-held conception that a 
scoreless listener’s perspective dictates what is perceptible. 
 Finding explicit justifications—as opposed to simple assertions—for a view of music as 
sound and perception as listening is less common, but in Fred Lerdahl and Ray Jackendoff’s A 
Generative Theory of Tonal Music (1983)—and in subsequent work by Justin London (2002, 
2004, 2009)—a rationale is offered, based upon essential, universally applicable aspects of 
music. The stated aim of A Generative Theory of Tonal Music is to describe the musical 
intuitions of a listener, and the authors consider that aim synonymous with the goal of music 
theory. For them, “a comprehensive theory of music would account for the totality of the 
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listener’s musical intuitions” (Lerdahl and Jackendoff 1983, 8). In other words, the book is non-
comprehensive only because it doesn’t discuss all the intuitions a listener might have. The 
authors justify this listener-centric perspective by first discussing the general nature of music. Or, 
more precisely, they first define out what cannot be considered a piece of music. “A piece of 
music is a mentally constructed entity… not a musical score, if only because many musical 
traditions are partially or completely unwritten… not a performance, because any particular 
piece of music can receive a great variety of performances” (Lerdahl and Jackendoff 1983, 2). 
Interestingly, the authors slough off scores and performances because they are dispensable and 
variable, not because they lack meaning. The fact that much music does not involve scores does 
not make scores musically irrelevant: it makes them musically nonessential (and nonuniversal). 
Similarly, the fact that many performances can all be “the same piece” makes those 
performances messy and difficult to handle, again nonessential, but also not irrelevant. Perhaps 
the authors saw the avoidance of performers’ perspectives as a weaker argument to make, and so 
bolstered it with a casual appeal to traditional priorities of music theory: “Music theory is usually 
not concerned with the performers’ activities” (Lerdahl and Jackendoff 1983, 2). This, of course, 
is not a very good justification, but it allows them to move forward.11 Relying on these reasons to 
jettison scores and performances, the authors do not define the field of inquiry around what can 
be relevant to music interactions. Instead, they only consider essential types of interaction 
relevant to all contexts in some way. 
 There might be good reason to set up limitations such as these. Doing so cleanly limits the 
scope of inquiry to “universals.” But the authors do not represent this move as a narrowing of 
                                                 
11 It is worth noting that in the decades following that 1983 publication, there has been music 
theory which foregrounds performers’ activities. Cusick (1994) provides an example of this 
perspective as something which might help construct feminist music theory. 
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their topic. Just the opposite: seeking out universals allows the project to be presented as 
fundamentally more whole, even though it isn’t. It may be worth breaking down this argument. 
The authors restrict the concept of music to what they describe as its fundamental type of 
interaction: listening to sound. Then they recast this restriction with a tone of universality: 
listening to sound is common to all music. Then—and this is a leap—musical interaction and 
experience comes to be defined only in terms of aspects universal to all music. Other types of 
interaction (seeing, reading, performing) are not viewed as a true part of music theory, because 
they aren’t universal. Consequently, a music theory which only explores listening to sounds can 
be seen as a comprehensive one.12 
 Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s perspective has concretized into a foundation for the work of 
later scholars.13 A case in point is the work Justin London, with a conceptual framework that is 
often rather similar.14 Like Lerdahl and Jackendoff, London, in his article “Temporal Complexity 
in Modern and Post-Modern Music: A Critique from Cognitive Aesthetics” (2009), makes a case 
in certain terms about what the nature of “music” is, although he brings in the notion of 
                                                 
12 Lerdahl and Jackendoff do acknowledge scores and specific performances, but only as 
“partial representations” by which a piece may be transmitted, not an actual transmission of “the 
piece,” something that only happens by listening. Recognizing scores and performances are 
partial representations does grant them quite a bit of meaning. However, “partial representation” 
is used mainly as a criticism. It doesn’t point out that these things can positively represent 
something. Instead, it faults their relation to music for lacking something else substantial 
(acoustic vibrations). To the authors, the representation is not very good because it is only 
indirect. “Partial” is not valuable for the “part” it conveys, but instead, weak because of its 
incompleteness. 
13 David Lewin offers a compelling contrast when he draws his own scope for music theory, 
but its reactive tone underscores the presence of a mainstream to which he responds (1986, 377). 
His article even addresses Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s Generative Theory directly and offers some 
measured qualification (Lewin 1986, 380). 
14 London’s most recent experiment (London et al., 2016)—which considers how listeners’ 
tempo judgments are affected by visuals of dancers—is a notable exception. 
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“perception” more prominently than Lerdahl and Jackendoff did. He also continues the trend, 
manifested in Lester’s article, of using his conceptual framework to construct deep flaws in 
modern compositions. His article begins by defining “aesthetically relevant” properties of an 
artwork, drawing upon aesthetic critiques of Gary Iseminger. Artworks “afford appreciation,” 
and this appreciation “involves the experience of the artwork.” London then continues that 
genres of art should be considered “in terms of the materials used in their composition, and 
correspondingly in terms of the sensory and cognitive faculties with which we perceive and 
understand them.” This by itself isn’t very restrictive, but London then goes on, explaining that 
“aesthetic experience and communication are strongly tied to the experience of the primary 
medium of the work.” And furthermore, 
It reasonable to presume that musical works involve the organization and presentation of 
sounds in time—sounds being the ‘primary medium’ of music. If the primary medium of 
music is that of sounds, then a proper experience of a musical work involves hearing those 
sounds. Thus, while musical scores may be interesting in their own right, their 
physical/visual properties are not of primary aesthetic relevance. Any relevance that the 
visual aspect of a score may have must supervene on the underlying experience of the 
music-as-heard. (London 2009, 46) 
 
There is a leap here not too dissimilar from Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s. London begins with the 
idea that aesthetic experience is strongly tied to a primary medium, but then proceeds as though 
aesthetic experience is only tied to the primary medium. Or, in other words, he uses an idea of 
“primary” medium, but without entertaining any possibility that there could be any “secondary” 
medium of music. Having set up that sounds are the only relevant medium, he explains that a 
proper experience means hearing them. This precisely encapsulates the main thread of this 
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section. By assuming music to be sound,15 obtaining knowledge about that sound is also assumed 
to happen by listening. London’s language also offers a glimpse of disciplinary norms. Listening 
to sounds is not simply the way to experience music, it is the proper way to experience it. This 
might be a tacit acknowledgment that there are plenty of other experiences out there, but judging 
that they simply aren't “proper.” Listening is how you are supposed to experience music. 
 London’s position is poignantly reflected through a thought experiment involving a piece 
of music he calls the Subtle Etude #1, reproduced below. 
 
 
Example 1.1, London's Subtle Etude #1 
 
His etude is based upon subtle changes that fall below thresholds of “just noticeable difference” 
found in psychological experiments. If you were given a precise performance from a computer, 
London states, then “what you see is what you hear, even though you can’t hear it. Any 
distinctions we think we might hear in listening to the MIDI realization will be misperceptions, 
perhaps influenced by the presence of the score” (London 2009, 64). In other words, we might 
think we hear subtle differences, but—because they wouldn’t be noticed without the score—we 
wouldn’t actually hear them. The difference between perception and misperception is the same 
as the difference between “hearing” and “thinking we hear.” Interestingly, this distinction cannot 
                                                 
15 This—defining music as sound—is slightly different from Lerdahl and Jackendoff, for 
whom “music” or “a piece of music” is a mentally constructed entity. Nonetheless, their 
assumptions based upon seeking musical universals are rather similar. 
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be based on the quality of experience, because, by definition, thinking we hear dynamic changes 
means that the experience feels like we are hearing them. If it felt otherwise, we wouldn’t think 
we were hearing it! And the distinction between perception and misperception is not based on 
accuracy, either. In London’s Subtle Etude, the score-influenced knowledge is, paradoxically, a 
misperception, despite being a more precise appraisal of the sound object. Ultimately, London's 
distinction is based on the source of information. To perceive something means not just to get 
information about sounds in time, but also to get that information exclusively from sound 
sources. What we hear in the wrong way, with the contribution of visual information, is 
downgraded to what we only think we hear, thus ruled out of the realm of hearing. This is how 
London excises “second-order knowledge” (London 2009, 60), or things we only think we hear. 
The “proper” experience of music is restricted to the perception of sound (music’s primary 
medium), and information-gathering must occur by listening. To gather information about 
sounds, but not through listening, gives rise to “misperceptions” whether or not they are 
accurate, even more. A musician who thinks she hears subtle changes influenced by score 
knowledge will be doomed to “misperceive” a piece until she can forget that abstract knowledge. 
Only then will the musician be “perceiving” the piece, even if those perceptions yield a less 
accurate temporal assessment of its goings-on! 
 We can twist London’s ideas a bit here if we let go of categorizing what should count as 
“music” or a “perception.” His thought experiment reveals that scores and analyses (i.e. “second-
order knowledge”) are capable of providing information beyond what can simply be heard. 
Perhaps these resources should be bracketed off as “improper” (if that’s possible), but they still 
may provide something which hearing does not or cannot. What's more, they can do this in the 
context of experiences that feel roughly the same, because we might still “think we hear” such-
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and-such a change. London does speak of analytically-informed listening as something valuable, 
but only if it is scrutinized by empirical verification. In other words, participants must be able to 
hear an analysis without the aid of the abstract (or has he calls it, “second order”) knowledge. If 
they cannot, the analysis fails. But we could also speak of a flipside to this. If participants were 
to think they heard something which they could not hear without the analytical help, this 
becomes proof of the potency of that “second-order knowledge.” 
 The disciplinary norm of listener-centrism excludes potentially worthwhile techniques of 
gathering information, based either upon the source of that information not being occurent 
sound, or upon the means of gathering that information not being properly perceptual. Limiting 
the perspective of music theory to that of listeners marginalizes motor behaviors and visual 
symbols. For example, in London’s Hearing in Time he states that “as listeners we are not 
directly involved in the production of movement trajectories” (London 2004, 32).16 Aligning the 
concept of perception with listening makes motor behaviors a reflection of perceptions, but not 
themselves perceptual acts. When London states that “perception is not only for deriving 
representations of reality; perception also serves to guide our behavior” (London 2004, 5), he 
takes the perspective that perceptions guide behavior, but not vice versa. 
 Even more broadly, listener-centric perspectives on meter emerge from assumptions about 
experience as perception. The quotation from London at the outset of this section defines a 
listener’s perspective as involving perception of a musical passage. Taking perception as the 
starting point is evident just by probing article titles and abstracts in music psychology, such as 
                                                 
16 While the first edition defines movement out of what it means to be a listener, the second 
edition is slightly reworked. “Although we may not be directly involved in the production of 
movement trajectories, listening in part entails recovering movement information from the 
musical surface” (London 2012, 32). It is not clear, however, whether “recovering movement 
information” refers to metaphorical motions or actual physical actions. 
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Longuet-Higgins and Lee’s “The Perception of Musical Rhythm” (1982) or Clarke and 
Krumhansl’s “Perceiving Musical Time” (1990). It is also connected to the psychological 
approach in general. Those two articles were published in the journals Perception and Music 
Perception, respectively. In fact, the foreword to the first issue of Music Perception uses music 
perception synonymously with listening, presumably as a way of bringing the discipline of music 
theory into the larger psychological enterprise. For psychologists, music provides another 
medium (sound) to reveal aspects of our brain function. By compartmentalizing music as sound, 
it sets up comparison and contrast with, for example, research on visual perception. Music as a 
research tool for getting information about brain mechanics becomes troublesomely complicated 
when viewed as multi-modal. 
 Music theory’s high value on perceptibility may also trace back through its own 
disciplinary history. Appealing to perception has long been the primary means of justifying the 
validity of claims.17 It was a way of claiming that Schenkerian graphs and conglomerations of 
pitch class sets were not merely products of abstract calculations nor obscure connections 
between pitches. Perceptibility stood to mean that such-and-such a musical device had 
experiential meaning. However, this logic does not work in reverse. We should not be left 
thinking that a device which is not conventionally perceptible cannot be experientially 
meaningful. That assumption about perception goes hand in hand with listener centrism. To say 
that something is not perceptible may actually mean that it is not perceptible in a specific 
context. When perception is assumed to involve a perceiver gathering information about some 
external object, this paradigm fits perfectly onto the situation of listener responding to external 
                                                 
17 This is not universal to all of music theory’s disciplinary history. Appeals to the ear would 
align with Aristoxenus, but not Pythagoras, who made claims based upon the perfection of 
certain ratios. 
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acoustic sounds. But is not so intuitive if the subject is a performer, actively involved in creating 




1.2 Meter and “Internal” Perception 
 
 Studies of meter often refer to metric processes as being “internal” or “underlying” as a 
way of distinguishing perceptual experience from observable physical action. For example, 
psychological experiments on temporality have purported “to gain insight into the internal 
representation of temporal patterns” (Povel and Essens 1985, 411) or to investigate “the 
underlying timing mechanisms in a sequential analysis of performed patterns” (Beauvillian and 
Fraisse 1984, 488). In a survey of the many “tapping” experiments, Bruno Repp summarized the 
dominant information-processing approach as a way of “describing hypothetical internal 
processes underlying behavior” (Repp 2005, 970) and rhythm perception was viewed as a form 
of “covert synchronization”(Repp 2005, 978). And Justin London’s theory of metric perception 
is based on the premise that “our attention literally ‘moves with the music,’ and this engenders 
and encourages our bodily movements” (London 2012, 5). However, it is unclear—and varies 
from source to source—what exactly is meant by adjectives such as “internal” and “underlying” 
(or sometimes “covert”). Is it by definition that metric processes are “internal,” or is an 
assumption of internality based on certain contexts? How does it relate to perception? To 
observability? To physical anatomy? 
 In this section, I view disciplinary trends from a different viewpoint, offering examples in 
which a notion of “internality” forms a part of metric discussions and arguing that it ties into a 
longer historical trend of a metaphorical mind being separate from—and valued more than—
physical and metaphorical bodies. I construct what I consider to be a music theoretical 
mainstream, using sources which lack much self-awareness about the implications that come 
from a reference to something being “internal.” Assuming that perception and meter are 
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“internal” or “underlying” constructs a wedge between observable actions and temporal 
knowledge, for example. I’ll begin by looking at early experiment-driven psychological studies 
on meter perception in the 1980s. Then I’ll trace how those assumptions have persisted and 
concretized in recent work, while also acknowledging countercurrents. 
 Just as Longuet-Higgins and Lee’s 1982 “The Perception of Musical Rhythm” set up a 
persistent equivalence between music perception and listening, Povel and Essens’s 1985 
investigation of the “Perception of Temporal Patterns” constructed an idea of temporal 
perception as internal through reference to an “internal clock.” Thirty years after Povel and 
Essens’s experiments, the findings seem rather banal. They found that participants’ reproduction 
of rhythmic patterns is significantly better when a pattern is more easily integrated with a regular 
beat than when it is not. Additionally, they found that a 12-beat pattern of onsets will be heard as 
a different pattern when paired with isochronous low-pitch beats of three pulses each than when 
paired with beats of four pulses each. However, it’s important to note that—although I’ll be 
showing how their notion of perception is now restrictive—it was, at the time, an attempt to open 
the notion of perception to be more subjective. Their work sought to eliminate the idea there was 
only a single possible perception given a sounded temporal pattern. In their words: 
Most essential is that it does not make sense to speak of the perception of a temporal 
pattern without further qualification. We have given evidence showing that the internal 
representation of a pattern completely depends on whether, and which, clock is internally 
induced (Povel and Essens 1985, 437). 
 
The fact that perception is now treated as subjective and contextually malleable can be taken as a 
sign of their project’s success. That said, it is worth digging into their conceptual substrate, as it 
has concretized into the foundation for later scholarly work. 
 Povel and Essens explained that the purpose of their experiments was “to gain insight into 
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the internal representation of temporal patterns, [by studying] the perception and reproduction of 
tone sequences.” Their basic assumption was “that perceivers try to generate an internal clock 
while listening to a temporal pattern.” And further, “it is assumed that if a clock is induced in the 
perceiver, it will be used as a measuring device to specify the temporal structure of the pattern” 
(Povel and Essens 1985, 411). They use “clock” simply to mean something that measures 
temporal intervals. For them, “a basic notion underlying the development of the present model is 
that time, and therefore sequences of temporal intervals, can only be assessed by means of a 
clock” (Povel and Essens 1985, 413). For Povel and Essens, “clock” broadly means anything that 
measures time, but more specifically anything consisting of a periodic pulse and counter. 
However, for temporal perception in music, they qualify this notion of clock as being “internal,” 
and justify the qualification by stating that temporal intervals in music simply cannot be assessed 
by means of an external clock. Presumably the qualification that perceptual clocks be “internal” 
is primarily a marker that “clock” is not being used in the everyday sense. It does not refer to the 
physical time-keeping machines on our walls and wrists, but rather refers to a sort of human 
counting potential. However, they fail to offer much clarification about what they mean by 
internal, and not having done so, strap additional baggage to the concept of perception. They 
could have characterized our biological counting potential as, for example, an “embodied clock,” 
which would also distinguish it from clock machines in the everyday use of the term. Opting 
instead for “internal clock” yields other associations. Even if they only meant internal clock to 
mean “not a machine,” it takes on additional meaning, such as “not external” and “not 
observable.” 
 Theorizing the concept of an internal clock can obscure the relation to the observable 
actions from which these studies draw their information. For Povel and Essens, “it is well known 
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that the foot tapping of music listeners, itself interpretable as reflecting their internal clock, is 
mainly determined by the occurrence of accented events in the music” (Povel and Essens 1985, 
414). Foot tapping (an observable action) is assumed to reflect metric perception (the “internal 
clock”), but the details of such a correspondence aren’t made clear. The set-up seems to 
construct a separation between actions such as foot tapping on the one hand, and internal 
representations (and perceptions) on the other. The authors could have allowed foot tapping to 
form part of one’s (internal) metric clock, in that it provides the periodic pulse to be counted. 
This is an idea I would argue. Technically, that isn’t necessarily ruled out by the quotation, but it 
takes a rather generous reading to arrive at some sort of integrated embodied concept from a 
statement like that one. The more straightforward reading of their statement is that foot tapping is 
not internal, and not part of one’s internal clock. In this reading, foot tapping is an external 
representation of a temporal pattern, facilitated by one’s internal clock. The observable actions 
are, in other words, valuable for providing information about the “internal clock” without 
constituting part of it.18 
 Robert Gjerdingen’s “Meter as a Mode of Attending” (1989) also moves the discussion of 
meter to the realm of the “internal,” but it does so as matter of possible context by focusing 
anatomically on activity of neurons in the brain. Much like Povel and Essens, Gjerdingen looks 
for a “metronome inside of us… capable of ticking to the beat.” And to find such a timepiece, “if 
it is in the mind that we fashion a musical metronome, that metronome must in all probability be 
constructed of interconnected neurons” (Gjerdingen 1989, 70-71). He constructs a model of an 
                                                 
18 There is good reason to view foot tapping as a non-essential part of metric perception, 
because foot tapping isn’t necessary to perceive musical periodicity. However, being non-
essential should not eliminate it. This is the sort of distinction I discussed previously in relation 
to Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s concept of a “comprehensive” music theory and London’s argument 
for a “primary medium” of music as sound. 
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oscillator for this neuronal activity, without being too restrictive that this be the way of 
processing periodic information. His article is delightfully self-aware of its exploratory nature. 
“The point of the preceding simulations has not been to suggest that anyone knows exactly how 
the human brain is able to synchronize itself with a musical meter. Nor is any claim made that 
the brain keeps the beat with these exact neural mechanisms” (Gjerdingen 1989, 78). 
Gjerdingen’s main point was to allow meter to also be in the brain. It was a way of saying that 
human physical biological rhythms, like acoustic music, can have “meter” (by which he means 
being periodic and hierarchical). He never defines musical meter as only in the brain. Instead, he 
posits how it might be in the brain, and limits his discussion to hypothetical brain activity. We 
can summarize his work’s “internality” as a matter of scope (not of definition) and of physical 
anatomy (since he is concerned mainly with neuronal activity). That internality is never assumed 
as a matter of fundamental definition. As such, Gjerdingen’s article can be understood as 
opening the discussion of meter as regularity not just in music sound, but also in us. 
 This search for that meter “in us” can generally characterize the interest of music 
psychology. However, Gjerdingen’s exploratory tone of possibility has been lost in music theory. 
A major premise of Justin London’s work, for example, involves fundamentally defining meter 
as attentional entrainment. For him, meter is “a stable and recurring pattern of hierarchically 
structured temporal expectations” (London 2002, 529).19 Such a definition of meter as 
expectation likely reflects the psychological focus of London’s work. The psychological 
experiments on which that theory is drawn, on the other hand, generally do not use an 
experiential definition of meter. Those experiments are sometimes rarely based on recent and 
                                                 
19 This definitional shift of meter as experience has been traced in Roger Mathew Grant’s 
dissertation “Four Hundred Years of Meter: Theories, Ideologies, and Technologies of Musical 
Periodicity since 1611” (2010). 
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nuanced music theory, but, more importantly, the interest in (internal) perception from the start 
does not require any change of definition for “meter.” In other words, meter need not be defined 
as perceptual in order to study the perception of periodicity. 
 As the focus of studies shifted toward internal perception, observable actions, such as 
tapping, have been put in an awkward, secondary position. The position is awkward, because 
experiments on temporal perception cannot involve direct observation of a participant’s 
attention. Researchers instead infer information about those internal processes via external 
actions such as tapping. The rationale for such inferences rests on an assumption that one’s 
internal attention facilitates synchronized tapping. London, for example, states that “tapping 
studies involve not only attention but also action, a behavior (tapping in synchrony) that depends 
on rhythmic attending” (London 2004, 12). In studying cross-cultural difference in meter 
perception, Beste Kalendar, Sandra Trehub, and E. Glenn Schellenberg similarly note that 
“although such music may sound irregular or ‘jerky’ to Western ears, listeners in those cultures 
perceive the tactus in the music, as reflected in their tapping or dancing.” (Kalendar et al 2013, 
196). In other words, if you’re physically tapping to the music, you must have been perceiving 
the beat. 
 It’s easy to slip into epistemological trouble here. To conceive of metric perception as 
“internal” presumably makes those external, observable tapping actions not internal, and not 
perceptual, at least not directly. And yet, those very same actions are also viewed as deeply 
entangled with perceptions, so much so that taps performed in experiments are treated as 
isochronous indicators of internally felt beats. And there isn’t much other information to use 
besides those external actions. The trouble here may be a relic of constructing metric perception 
as an “internal clock” and pushing physical actions into a separate category, despite needing to 
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draw an equivalence when analyzing experimental data. This sort of tension reflects a deeper 
disciplinary bias toward metaphorical and physical minds over bodies and aligns with feminist 
critiques by Suzanne G. Cusick (for example, “Feminist Theory, Music Theory, and the 
Mind/Body Problem,” 1994). 
 David Lewin offered an early reaction against the mainstream notion of perception in 
music theory along with an call to expand what constitutes perception. Lewin criticized the 
“X/Y” paradigm in which “a ‘listener’ X is ‘perceiving’ some ‘music’ Y that is demonstrably 
other-than-X.” His solution was to open theory to include not just musical perception but also “a 
broader study of what we call people’s ‘musical behavior’” (Lewin 1986, 375). Lewin’s proposal 
was to consider musical behavior as a worthwhile category of perception. He cautioned that “one 
cannot simple-mindedly divorce constructive creation from perceptive understanding, as if the 
one could occur without the other, or at least without some experience of the other” (Lewin 
1986, 380). Reacting specifically against previous perceptual theories, such as Lerdahl and 
Jackendoff’s, he aimed to bridge this gap by considering musical actions as a mode of 
perception. He gives the example of returning home after a concert and playing excitedly at the 
piano as an act of perception, rather than a mere aid to perception, or an aid to the memory of a 
perception. 
 Approaches under the umbrella of “embodied cognition” align with Lewin’s expanded 
notion of perception, though they have not yet become typical in studies of meter.20 As Margaret 
Wilson (2002) explains, “embodied cognition” emerged against traditional cognitive science 
                                                 
20 Approaching meter through the lens of embodied cognition is not typical, but it is also not 
entirely uncharted. Among others, Mariusz Kozak (2015, for example) brings embodied 
cognition research into the area of metric theory. His work involves motion capture technology 
to provide analytical information about the experiences or particular pieces of music. 
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approaches in which perceptual and motor systems merely provide input and output for the 
central processor of the mind. She depicts embodied cognition generally as involving “a growing 
commitment to the idea that the mind must be understood in the context of its relationship to a 
physical body that interacts with the world” (Wilson 2002, 625). Appealing to the biological and 
evolutionary importance of motor behavior for perception, embodied perspectives blur the 
distinction between centralized, abstract cognition on the one hand and input and output modules 
of sensorimotor processes on the other. However, as Wilson also notes—and in fact, it is the 
primary point of her article—“embodied cognition” is not a single idea. It has come to involve 
multiple different claims, including the ideas that we off-load cognitive work onto the 
environment, that cognition is for action, and that offline cognition is body based (Wilson 2002, 
625). Experimental data has corroborated that a relationship between metric perception (“mind”) 
and physical entrainment (“body”) is entangled beyond some central processing that facilitates 
action. In a neurological study of the brain, Daniel Cameron and Jessica Grahn (2014) found that 
listening to music with or without a beat creates widespread activity in the cortical motor system, 
and in the supplementary motor area and premotor cortex more specifically (Cameron and Grahn 
2014, 111). This neurological linkage aligns generally with the embodied notion of cognition 
being for actions. But there is additional research suggesting that action can be, or can aid in, 
perception. Jessica Phillips-Silver and Laurel J. Trainor’s study “Hearing what the body feels: 
Auditory encoding of rhythmic movement” (2007) found that instructions to move (by bending 
at the knees) influenced perception of auditory rhythmic structures. The researchers argued that 
auditory input can give rise to sympathetic movements, but so too can movement influence the 
processing of auditory information. Hence their expression “hearing what the body feels” 
(Phillips-Silver and Trainor 2007, 544). Claire McCoy and Mark Ellis’s (1992) experiments with 
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college-aged non-musicians support this possibility. In those experiments, participants were 
given tasks to discriminate recorded excerpts of music as metrically “duple,” “triple,” or “other,” 
and their accuracy was compared with the type of instructions given. One group received verbal 
instructions (defining “meter,” “duple,” “triple,” etc.). Another group was given a click track, 
faded in and out as the excerpt played. And the third group was instructed to engage in various 
large muscle movements along with music (marching to the beat, stepping to the pulse while 
tapping the thigh or clapping accented pulses, stepping on the accented pulse and clapping 
unaccented pulses, and pulling ropes with a partner such that changes of direction coincided with 
new measures). Although all groups showed some improvement against a control with no 
instructions, the students who engaged in “large muscle movements” showed the best results. 
 Disability studies by Jessica Grahn and Matthew Brett (2009) in a study of patients with 
Parkinson’s disease corroborate this point. They found that dysfunction in the basal ganglia—
which is the part of the brain involved in coordinating movement—was associated with impaired 
ability to perceive and discriminate between beat-based rhythms. The discrimination tasks did 
not require physical actions of the kind that participants had difficulties coordinating. The 
implication is that action forms a productive part of perceptual processes, whether or not an 
action is actually performed in the task at hand. Parkinson’s disease patients did not need to 
observably move in order to carry out those judgement tasks, but nonetheless their motor 
limitations correlated with difficulty making sense of temporal information. 
 Recent work by Mariusz Kozak (2015) incorporates embodied cognition into studies of 
musical temporality, though not meter studies specifically. His inquiry starts from the 
assumption that individuals’ “bodily experiences meaningfully structure their understanding of 
musical sounds” as opposed to simply being external reflections of internal processes. He 
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positions his work generally in line with Carolyn Abbate’s notion of “drastic” real-life 
performative experience (Kozak 2015, 1.8) and more specifically with David Lewin’s active 
“transformational” notion of perception. Lewin’s model considers listeners as actively going 
from one place to another or doing something to a Klang, rather than passively witnessing 
motion and change in something else. Kozak notes that Lewin’s transformational gestures are 
used metaphorically, but do not fully reconceive of perception as “a process that is integrally 
yoked with action” (Kozak 2015, 2.6). Kozak extends Lewin’s sentiment by exploring the 
movements of real, embodied listeners using motion capture devices. However, Kozak makes a 
point that his approach does not represent the music theoretical mainstream and that 
incorporating listeners’ actual bodies into music analysis also poses its own set of challenges.21 
 In light of experimental findings such as Cameron and Grahn’s and Phillips-Silver and 
Trainor’s, the notion of an “internal clock” should be aligned with notions of embodied 
temporality to avoid sidelining actions as mere output of a perceptual system. We should attempt 
to clarify when “internality” is employed to mean unobservable, without implying or defining 
perception as only internal. This makes room for possibilities of embodied cognition, in which 
actions form a more productive part of the perceptual system. I will suggest that the notion of 
internality can also be a qualifier that expands the relevance of embodied actions. Given the 
psychological and neurological findings pairing temporal perception with sensorimotor behavior, 
it may be worth considering temporal perception as involving internalized action. In other words, 
we may “go through the motions” of synchronizing our body with music without actually 
moving our bodies. For this reason, our brain neurons would fire up for movement just the same. 
                                                 
21 Kozak notes that gestures may be “attenuated…or too fleeting and idiosyncratic to 
contribute to a rigorous theoretical inquiry (Kozak 2015, 1.7). 
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 There is already value placed on embodied action in metric pedagogy. Dalcrozian 
pedagogy, for example, teaches rhythmic development through movement. How often is a 
music’s temporal structure difficult to follow until having physically tapped out beats? Or, 
imagine the common situation of a student unable to find the meter of a piece until after being 
asked to conduct along with it. I would like to consider such motions as themselves serving as 
counting mechanisms of an embodied clock. Once you (or the student) are able to follow metric 
structure without needing to move, we might say that those actions have simply become 
internalized. And perhaps that would be the best way of characterizing perception as an “internal 
clock.”22 Motor neurons in the brain would “have” meter as they imagine physical entrainment 
with music, even if they don’t actually send out axonal signals for muscles to contract. Chapter 







                                                 
22 This rebranding of “internal” as internalized action, need not only be applied to temporal 
issues in music. In teaching melodic perception, singing is often used an aid to ear training. One 
might consider melodic dictation as involving some degree of internalized singing. Indeed, I 
recall being terrible at dictation despite extensive experience listening. Only once I focused on 
my ability to sing, did melodic dictation improve. 
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1.3 Notation and Perceptual Representation 
 
 Modern Western staff notation (henceforth “notation”)—as well as some other forms of 
music notation—is a static, visual object which can represent dynamic, sounded events. As such, 
it has a complex relationship with music. Its visual medium has led to charges of “unmusicality” 
and to omission from experimental designs (for example, London 2009, Clarke and Krumhansl, 
1990). And the fact that it is not a universally necessary component of music subordinates its 
status in music theory (for example, see the previous discussion of Lerdahl and Jackendoff 
1983). Even with the starting point that notation is not music(al), it nonetheless has a range of 
important musical uses. Notation can give instructions to performers about what notes to play, in 
what order, and for how long. It can also express musical structures associated with concepts 
embedded in the entire Western notational-pedagogical system. If someone says “I hear the high 
note as the downbeat to a measure of 3/4,” they are expressing temporal experience using the 
language of the Western notation system, though the reference may be only to an imagined 
score. Engagement in music theoretical discourse takes for granted a fluency in the Western 
notational system. Notated analytical examples abound, if often with qualifications, reservations, 
or larger critiques. In this section, I present issues surrounding Western notation, in particular: 1) 
variability in training and literacy, 2) cultural specificity, 3) its simplistic representation of sound 
objects, and 4) its inadequacy in reflecting musical experience. These issues motivate caution 
and criticism, but do not warrant exclusion. 
 For Western art music, learning to read staff notation involves a specialized sort of training 
which usually goes hand in hand with instrumental music lessons. Notation gives the order and 
length of pitches to be played, providing partial instructions for a performance. As students 
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progress, reading staff notation begins to involve more theoretical and aural knowledge. It 
requires an abstract grasp of the system, such as what combination of notes will last a measure of 
a certain meter, or that G# and Ab are played on the same piano key. It also involves connecting 
abstract “mathematical” relationships to aural experiences about how intervals and rhythms will 
sound and feel. This could mean following a score to a piece of music as it is played. It might 
also mean singing the notes given on a page or “internally hearing” a new piece of music given 
only the score. By representing sound, notation can also communicate aspects of heard music to 
others, through transcription, for example. All these skills are aspects of notational literacy, and 
“literacy” can refer to those aspects individually as well as their total. Achieving literacy is 
intertwined with the formal Western music training apparatus and varies widely in degree. 
Because of the many different skills associated with notation—sight reading and singing, 
dictation and transcription, and score analysis—variations in literacy are not a simple spectrum 
from better to worse. This all adds up to the point that notation is esoteric and variable even 
among the initiated. Along with the fact that it is not an acoustic sound object, it is a messy 
variable for controlled laboratory experiments. 
 Western notation has limitations which give rise to its cultural specificity. It excels at 
providing a symbolic shorthand for the order of notes and durational ratios, but struggles at 
representing subtleties of intonation and rhythmic timing. Indeed, the idea that a rhythm can be 
represented by notes at all, with perfect fraction durations, and discrete note names turns a 
continuous spectrum of pitches into discrete quantities. Wrapped up in Western music pedagogy, 
notation is both subjective and intertwined with culturally specific concepts, such as “note” and 
“meter.” As such, ethnomusicologists have been wary that using it for non-Western music might 
be forcing that object to fit a Western mold. Charles Seeger wrote that 
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In employing this mainly prescriptive notation as a descriptive sound-writing of any 
music other than the Occidental fine and popular arts of music… we single out what 
appear to us to be structures in the other music that resemble structures familiar to us in 
the notation of the Occidental art and write these down, ignoring everything else for 
which we have no symbol (Seeger, 1958, 186) 
 
Part of Seeger’s concern arose from his consideration of notation as prescriptive, telling 
performers what to do, as opposed to descriptive, representing the musical object. His concern 
was that elements of music which are not given notational symbols are in danger of being 
ignored or undervalued. Twenty years later, Jairazbhoy (1977) comments that this fear may be 
overstated. As ethnomusicologists have made attempts to immerse themselves in the musical 
cultures they study, they look for musical aspects which Western notation fails to acknowledge. 
One attempt at solving this problem has been to simply construct new symbols (Jairazbhoy 1977, 
270). Otto Abraham and Erich von Hornbostel codified a larger set of notational possibilities 
which ethnomusicologists might use in the transcription of field recordings. However, they note 
that the stopgap of creating additional symbols falls short for indicating various tone colors 
(Abraham and von Hornbostel 1994, 433-434). They suggest using either verbal annotations, 
such as “trumpet-like,” or constructing a lettered key for the specific piece of music being 
transcribed. Using annotations in addition to special symbols provides more detail, but is not 
entirely sufficient. 
 The desire to explore aspects of music ignored or warped by symbolic notation has been a 
recurring source of discussion for theorists as well as ethnomusicologists. When 
ethnomusicologist Charles Keil sought to explore the “engendered feeling” of “groove” or 
“swing” that induces movement in listeners, he criticized music theory for lacking adequate 
language to describe it. Part of the problem for Keil was that the sense of groove did not emerge 
from anything that might be represented by standard rhythmic notation. In response, he 
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constructed a framework of “participatory discrepancies” to describe that expressive microtiming 
(Keil, 1994). Theorists such as Matthew Butterfield (2006, 2010) have expanded upon his work. 
Similarly, Fernando Benadon’s “Slicing the Beat: Jazz Eighth-Notes as Expressive 
Microrhythm” (2006), explores the variety of timing differences among notationally equivalent 
“swung” eighth-notes.23 The complexity of music sound beyond what standard notation 
expresses has not received as much attention from psychologists, on the other hand. In exploring 
the “nonharmonious” relationship between music psychology and theory, Nicholas Cook (1994) 
details criticisms of perceptual psychologists for being insufficiently trained in music to 
understand its complexities: they assume that music is simply “made out of notes” (Cook, 1994, 
81).24 No doubt, assuming music to be “made out of notes” helps clean up the discussion and 
results, but it continues the trend of psychological approaches simplifying the musical objects of 
study. This is understandable, as psychologists typically use music as a means of exploring 
aspects of brain function, as opposed to exploring nuances of musical objects. 
 Notation, in addition to being an imperfect representation of sound, has also been used as a 
representation of the experience of those sounds. Longuet-Higgins and Lee’s paper “The 
Perception of Musical Rhythm” (1982) states, for example, that “musical notation provides a 
very strong clue as to what relationships are perceived when one hears a melody; more precisely, 
we feel that the concepts of ‘beat,’ ‘metre,’ and ‘bar’ are of central importance in the perception 
of music” (Longuet-Higgins and Lee 1982, 115). Similarly, Povel and Essens assumed that, 
                                                 
23 Benadon’s (2006) discussion of rhythmic nuance uses the term “expressive microrhythm,” 
no “participatory discrepancy.” 
24 Cook notes that the tension between music psychology and theory goes both ways. 
Theorists criticize psychologists for simplistic views on music, while psychologists are critical of 
the cavalier usage of “perception” (among other things) by theorists (Cook, 1994, 67). 
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given a metrically ambiguous stimulus, notation could induce “musical intuitions” based upon a 
score (Povel and Essens, 1985, 437). Joel Lester’s struggle with Babbitt’s Composition for Four 
Instruments (1986, discussed previously in section 1.1) stemmed not only from non-
correspondence between perceptions of performers and listeners, but from the possibility that a 
scoreless listener might not perceive what is given in the composer’s score. He questions: “how 
could a listener ever know to subdivide that measure-long pulse into twelfths (eighth triplets) so 
that that listener could understand the duration from the downbeat of measure 3 to the cello Ab 
as 5/12 of that measure pulse?” (Lester, 1986, 123-4). And he follows up with a rhetorical 
challenge for any listener who has never seen the score of Babbitt’s piece to recreate it only by 
listening to the piece (Lester, 1986, 126). His concept of notation involves subjective 
interpretation of sound structures, and one which should reflect the experience of those sounds 
by a scoreless listener. 
 Lester’s concern over metric notation reflecting perception is rather general. His issue was 
that a scoreless listener’s temporal perception of Babbitt’s music would bear little resemblance at 
all to the composer’s score, and he places the burden of responsibility primarily on the 
composition. Inquiries by other theorists have taken a more detailed approach in comparing 
metric notations to perceptual experience. Russell Jones (1985), for example, compared 
approaches to meter by Serafine, Gordon, Cooper and Meyer, and Yeston and came to the 
conclusion that “there is virtually unanimous agreement that meter signatures are often not 
consistent with the ways in which rhythms are perceived and/or performed. The main 
disagreements have to do with how metric patterns are perceived or subjectively organized” 
(Russell Jones, 1985, 54). In subsequent decades, various models for temporal perception have 
emerged out of this starting point that metric notation is deficient in some way. 
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 Justin London (2004) constructed circular loop notation, because “what is never fully 
notated in our familiar system…is meter.” His problem with traditional notation is that it is 
essentially “a continuous graph of pitch and time” (or “a long ribbon”) which obscures the cyclic 
nature of entrainment (London, 2004, 60). He does not claim that a patterned ribbon cannot 
represent cyclicity, but that a ribbon simply makes it less apparent. As London points out, 
analysts in the past have updated notation in several ways to provide metric information. Riepel, 
for example, used numbers below the staff. Lerdahl and Jackendoff constructed hierarchies of 
dots. And Zuckerkandl added metric “wave” annotations (London, 2004, 62-3). Christopher 
Hasty (1997) has also taken issue with static set of homogenous grids associated with notation 
and with these normative metric perspectives in general. His book Meter as Rhythm approaches 
meter to highlight the experiential process of becoming (through what he terms “projection”). 
His project aims to incorporate in meter the “creativity, spontaneity, and particularity that we 
often ascribe to rhythm” (Hasty 1997, 6), and critiques scientific theory for importing ideas 
which fail to account for the aesthetic, dynamic experience of perceiving music in time. For 
Hasty, constructing a set of metric types and grouping examples into categories such as “3/4,” for 
example, ignores processes specific to individual pieces. 
 Notation—along with the general Western musical concepts associated with it—is in a 
difficult position in music theory. Its role as a set of instructions for how to produce sounds is 
generally neglected. Instead, it straddles being a representation of sound and a representation of 
the way sound is experienced. And this awkwardness occurs in addition to fact that it involves 
translation of dynamic sound and aural-temporal experience into static symbols. Some aspects 
are standardized and normalized while others are ignored entirely. Theorists and 
ethnomusicologists discussed in this section have criticized notation for its imperfect 
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representations and non-aural medium. Psychologists have been criticized for treating music 
sound like its notation (Cook 1994). And psychological experiments on music go out of their 
way to avoid giving participants notational information. How often have we been told that the 
notation is not the actual music? Or that to merely read and look for relationships in a score is 
insufficient without a proper aural experience of sound. These are valid complaints, but they can 
also obfuscate productive features of notation. Some “imperfections” of representation can also 
be special features to exploit. 
 For all the critique that Western notation gets, it is worth also considering its active role in 
shaping the way we experience sound. Notation may focus upon aspects of sound and discretize 
continuous spectra, but its thorough intertwinement with our musical educational system means 
that those distortions and omissions may become real parts of our experience, at least for those 
thoroughly trained in the Western system. Uninterpreted sound may not be “made out of notes,” 
but if we’re trained to hear notes, it can be experienced as such. Notation may actually represent 
musical experience better than it has been given credit, but only as we learn to experience what 
is notated. This may relate to Diane Persellin’s (1992) interviews with first, third, and fifth 
graders about musical memory. She found varied answers in terms of modality were affected by 
age. Some relied on hearing, others on printed visuals, and others on kinesthetic memory. 
Younger students (first graders) were less engaged with the visual stimuli, suggesting notational 
aptitude may change significantly around these ages. 
 Respecting notation as more than a caricature of sounds begins by taking a performer’s 
perspective. Scores and notation provide incomplete instructions (though no instructions are 
complete) and their “distortions” can be productive and meaningful, despite being culturally 
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specific constructions.25 At some point, we moved away from notation as a trace of something 
you do whether or not the person reading that notation is the performer of the piece. Nicholas 
Brown is sharply critical of this move as an erasure of the link between sound and gesture. 
Indeed, it is tempting to recall the development of Western music, its close historical ties 
to the church with its Augustinian denigration of carnality, and the maturation of music 
from pure performance into the dualist, notation-authorized program that provided a 
platform for the Stravinsky-Schoenberg legacy and score-based ‘accounts’ of the musical 
experience. Modern notation reflects this ‘misunderstanding of the being of the human 
body’. As an elaborate system, it makes a kind of musical scientism that exerts a level of 
control over natural phenomena, whether sounds, or the human gestures that comprise 
their origin. (Brown 2006, 42) 
 
 
Brown’s criticism stems from the value placed on listeners’ perspectives at the expense of 
performers’, and his argument fits with this project by pushing for a more “performative” 
conception of score, which links gestures to sounds. Brown also connects this problem to larger-
scale disciplinary scientism and cultural erasure of bodies which I address in section 1.6. In 
subsequent chapters, I allow scores a more fundamental role in musical experience, but without 
assuming that a score-based account is adequate for all musical variables. Additionally, scores 
factor in alongside complementary embodied accounts, and those accounts help avoid the erasure 




                                                 
25 Joseph Dubiel offered a good analogy to spoken language on this point. Transcribed 
speech may involve breaking apart a continuous stream of sound into discrete words, but I can’t 
imagine considering this a “distortion” of the sound. Instead it is a necessary move that helps 
move toward linguistic meaning. 
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1.4 General and Specific Training for Temporal Tasks 
 
 Music psychologists usually acknowledge the musical background of an experiment’s 
participants in a very general sense, as a potential variable which affects performance. Olivia 
Ladinig’s study of meter in “adult listeners without extensive music training” found that mental 
representation of meter “does not require advanced formal training” while also conceding that 
this “does not rule out the possibility that …[it] can be improved by musical training” (Ladinig 
2009, 385). Other researchers such as Clarke and Krumhansl, in a study on meter perception 
(1990), made a point that their participants were “musicians with a considerable amount of 
performing experience,” but offer only a vague sense that this “may also be significant” (Clarke 
and Krumhansl 1990, 250). Comparative studies differentiate between participants as “novices” 
(people with little or no formal musical training) or “musicians” (often undergraduate music 
majors) to explore performance differences between the groups (Küssner 2014, Vuust et al 
2005). Music theorists also make this sort of general distinction between musicians and non-
musicians, though with greater preference toward the experience of musically trained people 
(like themselves). The basic premise of Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s Generative Theory of Tonal 
Music was to formally describe “the musical intuitions of a listener who is experienced in a 
musical idiom” (Lerdahl and Jackendoff 1983, 1). For them, “a listener without sufficient 
exposure to an idiom will not be able to organize in any rich way the sounds he perceives.” 
(Lerdahl and Jackendoff 1983, 3). In all of these cases, having a musical background is clearly 
important, but it remains unclear what constitutes “sufficient exposure,” “experience,” 
“expertise,” or “training.” These variations in terminology are frequently given vague or overly 
broad definitions. Defining musical training as a number of years of study, for example, does not 
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provide much detail about what was studied during that time, nor to the quality of that study. 
Considering musical background very broadly as something you have or do not aligns with 
psychology’s goals toward generalizability, but there have also been efforts (particularly in the 
last twenty years) toward exploring more individuated categories of musical background. 
  Among terms such as “musical training,” “musical experience,” or “musical background,” 
little fuss has been made trying to give these individual terms distinct definitions, presumably 
because their definitions are rather fuzzy anyway. For this reason, I will not make much effort to 
distinguish between the variations in terminology. Among these variations, Kuck et al’s (2003) 
definition for “trained musicians” is rather typical. They define musical training according to the 
number of years of formal training one has had. In their article, the threshold is five or more 
years of formal musical training on a melodic instrument or singing in choir. (Curiously, none of 
their participants played percussion.) Other definitions are broader. Nozaradan et al.’s study of 
neuronal entrainment used eight participants who all had “musical experience,” either as 
performers with fifteen to twenty-five years of practice, or “as amateur listeners or dancers” 
(Nozaradan et al. 2011, 10234). Including amateur listeners is an unusually broad concept of 
musical experience indeed. Amateur listeners are exposed to plenty of music, but perhaps not in 
the same way (or degree) as someone with fifteen (or twenty-five) years of performance practice. 
Mari Riess Jones et al.’s experiments on attentional flexibility also divided participants based 
upon musical experience, by separating 199 undergraduate psychology students into “high-skill” 
and “low-skill” categories. The “high-skill” group was comprised of students who had played an 
instrument for at least ten hours in the last month and had four or more years of formal musical 
training on an instrument. The “low-skill” group included only students who had not played a 
musical instrument in the last month and who had had less than two years of formal music 
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training (none of which could be recent). Jones’ category for “high-skill” requires a minimum 
threshold for training, but there’s no upper limit. There is no differentiation between someone 
with four years of training and someone with fourteen. Participants who noodled around for ten 
hours in the past month fall into the same category as someone engaged in ten hours of 
structured practice per day. An undergraduate music minor would be considered “high-skill” 
alongside the prodigy guest soloist touring with a major orchestra. 
 The concept of “musical experience” not only includes variations in degree (i.e. how long 
you’ve been doing “music”), it also lumps together different types of training. Classical 
violinists, jazz drummers, and pop guitarists may have had the same amount of training (in years 
of study), but their training is qualitatively different. All have “musical backgrounds,” but spend 
time developing distinct musical skill sets. This wide range of traits subsumed under the heading 
of “musical experience” is an asset when one’s goal involves studying general cognitive skills 
and capacities—as much psychological study does. Maintaining a broad label such as “musically 
trained” helps argue for general applicability of a study to a wide range of people. Nozaradan et 
al.’s paper is just that sort of study. It seeks to show that neuronal entrainment is a general and 
observable phenomenon, and a broad sample set and general concept of musical training works 
in favor of that goal. 
 At the same time, Cameron and Grahn’s survey of neuroscientific studies of rhythm 
includes criticism regarding the comparison of musically trained and untrained groups. They 
considered distinctions based only on years of musical training as an imprecise first step. “In the 
normal human population there is a wide range of abilities and traits related to rhythm 
perception… Accounting for individual differences is becoming an increasingly apparent issue, 
with a wide range of rhythm abilities present in the normal population.” (Cameron and Grahn 
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2014, 114). Cameron and Grahn point to a couple of studies which are more sensitive to 
individual difference, but the point is made within the discussion of “future direction” for 
research. Roger Grant’s dissertation tracing the history of meter makes a similar point. He notes 
that interest among cognitive scientists in acknowledging and incorporating “local and individual 
knowledge” is growing, and he suggests that meter research is now “moving on from its 
generalizing moment” (Grant 2010, 288). That shift is evidenced by increasing numbers of 
studies which account for cultural specificity (e.g. Kalendar, Trehub, and Schellenberg 2013, 
Jacoby 2017). The esoteric strategies of smaller musical populations do not have as much 
immediate general applicability. However, they become relevant for people willing and able to 
engage similar sorts of training as those musical subgroups. Studying a few extraordinary cases 
will not serve to describe what most people already do, but it can serve to guide pedagogy in 
what people might be able to do if they undergo similar musical training. That aim is an 
important part of this dissertation.  
 It is difficult to tell which cognitive tendencies and limits found by psychologists are 
“fixed” in our biological system, and which result from individual training. In her editorial for 
the opening issue of Music Perception (1983), Diana Deutsch grappled with this problem as a 
possible issue for music psychology as a whole. The burgeoning field lacked (and still does) an 
absolute way of differentiating “fixed” or fundamental cognitive limits from those that result 
from training. Deutsch conceded that no clear answer can be obtained by laboratory experiments. 
“Negative results would not be conclusive, since it could always be argued that many years of 
long-term exposure might have produced positive results instead.” Her recommendation was that 
researchers instead make “inspired guesses” regarding the role of experience on cognitive 
capacity (Deutsch 1983, 2). She also urged an acknowledgement that experimental results may 
 47 
end up reflecting the historical-cultural moment in which participants (we) live. 
 All these differences in musical training refer to ways individual participants are generally 
prepared for the tasks that might be given by researchers in an experiment (or not). However, 
little attention has been paid to specific practice for tasks given. Or more precisely, experimenters 
often make a point that participants are not given any specific practice. If a task is familiar, the 
particular stimulus is new (e.g. Beauvillain and Fraisse 1984, Clarke and Krumhansl 1990, 
Tillman et al 2011). Even in Bruno Repp’s tapping studies, participants selected on the basis of 
being highly skilled (“master”) tappers—i.e. demonstrating a high degree of consistency and 
control over their tapping—did not enter an experiment knowing exactly what they would hear. 
It is often desirable to test participants with an unfamiliar stimulus. With the goal of observing 
the effects of certain aural variables on performance, giving participants time to practice does not 
advance that pursuit. Instead, practice time maximizes the success of an individual’s 
performance, potentially minimizes the sorts of deviations that experimenters want to find, and 
throws an extra variable into results.26 
 Psychological experiments might have little stake in getting participants the best possible 
performance, but that is precisely what musicians seek. That is why, when I have trouble 
following something’s temporal structure, I go back and try again. Cases where we come into 
contact with a piece over and over again can be aesthetically problematic when an important 
aesthetic effect is one of surprise, but in most cases extra study enriches musical experience. The 
first time I listened to the Mehldau and Rossy trio’s improvisation on “Anthropology,” I had an 
acute sense that my experience was somehow “wrong.” In their recording, the group 
                                                 
26 This point would not stand if practice itself were the variable to be tested. Experiments 
could determine which tasks are substantially affected by practice, and which not, but this 
avenue has received little attention. 
 48 
superimposes a triple meter feel over an underlying 32-bar structure based on “rhythm changes,” 
and I let the superimposed meter whisk me away. I lost a grip on the underlying song form. 
Being able to follow that passage took practice, transcription, and some listening to artificially 
slowed versions of the original recording. I, a percussionist with considerable training, am well 
prepared in general to confront metrically challenging music such as this, but my experience was 
unsatisfying until I found time for specific practice. During that practice time, I found special 
strategies to facilitate difficult temporal navigation. If I were asked to tap along before and after 
this specific practice, the results would no doubt be quite different. 
 Existing experiments which do not give participants specific practice do well to explain my 
unpracticed “failed” attempt at tracking Mehldau’s solo upon first hearing. In Treffner and 
Turvey’s work on “resonance constraints,” participants performing a regular action were 
instructed to continue that action while another competing stimulus was introduced. The study 
explored changes of the action to resonate with the competing stimulus, and the authors found 
that participants tend to make adjustments that simplified polyrhythmic ratios. In 
“Anthropology,” Mehldau’s superimposed triple feel introduced a competing stimulus which 
interfered with my ability to continue following the original song form. According to Treffner 
and Turvey’s experiment, I did what people generally do when given competing stimuli. In this 
case, the most natural tendency was not the best course of action. The path of more resistance is 
sometimes preferable. I argue that it is the difficulty provided by the metric competition which 
makes the improvisation more aesthetically powerful. It presents a challenge which is gratifying 
to overcome. 
 In sum, familiarity and specific practice can alter our responses to music and create a 
messy variables for psychological experiments. How much familiarity and practice does each 
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participant enter an experiment with? Did participants practice in different ways? Taking away 
that familiarity effectively levels the playing field and makes results easier to read. Doing so is 
also practical: participants perform a new task and finish without having to commit to practice 
time (or, in the case of compensated experiments, be paid for it). There are cases where a lack of 
prior knowledge is absolutely necessary. Studies on the learning of new timing patterns (Dell 
2010, Tillman et al. 2011) need to present fresh stimuli in order to witness the acquisition of new 
temporal pattern under controlled conditions. However, the main problem with this modus 
operandi begins when it occurs at the expense of acknowledging highly practiced tasks and 
responses to familiar pieces. Some musical contexts demand a high amount of work (practice) to 
experience a certain aesthetic possibility. In many cases, the most natural, naïve response to a 





1.5 Attentional Entrainment in Music Psychology 
 
 Discussions of temporal periodicity in music generally consider meter, perception, and 
listening together: to experience meter means to perceive temporal hierarchy by listening to 
sounds. With this sort of conceptual underpinning, work by Robert Gjerdingen (1989), Mari 
Riess Jones (1981, 1985, 1986, 1995, 1999, 2006) and Justin London (2002, 2004) has yielded a 
metrical theory of attentional entrainment, or “attending,” in which one’s attention synchronizes 
with the periodicities of external sound stimuli. 
 Mari Riess Jones (1976, 1981, 1985, 1986, 1987) pioneered the idea of meter perception 
as involving metrically modulated attention, and subsequently tested and honed it through 
various controlled experiments (1995, 1999, 2006). Her initial writing on meter perception 
(“Only Time Can Tell: On the Topology of Mental Space and Time” 1981) did not use the 
concept of attention in any central way. Instead, it focused on dynamic expectancies toward 
future events based upon invariants in a stimulus. Her goal early on was simply to have 
psychological theory account for future-oriented expectancies (which represent “positive time”) 
as well as retrieval and storage of codes in memory (“negative time”). At the time of her writing, 
this was a new move. She criticized existing research for failing to acknowledge “positive time-
based processes” and being preoccupied with “negative time.” She urged psychologists to 
formally represent “dynamic attentional energies, which thrust forward toward targets in the 
future and backward toward things past” (Jones 1981, 576), and that hope was primarily 
followed through her own subsequent work. 
 In Jones’s later research, attention (and attending) became more central. In her article on 
“attentional rhythmicity,” she outlines how previous approaches to attention (which were not 
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specifically about music) had not made adequate use of stimuli which were themselves rhythmic. 
She traces previous research in the 1950s through 1970s in which attention is considered as a 
filter, a resource of limited capacity, and a part of schema theory. Early models of attention as a 
filter were relatively simplistic. The regulation of informational flow through filters was treated 
as “all-or-none.” You either attend something or you do not. However, following Kahneman 
(1973), the model of a filter was scrapped in favor of one in which attention was treated as a 
resource of limited capacity. Thus, when experimenters introduce competing tasks for 
participants, performance declines in comparison to execution of tasks without the distracting 
variable. Resource capacity models were given subsequent refinement. Navon and Gopher 
(1979) considered the possibility of modality specific resource pools. They found that auditory 
signals present more interference for auditory tasks than with visual ones. Posner and Snyder 
(1975) added an additional distinction between “automatic attending,” which is not limited by 
attentional resource capacity, and “controlled attending,” which is. Their proposal for a concept 
of “automatic attending” accounted for the performance of highly practiced tasks without much 
awareness. “Controlled attending,” by contrast, described situations in which is more focused 
and requires an “original response.” 
 As Jones points out, these theories critically fail to address what “attentional energy” is, 
and what determines the limits on that capacity. In her words, “it is not clear from whence the 
resources, as attentional energy, come. Nor is it clear why and how these resources are actually 
task specific.” (Jones 1986, 15-16) For Jones, one problem is that the theories lack much 
predictive value. They give a banal finding about how distractions burden attentional resources 
(whatever those are), without being able to say much about the degree to which those resources 
will be burdened by various types of distractor. Another problem for Jones is that Posner and 
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Snyder’s distinction between “automatic” and “controlled” attending ends up being a simplistic 
dichotomy. It considers tasks that are performed either as expert or beginner, without room for 
intermediary stages or the development of skills through practice. In the 1970s, Ulrich Neisser 
offered another model for attention which offered a better account of skill development. Neisser 
tied attention to acquired perceptual schemas (drawing upon theory from Sir Frederick Bartlett). 
It’s a subtle difference, but his theory essentially argues that performance is determined by level 
of skill (i.e. the acquisition of schemas), not some fixed pool of resources. This avoids the vague 
concept of a “resource pool,” but that vagueness is essentially transferred to the concept of the 
“schema.” Jones points out that schema theory, just like a theory based upon attentional resource 
pools, similarly lacks predictive value beyond the idea that people improve through practice. 
 A recurring problem for filter, resource, and schema models of attention is the lack of 
temporal contexts they incorporate. More specifically, Jones points out that “time” was 
incorporated in terms of “processing time” (“the amount of time required to encode an isolated 
item”) or “absolute time” (the rate at which successive stimuli are given). However, these models 
did not acknowledge the effects that temporal patterning of events (i.e. rhythm and meter) might 
have on attention. Jones’s desire to incorporate rhythmic and metrical stimuli reflects her 
disciplinary affiliation to music. The omission of temporally patterned stimuli in attentional 
theory is rather obvious only after shifting “attention” from general psychological inquiry to 
music psychology. Jones’s larger career project involved setting up various experiments on 
attention in which the stimuli were temporally patterned. Her approach also attempted to 
concretize the concept of “attentional energy” from previously vague usage. Instead of allowing 
attention to be metaphorical, she required it to be “potentially measurable in terms of heightened 
amplitudes (or increased recruitment) associated with excited brain rhythms of particular 
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frequencies.” (Jones 1986, 20). In other words, whenever you are paying more attention, it must 
be potentially observable in brain activity. That may not be a completely satisfying concept of 
what attention is (or from whence it comes), but it does make a point of discussing attention in 
terms of neurological observables. 
 Drawing upon Jones’s early exploratory work, Gjerdingen’s article “Meter as a Mode of 
Attending” (1989) offered a possible neurological model connecting meter and attention. At the 
outset, Gjerdingen notes that the concept of attention in psychological literature is a bit of “a 
catchword for the many diverse aspects of human information processing that focus, filter, or 
otherwise guide our perceptions” (Gjerdingen 1989, 68). Among the many ways in which 
attention can be allocated, he considers one such mode—one “mode of attending”—that might 
be directed toward metrical patterns. This formulation remains rather open-ended. He claims 
only a certain mode of attending can be directed toward metrical patterns, but does not define 
meter perception as attending. The article focuses upon the idea that low-level processing in the 
form of neuronal oscillation might allow for complex perceptions. 
Later discussions by Jones (and London) fused the link between meter perception and 
attention. Jones’s 1999 article on “The Dynamics of Attending” (in collaboration with Edward 
Large) explains: 
Coordinated attending rhythms fashion a crude mime of an event's rhythm, an adaptive 
attentional cartoon of its shape in time. Thus, by virtue of dynamic mimicry, the attender 
“participates” in the rhythm of a remote event. Entrainment means that parts of an 
attender literally “match up” with certain time spans in the remote event, and in this sense 
attending is participatory. The resulting synchrony with temporally structured events 
functions as a form of direct knowing. (Jones and Large 1999, 153) 
 
Their work presents dynamic attending the mode of tracking time-varying events, without 
acknowledging the possibility of other modes of perception. Importantly, these “attending 
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rhythms” are defined as “internal oscillations” (Jones and Large 1999, 119). For Jones and 
Large, the “literal” match-up of these neuronal oscillations should be observable with brain scan 
technology, but physical gestures are not a direct component of the theory. Large clarifies this 
point in a related article “On Synchronizing Movements to Music,” proposing that “most likely, 
when people listen to a musical rhythm, they perceive a beat and a metrical structure in the 
rhythm, and these perceived patterns enable coordination with the music (Large 2000, 527 italics 
added). More recent experiments by Jones and other collaborators add nuances to the theory of 
attentional entrainment. In “Effects of Auditory Pattern Structure on Anticipatory and Reactive 
Attending” (2006), Jones, Moynihan Johnston, and Jennifer Puente, manipulated instructions 
given to participants to show that people have some control over their attention. Attention is not 
an entirely automatic, stimulus-driven response.27 
 One reason for involving the concept of attention in meter theory to begin with may be 
that it allows meter perception to happen internally. People can “feel” the beat of the music, even 
when not observably moving. Invoking attention may also be more intellectually attractive, 
injecting into research a sense of humanity and consciousness. Writing about attention in the 
general field of cognitive science, Bernhard Hommel commented on how conference papers 
dealing with attention seemed rather popular. 
Cognitive scientists love attention as a topic. In contrast to sensory and motor processes, 
say, which rather smell like hardware and mechanics, the concept of attention seems to 
directly connect to what makes us human… The drawback of this attractiveness is that 
concept is more often than not used as a wastebasket, a container that serves as a pseudo-
explanation for the phenomena we still fail to understand. (Hommel 2010, 121). 
 
Hommel’s comments are essentially a stronger, more critical version of Gjerdingen’s admission 
                                                 
27 Other work such as Carlile 2014 addresses this “cognitive steering” of participants. 
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that attention is a bit of a psychological “catchword.” Whether a catchword or wastebasket, it’s 
worth being aware that the application of attention might not be doing as much explanatory work 
as it seems to. Simply referring to internal entrainment might be good enough. 
 Regardless, the concept of attentional entrainment has since become less tentative, no 
doubt related to the existence of a more robust corpus of relevant laboratory experiments and 
theories which draw upon them. London’s Hearing in Time (2004)28 presents the most prominent 
theory of this sort, and draws explicitly upon Jones. London’s central premise is that meter is a 
form of entrainment in which a listener’s “attentional rhythms” phase lock with regularities of 
music sound (London 2004, 12). There is an important shift from Gjerdingen’s “Meter as a 
Mode of Attending” and Jones’s early research. First, London’s definition of meter is different. 
For Gjerdingen, “meter” refers to periodicity which might be present in music or in neuronal 
activity that perceives it. For London, “meter” is the perception of those regularities in music. 
Additionally, London’s concept of meter-as-perception is limited to attentional entrainment. 
There are no other ways to perceive musical periodicity. 
 London repackages Jones’s research (including reference to work by Gibson, Neisser, 
and Kahneman) for music theorists, including her point that “attention” corresponds to real brain 
activity. However, even if attention is potentially observable as neural brain activity, the primary 
source material involves bodily movement from which “attention” is deduced with the 
epistemological awkwardness discussed previously in relation to meter perception’s 
“internality.” An important concern of London’s is to outline various cognitive constraints upon 
attention. For example, he puts forth a “temporal envelope” on the intervals “that we can hear or 
perform as an element of a rhythmic figure” ranging from 100 milliseconds to 6 seconds on the 
                                                 
28 Note that London 2004 refers to the first edition. London 2012 is the second edition. 
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(London 2012, 27), and points to experimental evidence which found significant changes in 
behavior around these thresholds. Synchronizing one’s taps to interonset intervals (or IOIs) of 
around 5 to 6 seconds becomes more “reactive.” Participants consistently tapped just after the 
stimulus. London admits that cognitive constraints and thresholds are “heavily dependent on task 
and context,” (London 2012, 27) but changes of context do not fundamentally alter these 
constraints. For him, context may affect the precise numeric limits, but not the general ranges 
and order of magnitudes (London 2012, 28). 
 London’s theory of attentional entrainment, at least in its original 2004 version, denies 
the possibility of polymetric perception. Attention may only admit nested layers of oscillation 
which combine to form a single hierarchic “ground” for various rhythmic figures. Limits on 
attention are extrapolated based upon well-formedness rules of a figure-ground paradigm. 
London claims that “the need to maintain a single coherent ground seems to be universal” and 
that “thus, there is no such thing as a polymeter” (London 2004, 50; italics in original). Although 
he withdrew such strong wording from the second edition, it is important to trace where this 
proscription comes from. London’s meter is not just regularity, but a form of perception 
involving the synchronization of attention. In addition—although he does admit the potential for 
conscious control of attention—London’s usage focuses upon “the automatic and subliminal 
process of metric entrainment.” He bases this choice of focus on what he considers a typical 
musical situation, in which “we reflexively entrain to a rhythmic surface without conscious effort 
or volition” (London 2012, 68). This meter-as-attention, in other words, does not involve paying 
very much attention! Following metrically conflicting streams, on the other hand, is precisely the 
type of situation that does require effortful and active strategies of temporal navigation. With this 
conceptual background, his statement about polymeter could be qualified: so-called “polymeter” 
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is not perceptible by only passively attending without conscious effort. 
 The prohibition of polymetric perception is notably absent from London’s second edition 
of Hearing in Time (2012), which acknowledges recent embodied theories of meter perception. 
The newer edition also steps away from a concept of internal attention always guiding external 
actions. London nods toward the alternate possibility that metric entrainment not only “engages 
our sensorimotor system” but “may be the direct synchronization of our movement(s) to external 
rhythms.” (London 2012, 12). This offering takes into account more recent research, but 








1.6 Situating Metric Theory Trends into Music Theory’s General Biases 
 
It is now generally known that in all arts and disciplines, it is more honorable to be a 
person who works from true understanding, rather than manual labor. Thus it is far better 
to know how to do something, than it is to do something but not know how it is done. 
Indeed, physical activity is tantamount to slavery; reason, however, rules like a mistress. 
For unless the hand follows the will of reason, all will come to naught. Where could it be 
more evident that it is better to possess rational understanding than to be a creator of a 
work or a practitioner, than in the science of music? It is just as much more noble than 
the mind is superior to the body because it is only reason that separates the expert from 
the servant. (Boethius, Fundamentals of Music ca. 520) 
 
Music theory is usually not concerned with the performers’ activities… The present study 
will justify the view that a piece of music is a mentally constructed entity, of which 
scores and performances are partial representations by which the piece is transmitted.” 
(Lerdahl and Jackendoff, A Generative Theory of Tonal Music, 1983, 2). 
 
The trends in recent metric and temporal theory both reflect and contribute to norms of music 
theory as a whole. It is our duty as responsible theorists to acknowledge and interrogate the 
biases and preferences which seep into meter studies and radiate from it. From Boethius to 
Lerdahl and Jackendoff, theorists equate the role of performers with that of servants and 
transmitters of pieces. By contrast, listeners (and theorists) occupy the superior role of rational 
contemplators. Giving priority to theorists-as-listeners may help explain some of the trends 
discussed throughout this section: of musical experience as perception, of music perception as 
listening, of perception as in some sense “internal,” and of metric perception as attentional 
entrainment. However, assuming such a focus reflects and contributes to a disciplinary erasure of 
bodies from discussion. Additionally, when Lerdahl and Jackendoff define “music” as an abstract 
“mentally constructed entity of which scores and performances are only partial representations,” 
they do so at the expense of real, individual experiences. Often couching their ideas in feminist 
theory, Fred Everett Maus, Suzanne G. Cusick, Carolyn Abbate, and Marion A. Guck identify 
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general problems in music theory which do not address studies of meter specifically, but help 
shed light on the trends in meter research explored in preceding sections. 
 Maus’ “Masculine Discourse in Music Theory” (1993) explores patterns in music 
theoretical writing—patterns of omission, in particular—which reflect “a desire to avoid 
discourse that might seem unmanly” (Maus 1993, 265 italics in original). He discusses several 
gendered oppositions which map onto, on the one hand, a music theoretical mainstream of 
“Schenker and sets,” and diverse alternative approaches which form a marginalized, feminine 
“permanent penumbra” in the discipline. Drawing upon oppositions in John Rahn’s “Aspects of 
Musical Explanation” (1979), Maus notes that a mainstream preference for science-like, 
atemporal, concept-driven, piece-oriented discourse over more literary, in-time, data-driven, 
experience-oriented alternatives reflects a gendered power dynamics of masculinity and 
femininity. Maus also relates an opposition between “concept” and “data” to form and matter, 
mind and body. That gendered opposition between metaphorical mind and body becomes a more 
central topic in Cusick’s “Feminist Theory, Music Theory, and the Mind/Body Problem” (1994). 
In that article, she criticizes the typical “mind-mind” conception of music in which composers’ 
“minds” transmit a work to listeners “minds” with performers merely serving as vehicles of 
transmission. Cusick constructs what feminist music theory might look like by incorporating in-
time, embodied, physical actions into analysis. She considers “Aus tiefer Not” from Bach’s 
Clavierübung in particular for the extraordinary physical tension it creates in its performer. That 
physical tension contributes to the piece’s musical meaning, but is not conveyed by sounds. You 
feel the tension by performing the piece (or imagining yourself performing it), but you cannot 
hear it, nor even see it in the notation. Musical meaning is found within the body. It essentially 
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reverses the power dynamic of performers serving the will of “reason” (for Boethius29) or some 
“mentally constructed entity” (for Lerdahl and Jackendoff). 
 Meter psychology’s priority upon generalizable results also erases individual subjectivity 
from discussion. Guck’s “A Woman’s (Theoretical) Work” presents a relevant gendered critique 
of music theory with a focus upon what constitutes authorized speech. Drawing upon work by 
Donna Haraway on situated knowledges, Guck points out the frequent omission of personal 
experience from analyses which gives an illusory impression of objectivity. Part of a “woman’s 
theoretical work” involves speaking personally about individual perceptions. On the other hand, 
psychological studies seem intent on erasing, or at least smoothing over the variety of 
participants’ musical backgrounds. Once entered into an experiment, participants become fitted 
with simplistic descriptors: musician or non-musician, man or woman, left-handed or right-
handed. To underscore the value of individuals and the particularity of experience, Carolyn 
Abbate invokes another worthwhile binary distinction between the “drastic” and “gnostic,” to 
reinforce the importance of subjectivity in music theory (and elsewhere). She uses the terms to 
highlight music theory’s focus upon shared knowledge among an initiated few about abstract 
hypothetical performances (the gnostic) at the expense of “real-life” performative (drastic) 
experiences of actual music making. Indeed, Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s quotation given at the 
outset about music theory does well to encapsulate exactly what Abbate responds to. Their stance 
that music theory is not generally concerned with performers’ activities and that performances 
only serve as partial representations of music leaves music not as an actual sound object, but an 
abstract mentally constructed entity. Abbate’s point was just the opposite, to say that we should 
                                                 
29 It’s worth noticing that “reason” in Boethius’s example is depicted as feminine (“like a 
mistress”), although it occupies the culturally masculine, dominant position of “ruling.” 
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be concerned with real, individual performances (and not only the ones that are recorded, nor 
ones that lead back to some score!). 
An important question remains, since these writings are now twenty years old: does 
feminist theory still form a marginalized disciplinary penumbra? I think these various alternative 
approaches which Maus depicts as unmanly and outside the mainstream have been able to garner 
more prominence. Feminist theory is respected at least within the theoretical circles I find 
myself, but I think it would be overly optimistic to think that that sort of research is now part of 
music theory’s “core.” Mainstream psychological approaches to meter continue perpetuating 
many of the patterns Maus critiques. Work on embodied cognition presents an important 
countercurrent. Mariusz Kozak’s work is particularly refreshing, in using motion capture 
technology to explore not just physical motions of participants dismembered into tappers, but 
complete, individual, moving human beings. His 2015 article “Listeners’ Bodies in Music 
Analysis: Gestures, Motor Intentionality, and Models” cites Cusick and Abbate as highly 
influential and points toward burgeoning interest in the area. The marginalized feminist 
alternatives which Abbate, Cusick, Guck, and Maus describe have, in other words, made their 
way in from the fringes of the discipline. These are progressive shifts, to be sure, but it is 
difficult to say just how fundamentally the discipline has changed since those writings. 
 Mainstream and normative perspectives on meter perception repeatedly scapegoat “post-
common-practice” and “(post)modern” music. (This is very different from Maus’s critique, 
which took aim at the language describing Babbitt’s music and not at the music itself.) Both 
Justin London (2009) and Joel Lester (1986) take aim at Babbitt’s music for failing their test of 
perceptibility. Lester’s critique of Babbitt’s Composition for Four Instruments for the 
imperceptibility of its notated meter led him to ask whether we ought to reassess “commonly-
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held conceptions of rhythm.” That question was surely rhetorical, but valid nonetheless. Taking 
difficult, metrically non-normative30 music seriously may entail a reassessment of fundamental 
assumptions about our experience. Diana Deutsch was aware of this issue for new music in her 
editorial (1983). As she points out, psychological approaches to music cannot differentiate 
cognitive limits which are fundamental from those that are experiential. In other words, it is 
impossible to know whether a participant simply needs more exposure and practice to follow 
such-and-such an aspect or idiom of music. Music psychology, rooted in testing what people do 
now, is set up to favor the status quo in established music. Deutsch refers to the Monteverdi-
Artusi controversy to illustrate her concern. She notes that, at the time, Monteverdi’s music was 
criticized for not appealing to the established modes of listening. Babbitt’s music, similarly, can 
involve experiences outside expected and established norms. In this way, it is less surprising that 
music psychologists approach his music with skepticism. 
 Remarkably, Babbitt’s music seems to generate criticism on multiple fronts. On one side, 
London’s psychological approach charges it with imperceptibility. And from another, Maus’ 
feminist critique dislikes “the science-like, objectifying framework that Babbitt’s methodological 
views support” (Maus 1993, 265). These may seem like opposite problems, but I think they both 
stem from an assumption that the experience of Babbitt’s music involve “first-order” perception 
of some complex mathematical relationship composed into the musical object. For different 
reasons, London and Maus both dislike the sorts of abstract calculation that Babbitt’s music 
seems to solicit. In “What’s the Use of the Twelve-tone System,” (1997) Joseph Dubiel criticizes 
                                                 
30 By metrically “non-normative,” I refer to music for which meter is not clear and notated 
score would not align with the hearing and transcription of a scoreless listener. Babbitt of course 
comes to mind, as his music figures largely in Lester (1986) and London (2009), but so too 
might the music of Feldman or Webern, among many others. 
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conversations about Babbitt’s music for being overly concerned with the mechanics of finding 
the series of a twelve-tone piece. For him, simply identifying tone row manipulations does not 
satisfyingly describe his experience of listening to the music. However, Dubiel does not fault 
Babbitt or the compositional system. Instead, he attempts to steer analytical inquiry away from 
the “regulation and control” of deterministic unity (which Maus also criticized) and focus instead 
on the openness that the twelve-tone system affords. Dubiel’s article may seem a bit afield from 
this project, but I point to his work as a model of openness to many sorts of musical experience 
worth exploring. 
 Maus states that one of his goals is “to encourage the development and empowerment of 
alternative approaches,” because “an aspiration to masculinity has distorted many writers’ 
images of music, insulating their account of music from common facts of musical experience” 
(Maus 1993, 265). Perhaps the masculine aspiration for clean, generalizable results in meter 
theory has led to insulation from visual resources, intersubjective experiences, and many other 
social-cultural issues that could be left to historians and ethnomusicologists. However, I have 
become increasingly aware that such an insulation occurs at the expense of aesthetically 
meaningful musical encounters and practically valuable musical tools. To begin incorporating 
feminist critiques into studies of meter, it may help to take on more individual and performative 
perspectives. This move adds embodied complexities into our understanding of musical 
experience, but that is not my main reason for doing so. The strategies and resources which 
performers use are of practical value and often necessary for overcoming difficult temporal 
hurdles. I think these tools reflect some of the “common facts of musical experience” which have 
been ignored or defined away, despite being worthwhile for performers and scoreless listeners 
who know what to do. To highlight these “alternative” approaches (and I use quotations, because 
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the approaches are more widespread than we might realize!), I consider temporal navigation of 
difficult passages as a problem to be solved by any means necessary. What constitutes 
“difficulty” is relative to the person engaging with a piece of music. I analyze music which I 
believe will pose challenges to music professionals and my intended readership. However, more 
straightforward passages might also be considered “difficult” for people with less musical 




CHAPTER 2: METRIC RESOURCES BEYOND ATTENDING 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 My means of highlighting varied temporal resources, contexts, and strategies involves 
particularly challenging examples of what I call “metric multi-tasking.” I am not attached to the 
concept of “meter” embedded in that term, because of the baggage associated with it. Similarly, I 
do not advocate a concept of what might constitute a proper musical experience. I make no 
contextual restrictions about music-as-sound-perceived-by-listening-and-attending. Nor do I 
require that musical objects be treated as novel, or that perspectives I offer apply broadly to 
many most people (or most musicians). Instead, my motivation stems from the practical concern 
of how musical periodicities may be navigated. So long as a strategy or resource is useful, it is 
worthy of study. I incorporate strategies which may result from extensive practice by specific 
people, including preparation for the metrical “obstacles” analyzed. In order to highlight various 
active strategies required by a situation, I take the perspective of a performer. I will not claim to 
know what actual performers did, nor try to construct what some idealized performer ought to 
do. My analyses describe my own experience trying to perform, or follow along, the examples 
given. 
 Ève Poudrier and Bruno Repp consider the possibility (and difficulty) of metric multi-
tasking in their article “Can musicians track two different beats simultaneously?” (2013). Much 
like this dissertation, to approach that question motivates several moves away from restrictive 
trends in music psychology and theory. The experiments they constructed provided participants 
with two concurrent temporal patterns, each with a distinct metric framework and pitch. 
Participants were then confronted with a probe tone (far higher than the other two pitches) and 
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asked to determine whether the added tone fell on a beat (or not). For the authors, “tracking a 
beat” essentially means metric perception,31 but their theoretical framework is open. Their 
concepts for meter and polymeter include its “descriptive” and “psychological” senses (Poudrier 
and Repp 2013, 372), meaning meter may either be “in the music” or “in the perceiver.” 
Furthermore, they define metric entrainment as “the dynamic process by which internal or 
external periodic processes (such as oscillatory brain activity, attention, expectations, or motor 
activity) are aligned with one or several… periodic pulses” (Poudrier and Repp 2013, 370). 
That’s a very open definition, because synchronization may involve either internal or external 
processes. Alignment of motor activity with a pulse constitutes metric entrainment, without 
requiring “internal” notions of attention and expectation accompany it. 
 Additionally, the article has a positive tone of possibility. It asks what can people 
potentially do (and how), as opposed to what do people do already, or what are people’s 
fundamental cognitive limits. It also avoids a priority on general applicability by asking if 
musicians can track two different beats. The musicians who participated in the study were not 
generic undergraduate music majors, they were graduate and post graduate students at the Yale 
School of Music. They also were regular participants in Bruno Repp’s lab on synchronization 
and rhythm perception, meaning that tapping along in an experimental context had been 
practiced prior to the experiment. The participants were also prepared with detailed descriptions 
of what to expect including musical notation of the rhythms they could expect to hear (although 
that notation was taken away during the testing phase). 
                                                 
31 “The present research is one of the first attempts at studying polymetric perception 
empirically” (Poudrier and Repp 2013, 385). 
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Perhaps surprisingly in the context of previous psychological research32—but 
unsurprising in the context of this dissertation—Poudrier and Repp found that musicians can 
indeed track different beats simultaneously. In keeping with other research, they found that 
performance was not as good as tracking a single pulse stream and that it suffered as the 
complexity of phase relationships increased. Through post-experimental interviews, the 
experimenters also found participants employed many different strategies. Some participants 
constructed composite rhythms, but strategies more often involved “some form of divided 
synchronization.” Participants reported many synchronization strategies, such as head nodding to 
one beat while listening to the other, or foot tapping to one rhythm while conducting to the other. 
Given the prevalence of these strategies, the researchers suggest that “divided attention might be 
successfully supported by systematically matching different beats to different motor or 
perceptual systems.” In some cases, participants also reported strategies which “are best 
classified as ‘analytical,’ that is responding…based on some specific feature of the polymetric 
structure” (Poudrier and Repp 2013, 387-388). 
 The resources and strategies I put forth in this section—e.g. counting, coding movement, 
and calculating—are similar to those strategies reported in Poudrier and Repp’s study. One 
notable difference here is the frequent preference for performers’ perspectives. Although the 
strategies may be employed by listeners (as was the case in Poudrier and Repp’s study), they can 
be jettisoned too easily when taking the perspective of a listener. Listeners can be lazy. Without 
any catastrophic effects, a listener’s mind can wander (or their person can literally wander about) 
as music plays, or they can fail to follow music’s temporal structure (and perhaps even fault the 
                                                 
32 Poudrier and Repp refer in particular to London (2004) and Keller and Burnham (2005), as 
well as many polyrhythmic studies in which participants 
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music for such a failure). Performers’ tasks, by contrast, carry more urgency, responsibility, and 
connection with the musical material. If a performer’s mind wanders during a performance, the 
intended temporal structure may fall apart. These performative resources and strategies are 
available to listeners, even if they are not necessary components of that listening. Recognizing 
them could mean opening up the concept of “listening” to include many non-aural relationships 
with music. Or, we might want to leave “listening” as a relatively tight concept. In that case, we 
could say that listeners can also engage in other sorts of metric navigation while listening. Such a 
distinction is admittedly a low priority much like determination of something as “musical” or 
“perceptual.” The following sections outline resources and strategies which are useful in some 
context, for some individuals. 
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2.2 Dynamic Symbolic Coding and Embodied Off-Loading 
 
In our everyday lives, we monitor the passage of time using clocks (whether they be 
watches, wall clocks, smartphones, or computers). This temporal relationship between person 
and clock has several important features. First, checking a clock requires specific learning. You 
need to know how to read dials on an analog watch, how many minutes make up an hour, how 
many hours make up a day, AM and PM, etc. Given that learning, reading a clock allows us to 
check in on something we haven’t paid much attention to, which is (usually) something beyond 
our capacity for attentional entrainment. The fact that it allows checking in on something we 
haven’t precisely followed is its point: the device keeps track of time when we do not. There is 
an element of trust—perhaps risk—in using this tool, because it is a fallible mechanism. It is not 
guaranteed to be accurate. It may slow down, reset, malfunction, not have been updated for 
daylight savings, and so on. What I call “dynamic symbolic encoding” involves a broad category 
of clocklike resources which provide time-dependent information contextualizing various 
moments in time. As long as you know how to read them, clocks provide information about what 
is happening now and facilitate off-loading of temporal information. 
There are some musical contexts in which musicians rely on conventional clocks (i.e. 
everyday devices to display seconds, minutes, hours) for timekeeping. Performers of John 
Cage’s 4’33” use a clock or stopwatch to make sure the piece and its movements last the correct 
amount of time. Film scoring musicians and conductors may also make use of clocktime to 
coordinate musical events with on screen actions. However, musical situations of dynamic 
temporal encoding more often involve making some sort of “clock” that tracks an aspect of the 
music at hand. Musical clocks synchronize with some temporal units in the music, as opposed to 
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absolute seconds and minutes. If you’ve ever counted measures as they occurred (aloud or in 
your head) you’ve created a musical clock. (I often think about poor percussionists tasked with 
waiting many, sometimes over sixty measures, for an entrance.) To count measures requires 
attentional entrainment in order to time each consecutive natural number with downbeats, but by 
encoding measures with numbers (symbols), one can follow large hypermetrical groupings while 
“feeling” durations only a measure in length. This technique relates to the memory problem put 
forth in Candace Brower’s “Memory and the Perception of Rhythm (1993, 31-33), namely that 
high-level “background” rhythmic structures last too long to fall within the working memory of 
the psychological present. 
In other situations, temporal events may occur within the threshold of attentional 
entrainment, but lack sufficient previous activity to make a periodic structure apparent without 
symbolic markers. Consider the situation of a pop musician cuing a song (presumably in 4/4) by 
shouting “Two, three, four!” or maybe just “Three, four!” In either case, the durations between 
the words set up a tempo, but the words themselves do not form an entire metric unit. There is no 
sounded downbeat from which to project a hierarchical organization, and indeed whether two 
words are used or three does not make a substantial difference. The words signify metric 
locations in relation to a temporal hierarchy which has not yet formed. They imply a previous 
downbeat and a hierarchical group which has not occurred. This is a substantial addition to a 
person’s temporal resources. Metric theory by scholars such as Christopher Hasty (1997) and 
Danuta Mirka (2009) focuses upon “finding meter” as a process in which previous timespans 
“project” potential periodicities which may or may not be realized. They also continue a trend 
which goes back to psychological studies of meter such as Longuet-Higgins and Lee’s. By 
assuming that relative durations of events provide sufficient information to the listener for 
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determining meter, they leave other sorts of information unexplored. These starting points reflect 
the listener-centric perspectives of those scholars. Listeners may find meter after the music 
proper begins, but performers must be synchronized from the moment they begin to play. 
Melodies and rhythms may also signify temporal information. Consider for example, the 
arrangement of “Giant Steps” by the Jean-Michel Pilc trio. The group features Jean-Michel Pilc 
on piano, Ari Hoenig on drums, and François Moutin on bass. All are regular collaborators in 
jazz clubs (often in the context of Ari Hoenig’s Monday night residency at Smalls jazz club in 
New York City), and known for metrically difficult and playful interpretations of standards. 
Their arrangement alters the meter of the standard, replacing measures of 4/4 in Coltrane’s 
original with alternating measures of 3/4 and 2/4, and creating a larger period of five beats. In the 
final measure of the sixteen-measure song form, the changes set up the return of B major with a 
ii7-V7 which the group blatantly underscores with a unison flourish of an ascending fourth, C# to 





Example 2.1, hits as symbol in the Jean-Michel Pilc interpretation of "Giant Steps" 
 
Importantly, the performers repeat these hits in almost every chorus. Their improvisations 
involve more florid, active material, meaning that, when the hits occur, the brief change of 
texture is obvious. The song form is quite difficult to follow during the solo section, but hearing 
the ascending fourth signifies “this is the last measure!” and “the next beat is the top of the 
form.” This knowledge makes position finding far more manageable. 
Gestures too may be encoded with metric information. Imagine the situation of an 
orchestral musician looking to the conductor to start. The conductor takes a breath while raising 
her hands and, as they come down, the musicians begin. In this situation, there are no sounds, 
only gestures encoded with meaning.33 You must know that the hands-up gesture means “the 
                                                 
33 There are not sounds in the sense of musical instruments playing, but the conductor’s 
breath could be audible. That sound may be provide symbolic information about metric location 
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next beat is the beginning of the measure!” in order to enter at the right time along with everyone 
else. When the gesture occurs is important (along with how quick it is), but it does not involve 
entrainment in a traditional sense. Its information content about periodicity does not stem from 
being periodic. A single gesture provides the upbeat, not the fact that that gesture occurs every so 
often. (The “upbeat” gesture may occur regularly thereafter, but at the beginning of a piece 
there’s no previous reference point to be attuned to.) Once the music is underway, a conductor’s 
gestures provide information to musicians about metric cycles. Importantly, musicians do not 
entrain and attend to all of a conductor’s signals. They can glance around from instrument, to 
score, to conductor. Each gesture provides information about cyclic processes, whether or not 
musicians see a complete gestural cycle. The use of symbolic temporal gestures is well known in 
practical and pedagogical contexts. Most ear training and musicianship courses will require 
students to do a bit of conducting along with exercises; however, Bruno Repp’s survey of 
“tapping” literature notes that conductors’ movements have not yet been investigated in detail by 
music psychologists (Repp 2005, 986). 
Dynamic symbolic encoding of meter serves as a form of off-loading: storing temporal 
information for access because attention is divided, because durational spans fall beyond what 
may be passively “attended,” or because temporal stimuli are insufficient to make correct 
judgement without such symbols. In the previous examples—reading a clock, looking to a 
conductor, listening for a bandleader’s count-off—temporal information is stored and provided 
by someone else (or something else). The storing and off-loading of metric information can also 
occur in one’s own gestures, and this possibility may be considered in relation to work in 
                                                 
much as the gesture does, with the difference being one of medium: it is heard, not seen. (Or it is 
heard and seen, if you hear her breath and see her lungs expand, for example.) 
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embodied cognition. Given the many meanings of “embodied cognition” (see Wilson 2002), I 
will use it here to mean that physical, observable actions are not simple byproducts of a central 
processor. They actively aid perception or—in contexts involving temporal knowledge that is not 
necessarily perceptual—temporal navigation in some broader sense. 
Psychological studies corroborate that embodied actions not only reflect but also help in 
metric perception. As discussed in section 1.2, metric discrimination tasks are easier when 
participants are given instructions to bend at the knees or engage in large body movements 
(McCoy and Ellis 1992; Philips-Silver and Trainor, 2005 and 2007). Conversely, participants 
with motor disorders often perform poorly in metric judgement tasks even if those tasks require 
no observable movement (Grahn and Brett 2009). For professional musicians, it may be difficult 
to realize just how beneficial moving to meter is. The studies cited involve distinctions between 
simple rhythms, or duple and triple meter which—for the professionals—are highly practiced, 
requiring little cognitive effort. The point may become apparent for people with more musical 
training when the discrimination tasks become more difficult. When finding the metric structure 
of Bulgarian folk music with an “odd” meter, for example, one of my first instincts is to tap out 
possible configurations (such as the 2+2+3+2+2 of a kopanitsa or the 2+2+3 of a ruchenitsa, 
etc.) to find out whether the music aligns with one of them. If I cannot easily entrain with a piece 
of music, I can (literally?) feel around for it! This is admittedly a bit of trial and error, but it helps 
to have a set of possibilities “in hand” which are mostly to occur. This strategy is in keeping with 
psychological models of entrainment. However, instead of some internal “first step” which 
facilitates action, exploratory actions form the first step which may be monitored and adjusted 
until synchrony is achieved. 
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Action such as tapping, swaying, and bending one’s knees may aid temporal awareness 
by strengthening the form of entrainment that occurs, recruiting not just one’s attention but also a 
physical action. Such action may also be considered a very simple type of metric encoding. Each 
action signifies “here begins a new unit.” This simple symbol provides the foundation upon 
which the “tapping” literature is built: tapping signifies the tactus. Exploring these simple metric 
motions seems a desideratum in music psychology for its quick applicability to “novice” 
listeners and for the lack of training required. In McCoy and Ellis’s experiment (1992) and 
Philips-Silver and Trainor’s experiments (2005, 2007), the goal was simply to show evidence 
that movement instructions improved performance. They were not concerned with how to 
improve performance of difficult, more esoteric tasks, continuing the trend of avoiding tasks 
which require extensive specific training. With the right strategies and practice, more complex 
motions can track more complex metric structures, though. They become vital components of 
rhythmic, metric virtuosity. 
South Indian (karnatak) classical music includes extraordinarily difficult temporal tasks 
as a typical feature of performances and relies upon cyclic gestures laden with temporal 
information. With the exception of rubato introductory material, a traditional composition will be 
in one tala (roughly meaning “meter”) throughout, meaning it repeats a single metric framework 
from beginning to end.34 Each tala is associated with a cycle of hand gestures (kriya), which can 
be performed by anyone whose hands are free to do so, including audience members. Kriya 
                                                 
34 Tala typically translates to “meter” or “measure,” but with a few caveats. A tala does not 
have an “accent” associated with its beginning. The most important point in a tala is the location 
where the text of a specific composition begins. This location (the eduppu) is usually the first 
beat (sam) though it need not be. Tala cycles can be quite long (up to twenty-nine “beats”), and 
they are also deeply entangled with an associated cycle of hand gestures. For more, see Nelson 
1999. 
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gestures involve touching (or clapping) one hand against the thigh or other hand as well as silent 
waving in the air for some tala. A composition in khanda eka tala, for example, has five 
gestures. The first gesture involves striking the full hand against the thigh or other hand (the 
“clap”) followed by use of only the pinkie, then ring, then middle, and then index finger, as 
shown in figure 2.2. Each of these gestures, especially the clap, may produce some sound. 
However, the gestures do not occur with much volume, unless they are articulated with chimes. 
 
 
Example 2.2, gestures for a five-beat cycle, khanda eka tala, based on Nelson 1999 
 
This cycle of gestures has some features worth noting. Each beat is associated with a unique 
gesture. A full hand clap (whether audible or not) indicates the first beat of the cycle. Touching 
the pinkie alone indicates beat two, and so on. Seeing a particular finger immediately translates 
to a unique location in the cycle, without any need to entrain or feel a five-beat grouping.35 Just 
                                                 
35 Not all tala have one gesture corresponding to only one metric location. Adi tala, for 
example, is an eight beat cycle, beginning with a clap (1), followed by pinkie (2), ring finger (3), 
middle finger (4), another clap (5), a wave (6), another clap (7), and another wave (8), as 
diagrammed below (following the style of Nelson 1999). 
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as an orchestral conductor can communicate the final beat of a measure with raised hands, each 
finger communicates a temporal location within the cycle. Another key feature of the tala 
gestures is the fact that performing the five-beat cycle does not require attending to a five-beat 
cycle. The pattern itself can function like an automated set of commands, which just happens to 
repeat every five beats. A sense of tactus (i.e. “beat”) is required, along with a sense of order in 
which the gestures occur. Performers must know to follow the pinkie with the ring finger, the 
ring finger with the middle finger, and so on. The pattern yields a five-beat cycle, whether or not 
you pay attention to its “five-ness.” For practical purposes, this affords a remarkable possibility. 
After extensive practice, a set of tala gestures—having become nearly automatic—allows 
attention to be directed elsewhere. Just as I might look to a clock after losing track of time, so too 
can I look to my own tala gestures for information about the current location in that cycle. (I can 
also look to someone else’s gestures, much like the orchestral musician looking to a conductor 
for information.) This seems necessary in passages of South Indian music which involve 
dramatic metric tension. For passages in which some other hierarchic framework is 
superimposed over the tala, it may help to direct attention toward that superimposed framework 
knowing that the tala remains visually or proprioceptively accessible. If I see a gesture of the 
index finger, it signifies the fifth beat of the cycle. A South Indian sankirna koraippu in khanda 
eka tala performed on Trichy Sanakaran’s Laya Vinyas CD (1990) and transcribed in Sankaran 
(2010, 72-75) illustrates this point. 
                                                 
As in khanda eka tala, a ring finger gesture always occurs on beat 3, but there are two 
“waves,” one on beat 6 and another on beat 8 (and also three claps.) Navigating this cycle 
requires a bit of context added to those gestures. Simply being a “wave” is not sufficient to 
identify a certain beat. However, knowing whether it is the first wave or the second wave of the 
cycle is sufficient to identify beat 6 or beat 8, respectively. Gestures still do signify metric 
locations, but only with an added contextual awareness.  
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 A South Indian koraippu (meaning “to reduce”) typically involves trading rhythmic 
materials between musicians in several rhythmic stages. In the first stage, a large rhythmic idea 
with many component parts is presented and repeated by other musicians. In subsequent stages, 
that idea becomes broken into successively smaller units leading to a fast-paced climax. But I 
will only consider the first stage here. This koraippu divides each beat of the tala cycle into four 
pulses. The first stage of a sankirna koraippu involves a phrase comprised of eight short 
rhythmic units of nine pulses each.36 Figure 2.3 provides the ideas as solkattu, or spoken 
rhythms, but they could also be played on an instrument, such as a mrdangam or kanjira.37 In 
this notation (in keeping with the style of Nelson 2008), a numeric subscript gives the number of 
pulses a syllable will last. Syllables without any numeric designation receive one pulse each. 
Syllables abbreviated to their first letter receive half a pulse. E.g., “k t T k t r k t” abbreviates the 








                                                 
36 I will only be concerned with the first stage of the composition here, but complete 
realization is available in Sankaran 2010, 72-76. A complete misra koraippu in adi tala is 
available in David Nelson 2008, 70-75, as well as Sankaran 2010, 66-71 
37 Trichy Sankaran’s recording Laya Vinyas does precisely this: rhythmic ideas are first 
performed as solkattu, then performed (traded) on a barrel-shaped mrdangam, and finally on a 
tambourine-like kanjira. 
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 ta2    din2    ta  din  gi na tom 
 ta2    din2    ta  din  gi na tom 
 ta2    din2    ta  din  gi na tom 
   ta2    din2    k t T k t r k t tom 
 
 ta2    din2    ta  din  gi na tom  
(ta2    din2    k t T k t r k t tom) 
(ta2    din2    k t T k t r k t tom) 
(ta2    din2    k t T k t r k t tom)                        [tam] 
 
Example 2.3, solkattu syllables for the first stage of a sankirna koraippu38 
 
These nine-pulse ideas form two groups of four, and the full structure is eight nine-pulse units. 
For aesthetic reasons, each stage should end on the downbeat (sam), which is articulated with its 
own syllable or drumstroke (here as “tam”). Hence, because this stage totals 8 x 9 = 72 pulses, 
while the tala cycle lasts five beats of four pulses each, or 20 pulses, this stage will require four 
presentations of the tala cycle, lasting 80 pulses, and will need to begin after eight pulses, or two 
beats of the tala. A convincing performance of the nine-pulse ideas should not skew to reflect the 
underlying tala. If anything, it might give a little emphasis or dynamic accent to the start of each 
nine-pulse unit. Conversely, a weak performance would add accent to syllables which align with 
the beats of the tala (i.e ta2 din2 ta din gi na tom ta2 din2 ta din gi na tom ta2 din2 ta din gi na tom 
etc.). 
Performing this stage requires an awareness of the underlying khanda eka tala, because 
the phrase must start on beat three of the tala. At the same time, a convincing performance also 
                                                 
38 Following Nelson (2008), usage of parenthesis and brackets indicates of a mora, a type of 
South Indian rhythmic “cadence.” 
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requires some freedom from that meter, which colleagues in my South Indian performance 
workshop described as “floating” between two hierarchies. Drawing on my own experience, 
finding (and beginning on) beat three only requires knowing the gestural location of that beat. It 
occurs with the ring finger gesture, just after the pinkie. This may require a bit of visual or 
proprioceptive awareness, but not very much. Meanwhile, more attention may be given to the 
superimposed structure. I can, in other words “feel” the superimposed hierarchy without losing 
track of the five-beat cycle. The idea that periodic hierarchy of a superimposed structure might 
receive more attention and structural focus than the underlying meter is reflected in both David 
Nelson’s and Trichy Sankaran’s notational styles, which are reproduced in Figures 2.2 and 
Figure 2.3, respectively. Nelson does not notate the underlying tala at all. In Sankaran’s book, 
text justification is based upon syllabic groupings, two nine-pulse units fit on a single line, and 
the underlying tala appears as annotations (“X” for the full hand gesture, which begins each 
group of gestures together called a laghu, and “I” for each finger motion) which correspond to 
certain syllables (or between them).39 This is precisely the opposite of Western notation, in 
which rhythmic durations are organized and broken up (“tied”) in relation to measures of an 
underlying meter. 
 
                                                 
39 His notation also makes room (literally) for each pulse. Syllables lasting less than one 




Example 2.4, sankirna Koraippu in Khanda Eka Tala as notated in Sankaran (2010, 72) 
 
The idea of performing a hierarchy of eight nine-pulse units while also tracking a five-
beat tala complicates—but does not necessarily contradict—existing metric theory, such as 
Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s metric well-formedness rules (1983), London’s polymetric 
proscriptions in the first edition of Hearing in Time (2004), and Vuust and Witek’s (2014, 7-8) 
notion of bistable rhythmic percepts, among others. These theories (among many others) rest on 
an assumption that only one framework may be perceived at a time. The example of a South 
Indian musician performing-and-attending one metric hierarchy, while maintaining an awareness 
of another by performing-and-seeing her own automated gestures, involves an awareness of two 
periodic frameworks, but “awareness” need not mean perception. In fact, it may be worth having 
a conceptual framework which acknowledges that following the two hierarchies involves two 
different strategies for doing each. We could say one is “felt” while the other is “counted” with 
aid of an embodied tala clock. Following London, I could argue that the superimposed 
framework is perceived through entrainment of one’s attention, but the other hierarchy (the tala) 
is not “perceived” in such a way. Instead, the tala is performed and accessible when you pay 
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attention to the gestures performed which symbolize temporal locations. In many regards, this 
rings true to my experience of tracking two hierarchies, each with a separate strategy and 
qualitatively different experience. On the other hand, it may muddy the notion of “attentional” 
entrainment. 
Attention is, in some way, directed to both hierarchies. Following Riess Jones, we can 
say that things competing for attention make the task of following any of them more difficult, but 
the label “attention” seems less adherent in London’s sense. We would have to argue that 
“attention” in this sense synchronizes with the nine-pulse units, while attention of a more 
everyday sort occasionally checks in on the tala, like a driver glancing in her rearview mirror. 
Conceptually pinning down attention with much detail is an elusive task here. After all, if the 
norm is to view periodic tapping as observable evidence of attentional entrainment, does that not 








2.3 Static Theoretical Knowledge 
 
Whereas dynamic symbolic of encoding involves time-dependent musical “clocks,” static 
theoretical resources are perhaps more like schedules and calendars. The resources are static, 
meaning they do not themselves “happen.” Instead, they provide information about things which 
happen in time, and the information given by scores provides an excellent example. Quite 
usefully, scores can be studied apart from the sounds they represent, at any pace. You can jump 
around and compare non-adjacent sections or pause over others which represent very fast 
passages. Physical, visual score objects are not necessary for the transmission of this sort of 
information. Memories of a score and simple prose can communicate the same. For this reason, 
“static, theoretical knowledge” includes both scores and score-like information as useful 
resources of abstract calculation. These are precisely the items with which Joel Lester struggled 
in “Notated vs. Heard Meter” (1986), which London (2009) considered to generate 
“misperceptions,” and which Clarke and Krumhansl (1990) excluded from their study on 
perceiving musical time. I acknowledge up front that the use of these resources might not 
ultimately be allowed admission into the normative conceptual category of “music perception,” 
but they constitute useful musical knowledge that can qualitatively affect musical experience and 
potentially aid perceptual ability regardless. Within Western musical culture, these resources are 
treated with suspicion—perhaps even considered “cheating”—while their place in South Indian 
music is more accepted. In the analyses that follow, it may be worth introspecting a bit regarding 
the effects of information being given. Some temporal structures are difficult to follow without 
an abstract description about their structure. 
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Score-based and score-like theoretical resources typically provide a relationship between 
sounding durations and a “metric” framework. This information includes temporal ordering of 
events, metric locations of specific events, and total duration for some set of events. Importantly, 
this includes information about events which have not yet occurred. Reading ahead of time that 
the first measure of a piece is three beats long depends on some degree of competence from 
musicians and on the accuracy of the score, but not on synchronization and attunement with 
occurrent sounds. Additionally, theoretical information may offer an organization of sounds 
which is in some sense preferable despite being more difficult than some other option. Consider 
for example, hearing three strikes of a snare drum equally spaced apart in time. This is precisely 
how the song “Ants Marching” by the Dave Matthews Band from the album Under the Table 
and Dreaming begins. In the absence of additional information, theories of entrainment 
(London) and projection (Hasty) would assume each of these events creates the impression of 
strong metric locations. Each drum stroke forms a beat. Experimental evidence suggests that 
listeners will also gravitate toward a duple hierarchy. However, the experience of those snare 
drum hits would likely be significantly different if I told you that they were on beats “4” then “2” 
then “4,” or if, more precisely, I offered the transcription, given below in example 2.5. 
 
 
Example 2.5, transcription of the snare drum introduction to the Dave Matthews Band’s “Ants 
Marching” from the album Under the Table and Dreaming 
 
This sort of knowledge may also rely on remembering a previous hearing of the piece, without 
actually having a score in hand. Listeners who know the song well enough—or who have a 
 85 
strong enough concept of snare drum strokes as providing a backbeat—without an ability to 
theoretically articulate a concept of, say, beats “2” and “4,” still utilize this general type of 
resource, though the discussion becomes a bit more complicated. In the absence of this sort of 
information, a listener’s experience would likely be different, and involve some retrospective 
shift once additional information is present to the contrary. 
 The effect of having a score in hand or being provided a set of relations is more 
aesthetically significant for music that is more difficult to follow. Drummer Ari Hoenig’s 
composition “Birdless,” for example, has a large-scale song structure which is difficult to grasp. 
As in canonical jazz, it is important to navigate the songform, because improvisations occur 
“over” and in dialogue with its chord changes. It may be worth first listening to the piece for its 
structure now before looking at the lead sheet provided. Both the version on the album The 
Painter and the one on Ari Hoenig Punk Bop: Live at Smalls will illustrate the challenge, but I 
will be analyzing the latter version. 
Part of what makes the structure less intuitive are its odd hypermetrical groupings. As 
shown in example 2.6, there is a six-measure interlude between solos (in lieu of the final two 
measures of the form) and an A-section comprised of two seven-measure phrases. The B-section 
has two sub-phrases in 4/4 which shifts into 6/4 “vamp” ending. 
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Example 2.6, “Birdless” lead sheet from The Ari Hoenig Song Book 
 
With the score, the challenge of following the form is more manageable, though it is still a 
challenge. Having the structure either in view or in memory allows preparation for shifts of 
meter and odd hypermetric groupings before they occur. Retrospectively putting together seven-
measure phrases, for example, might be possible (though tough) during the “head,” but it 
becomes extremely difficult during improvisations, as the group refrains from making the form 
obvious. Quite the opposite, they often revel in obscuring it. 
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 A sublime example of the metric superposition occurs during the drum solo section 
(beginning at 7’41” on the album Live at Smalls). Again, it may be worth giving it a listen before 
reading and following along with my notation of the band’s “hits” given below in example 2.7. 
 
Example 2.7, “Birdless” songform for drum solo 
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In the A-section of the drum solo, there are eight hits seven eighth notes apart, in total spanning 
seven measures comprised of eight eighth-notes each. The harmonies of these hits—D-7, E-7, D-
7, E-7, EbM, GbM, FM, EbM—overlay a relatively square 2+2+4 grouping structure on the odd 
phrase length, as shown in example 2.8. 
 
          1               2               1                2                1                2                3              4              1 
 
Example 2.8, duple structure of band hits during the drum solo of “Birdless” 
 
Knowing the aesthetic tendencies of Hoenig and his groups, it is likely the seven-measure phrase 
length was designed specifically for the possibility of superimposing a large-scale polyrhythm 
which, seeming more “natural” would lead away from the underlying 4/4. Maintaining this 
underlying meter is made easier through an awareness of structural relationships between the two 
rates. This might entail, for example, knowing that the penultimate hit lies on a downbeat, or that 
the final hit lies on the last eighth note of the 4/4 meter. In fact, you can navigate this passage by 
simply “counting” hits as they occur. After once (or twice) through the progression of eight (or 
sixteen) hits, a d-minor seventh chord will always land on the final eighth note of the measure. 
This idea—that a d-minor seventh chord might indicate the final eighth note of a measure—
requires theoretical knowledge of the section’s structure to facilitate symbolic encoding of the 
staccato chord. Listeners (as opposed to performers) may also visually and gesturally encode the 
passage! Each time a hit occurs, physically point to it in the score. You will be pointing at the 
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metric location in which it occurs, whether or not you “feel” 4/4 meter in the way the notation 
normatively implies. 
In the third and final chorus of the drum solo, Hoenig adds to the challenge of juggling 
the two rhythmic streams by employing the normative “rock” backbeat aligned with the 
superimposed band hits. The superimposed seven-pulse units are subdivided in half by the hi hat, 
and grouped in twos through alternation of bass and snare, as shown in example 2.9. 
 
Example 2.9, “Birdless” band hits and rock groove played to align with superimposed “hits” 
 
Here the notated meter is extremely difficult to maintain, likely because the groove’s 
superimposed beat becomes so magnetic. But the structural features remain in effect just the 
same. The final d-minor seventh chord still falls upon the final eighth note of an underlying 4/4 
measure. The penultimate “hit” is on a downbeat, and so forth. It does not last long, probably 
because of the extraordinary tension between the two frameworks, which Stefan Love (2013) 
terms “subliminal dissonance” (or alternatively “consonance,” in scare quotes) to highlight that 
the non-alignment involves some unsounded (“subliminal”) temporal structure. (No one plays on 
the downbeats of 4/4.) The difficulty keeping track of both, and tendency to “lose” listeners, is 
part of the point. To be “lost,” yet know that the group was able to harness the temporal streams, 
is to acknowledge the virtuosity of the performers. This type of experience is somewhat 
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paradoxical. It involves knowing about something which is beyond our grasp.40 Being able to 
keep track of the form becomes a euphoric triumph. And theoretical knowledge of the specific 
structure involved serves as one potential resource to keep track of the form.  
 In South Indian music, this sort of knowledge helps check in on passages which “float” 
over the tala, such as the sankirna koraippu in khanda eka tala discussed in the section 2.2. In 
that example, it helps to know that the composition starts on the third beat of the tala (the “ring 
finger” gesture), as well as that the composition’s second group of four nine-pulse units begins 
on the second beat (the “pinkie” gesture), and that its final syllable falls on the downbeat (the 
“clap” gesture). Working out how certain rhythmic constructions will lay against the tala, or 
“calculation,” has a more respected place in South Indian music than in the Western musical 
mainstream. Clever rhythmic manipulations are an expected part of classical South Indian 
performances, especially in a tani avartanam (percussion solo). By contrast, Western groups 
which consciously deal in such metric manipulation are more esoteric, receiving a mixture of 
cult-like devotion on the one hand, and, on the other, derision for an excess of “mathiness.” In 
either case, conscious articulable calculations about temporal relationships seem to provide a 
shortcut to the end that could be reached through practice, namely knowledge about how 
temporal streams align. Performers may know when to begin a rhythmic idea or how to perform 
two periodic streams without being able to verbally articulate what they are doing. To an 
observer, there would not be much difference between this condition and the condition attained 
through calculation, and “intuitive” knowledge derived from practice could not be distinguished 
                                                 
40 This may be a larger part of theory than we often discuss. Analyses can point out things in 
music we may not have noticed before. And pointing them out does not necessarily make them 
immediately perceptible. With work and practice, they could be, but I often find myself in the 
position of appreciating musical features by grasping that they exist, even if I do not hear them.  
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from “theoretical” knowledge. A key difference exists from the perspective of the performer. 
Abstract, articulated knowledge about periodicity may derive its usefulness primarily from its 
efficiency in bypassing potentially time-consuming practice. I leave open the possibility that 
scores—or the information they represent—do more than provide a shortcut through a more 
difficult process of learning. There may be cases where repeat listening cannot arrive at the 
“solution” put forth in a score. Lester’s (1986) struggle with Babbitt’s Composition for four 
Instruments is one of these instances 
 It is not immediately clear how fit these resources into the music theoretical conceptual 
landscape. To be given credible and actionable information about a temporal structure helps to 
understand it and changes musical experience. However, should this knowing be considered 
perceptual? Generally, I think knowing should constitute a wider conceptual category than 
perceiving. In this case, I would like to consider that being handed abstract information does not 
constitute perception in itself, but that it either substitutes for it or affects one’s perceptual ability 










CHAPTER 3: ANALYSES 
 
 In this part, I offer musical examples in which expanded resources aid temporal 
navigation, whether for performers or listeners. The most basic goal is to acknowledge what 
these resources are and that they are useful. To do that, I first consider how examples 
demonstrate an awareness of more than one temporal framework at the same time. Then, because 
of the challenge involved, I consider what might be involved in that “awareness.” Although I 
will also argue that symbolic resources are meaningful in more temporally straightforward 
contexts, those simpler situations do not present such a strong motivation for finding additional 
temporal strategies. The second goal of this section is to explore the how additional resources 
may enrich our aesthetic experience of the music, and how some music might manipulate the 
strategies that involve them. In instances of metric multi-tasking there is an aesthetic payoff to 
engaging with varied types of knowledge and awareness. As explained in Ari Hoenig and 
Johannes Weidenmuller’s practice book, 
One of the purposes of superimposing one groove or time feel over another is to create 
tension. Rhythmic superimposition creates two sets of pulses competing for your 
attention and therefore two sets of competing musical expectations. A form - any cyclical 
set of bars, with or without harmonic movement - provides an opportunity to raise the 
intensity of your expectations for resolution. Without a form over which to apply the new 
groove, you won't achieve the same amount of tension nor the effect of any subsequent 
release. Second of all, in order for musicians to communicate with one another, we must 
have some kind of a framework or road map as a basis of communication. A form can be 
that framework. (Hoenig and Weidenmuller 2009, 2) 
 
This sense of tension and release to which Hoenig and Weidenmuller refer would be lost without 
following the form, either by choosing the experiential path of least resistance or not knowing 
that such a form is in operation. To find examples involving this sort of tension requires that 
there be a relatively stable framework against which other constructions are in dialogue. The 
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clave of Afro-Caribbean music and tala of South Indian music framework provide excellent 
examples; however most of the analyses here come from jazz. This is in part because the 
framework for jazz improvisations (the song form) is longer and includes harmonic and melodic 
components. Whereas a clave or tala involve a handful of beats, jazz forms often involves a local 
meter as well as a larger hypermetrical construction, and an associated tune and set of harmonic 
changes. As such, jazz examples more easily bring a greater variety of temporal resources into 
discussion. At the level of an entire song form, temporal structure is also too long to be available 
for echoic and short-term memory (Brower 1993) or conventional attentional entrainment. My 
intent is not to imply that jazz is more temporally challenging than other genres, or that the 




3.1 Metric Multi-tasking: Stamping, Clapping, and Singing “Panda Chant II” 
 
Composer and choreographer Meredith Monk has pioneered works which involve music 
and movement, and her compositions are not only for hearing. They often involve physical 
(embodied) and visual components. “Panda Chant II” is such a work, a choral composition, that 
requires more than voices. All performers must rhythmically stomp and clap in unison while 
singing various other patterns. The pattern of stamps is an ostinato notated in 6/8 (beamed in 3/4) 
and performed by all singers throughout the piece, shown in example 3.1. 
 
 
Example 3.1, stamping ostinato performed by all singers in “Panda Chant II” 
 
After the tenors start looping their vocal pattern, the altos must enter with pattern given in 
example 3.2. Performing this is tricky. It alternates between measures of 6/8 and 5/8, which loop 
concurrently with the stamped 6/8 pattern.  
 
Example 3.2, vocal pattern performed by altos in addition to stamped pattern 
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This metric juggling is unique to the altos. Tenors, basses, and sopranos layer parts into the mix 
with varying degrees of syncopation, but their parts loop patterns of six or twelve eighth-notes. 
They do not present large-scale periodic asynchrony in relation to the stamping pattern. For this 
reason, my analysis focuses upon the perspective of the altos. But there’s more they must do in 
addition to stamping and vocalizing! After all individual parts have entered, an additional pattern 
must be performed: a quick pair of handclaps on the second eighth note of each 6/8 measure. As 
shown in example 3.3, a soloist first introduces the claps and the full ensemble then follows suit, 
all while continuing their individual vocal parts and stamping in unison. 
 
 
Example 3.3, clapping pattern performed by all 
 
The altos must somehow navigate two temporal frameworks, one in 6/8—which involves 
stamping, clapping, and conductor gestures—and one in 11/8, which is vocal. I describe these 
frameworks according to their notated time signatures (11/8 being a composite of 6/8 and 5/8), 
but do not invoke “meter” in its mainstream psychological usage. 
In order to figure out what sorts of resources could be required to do this, I would like to 
offer a way of approaching this task from my own experience trying to do it. My starting point 
involves what it is like to be an active participant—to do “Panda Chant II”—not what it is like to 
simply listen and watch others doing it. This distinction is important not only for the felt, 
embodied component of the experience, but also to give proper attention to the performers’ 
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heightened responsibility in following the material. (Getting “lost” as performer has obvious 
consequences not present for listeners.) The piece serves as an excellent example of the value 
found through specific practice and preparation, symbolic temporal encoding, and abstract 
theoretical knowledge. 
To perform “Panda Chant II,” I repeated the foot stamp pattern many times. With enough 
practice, that pattern requires less and less concentration, but I was surprised at how little 
practice it took me to get the pattern going nearly automatically. This may have something to do 
with the fact that the foot stamps are not too dissimilar from walking, which is already a highly 
practiced activity. Part of what makes the pattern so “walkable” is that the pattern involves a 
change of location, first moving to the right, then to the left. That might make it easier than 
stamping in place. When moving to a new location the left foot simply follows the right, and vice 
versa. I am also well prepared generally to take on these sorts of coordination tasks, through my 
personal practice on drum set and pipe organ. However, specific practice was critical to get the 
stamps going automatically—i.e. to a point where they need little conscious control—so that 
focus may be directed elsewhere. In this case, the nasal “aa” pattern in 11/8 requires more effort. 
It is isn’t particularly difficult by itself, but it is longer and asymmetrical. I would say that I 
attend to the vocal pattern more than the stamps, but it is not clear how to situate this instance in 
terms of London’s concept of attentional entrainment. I will return to this issue later. 
The stamping choreography can serve as embodied symbolic off-loading of the 6/8 
cycles. Much as in South Indian tala gestures, each beat is associated with a unique motion (or 
lack thereof). To execute the stamping pattern does not require the feeling of a larger cycle. It 
requires only an eighth-note pulse which is associated with an ordered set of six actions. There 
are four unique movements: the right foot moving right, the left foot moving right, the left foot 
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moving left, and the right foot moving left. Each of these movements corresponds to a unique 
location in the notated meter: the first, second, fourth, and fifth eighth notes of the 6/8 cycle, 
respectively. As the “ring finger” motion signifies the third beat of a tala cycle, the left foot 
stamping left signifies the fourth beat of this cycle. The two rests also have unique embodied 
associations. The rest on the third eighth note occurs when the body is positioned to the right 
(from the perspective of the performer), and the rest on the final eighth note occurs when the 
body is positioned to the left. 
This type of information can also be used to check that the patterns are being performed 
accurately, provided you have abstract theoretical knowledge which relates the cycles of 6/8 and 
11/8 to each other. In this case, it helps to know how the vocal pattern of “aa’s” phases with the 
stamped cycles of 6/8. Each cycle of 11/8 will begin one beat earlier than the last. Because each 
beat corresponds to a gesture, one may confirm that the correct phasing takes place by noting 
which stamping gesture occurs with the beginning of each vocal cycle. The second iteration of 
the vocal pattern should occur with the “no stamp” when the body is positioned leftward, since 
that occurs on beat 6 (one beat earlier in the cycle). The third iteration corresponds with the 
“right foot to the left” stamp (beat 5), and so on, as summarized in example 3.4. That's a rather 
abstract bit of information, but I find it helps. It is also worth keeping in mind that the 6/8 pattern 
functions as a ground for the vocal pattern which occurs over it, but only with intermittent 
conscious checks. The “ground” does not receive much attention. 
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Example 3.4, relation between stamping choreography with the beginning of the alto pattern 
 
Adding the pair of claps on the second eighth note (given previously in example 3.3) 
presents an additional hurdle for the performer. It is neither consistent nor “walk-like” as the 
stamps are, and thus less prone to automation. Continuing to assume attention is mostly directed 
toward the “odd” vocal pattern, I propose to again use the stamping pattern as a set of symbols 
for metric locations in 6/8. The hand claps need not be felt in relation to a downbeat or periodic 
cycle. Instead, they may simply be assigned to the time when your left foot moves to the right, 
knowing that this motion corresponds with the correct location in the notated 6/8. Or, if you 
prefer, you could say that the clapping should occur on the beat after the one where the right foot 
moves to the right. 
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 This approach takes physical practice and relies on symbolic and theoretical knowledge 
of the piece’s temporal structures. But what can we say about attention, and how might this 
situation fit into Justin London’s theory of attentional entrainment? In this example, I considered 
the stamping pattern to be practiced to the point of requiring little “attention.” Instead, it encoded 
temporal information which could be accessed as needed. On the other hand, the comparatively 
difficult vocal pattern, required more conscious effort. My “attention”—in the colloquial sense of 
“paying attention”—was mostly directed at the vocal pattern, albeit with intermittent checks on 
the choreographed movements. The theory of attentional entrainment would likely argue that my 
experience involves entraining my attention with the 11/8 pattern, but not the 6/8 pattern. 
Importantly, my awareness of the 6/8 via gestural signifiers did not require attentional 
entrainment with those motions, even if attention in the colloquial sense was directed toward it. 
This point becomes particularly odd when considering that the 6/8 cycle to which my “attention” 
is not entrained is nonetheless something which I myself physically do. Not only that, those 
stamping motions serve as a conscious “ground” to which the vocal pattern is related. 
I do not think this should motivate a full-scale reworking of the theory of attentional 
entrainment, but it does highlight that “attention” may have a particular meaning within that 
theory. And a lack of attentional entrainment does not preclude temporal awareness of periodic 
events. We might want to consider conventional “attending” as a form of conscious attention. In 
this instance, the “ground” of the foot stamps relies upon embodied cognition “in the feet.” The 
fact that the foot patterns of the group occur in synchrony with temporally structured events of a 
6/8 cycle constitutes what Jones and Large might call a form of “direct knowing.” (Jones and 
Large 1999, 53). They introduce that notion to consider how physical entrainment generally 
reflects attentional entrainment. Here, however, the foot motions either do not reflect that 
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conventional “attention.” They constitute embodied knowledge (and possibly some other form of 
unconscious attention), which is monitored by yet another type of “attention.” And that attention 






3.2 Changing Rhythms in Rhythm Changes: Mehldau and Rossy’s “Anthropology” 
 
 Sometimes improvisation on a jazz standard emerges in dialogue with both distinct 
aspects of the composition and with other interpretations of it. A group of musicians may 
develop ideas in dialogue with previous recordings by other groups, or with previous 
interpretations by that group. Gigging jazz groups may continue to develop ideas in club sets 
from week to week, such that there is a long-term process built on cumulative, communal 
practice. The aura of spontaneity surrounding improvisation may obscure the fact that some 
rhythmic techniques are highly practiced, not just by individuals on their own, but also by groups 
regularly performing together. In this analysis, I invoke a performer’s perspective with no claim 
that the performers themselves approached the passage in the way I describe. The individuals on 
the recording might have done so or they might not. The point is that one could do so. However, 
the goal of this analysis is not to find out how to perform the passage, but to find out how to 
follow the periodic streams, whether as a performer or not. More specifically, this analysis 
explores navigation of two periodic hierarchies in a group context, in which individuals display 
awareness of both streams. 
 Brad Mehldau’s trio recording of “Anthropology” from the 1994 album When I Fall in 
Love follows some basic norms of mainstream jazz improvisation. The piece begins with a 
statement of the melody, along with its associated harmonic structure, and these together form a 
repeating framework around which improvisations occur. (A full transcription is available in the 
appendix.) Much like the foot stamps in Meredith Monk’s “Panda Chant II” and the tala gestures 
of South Indian music, jazz form (or “changes”) constitutes a repeating cycle for the duration of 
the piece to which other ideas relate. However, a jazz form is not comprised of gestures, nor even 
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any particular sounds. The melody in its entirety does not repeat, and chordal changes need not 
actually be sounded at all times. In fact, jazz musicians must often track form with remarkably 
little reinforcement. Rather, the form refers to a framework of ideas to draw upon at given points 
in time. This may involve pitch sets associated with particular harmonies (i.e. “the changes”), a 
melodic idea derived from the main melody, or typical “timekeeping” rhythms, such as a 
“walking” bassline. There is not such a clear and precise correspondence between event and 
form, making the situation more complex, but with added opportunity. There are multiple ways 
of revealing the formal structure, and realizing this variety can be a playful part of the formal 
brinkmanship with which some musicians toy. 
In the case of “Anthropology,” the underlying form is a 32-bar AABA “rhythm changes” 
form at a blistering tempo. At the beginning of the improvisation section, drummer Jorge Rossy 
obscures that form by playing the snare drum every three beats, against the underlying 4/4 meter. 
This superimposed three-beat cycle is not a fleeting feint. It continues along with the form for 
close to two minutes! For the entire duration of this “superimposed” passage, Rossy physically 
and sonically articulates both periodic streams. With his foot, he articulates the 4/4 meter, using a 
typical hi-hat pattern on beats 2 and 4. With his hands, he superimposes groupings of three on 
the snare drum, as shown in Example 3.5. 
 
 
Example 3.5, drum pattern mixing both 4/4 (hi-hat) and superimposed 3s (snare drum) 
 
In some respects, this coordination is similar to multi-tasking required in Meredith Monk’s 
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“Panda Chant II” discussed previously. Much like the foot stamps there, the hi-hat pattern is 
highly practiced for a jazz drummer, and requires little effort or conscious maintenance to 
perform. The superimposed three-beat cycle is also somewhat like the 11-beat nasal “aa” pattern 
from “Panda Chant” in that it creates phasing. The first drum stroke occurs on beat 1, the next on 
4, then 3, then 2. One obvious difference here is how incredibly quickly all of this occurs: three 
measures take about a second and a half. Another important difference between this phasing and 
that found in “Panda Chant II” is the relative simplicity of the snare drum pattern, which simply 
marks every third beat with a drum stroke. This affords the possibility that snare drum strokes be 
taken as symbols of “downbeats” to the superimposed pattern. In that case, bassist Mario Rossy 
and pianist Brad Mehldau need not continuously track the “threes.” Instead, they may find the 
superimposed stream by simply hearing a snare drum stroke, as an absent-minded orchestral 
musician might look to her conductor for a metrically significant gesture. 
There are several instances in which bassist Mario Rossy and Mehldau demonstrate 
awareness of the superimposed “threes” as well as the underlying 32-measure harmonic song 
form. This “awareness” is clearest when the rhythms of what they play align with the 
superimposed threes while the pitch content continues to reflect harmonic changes in 4/4. 
Perhaps the most distinct harmonic moment of the form is found at the arrival of the bridge. 
Whereas the A-sections sit nearly diatonically in Bb, the bridge begins with a D7 harmony. That 
harmony ultimately leads back to the home key via a chain of applied dominants (D7 – G7 – C7 
– F7), but the moment of its arrival presents a shift in pitch material. The associated pitch set 
includes E, F#, and B rather than Eb, F, and Bb or the global key. And because this pitch 
material relates to the form, its occurrence reflects large-scale temporal structure. In this way, the 
 104 
temporal structure may be signified by pitch content.41 Mehldau’s improvisation when the bridge 
arrives in the first chorus of his solo is extraordinary in this regard, for its use of material derived 
from the original melody and simultaneous alignment with the alternate pulse stream. Example 
3.6 transcribes his solo, alongside the snare drum hits every three beats, and the original 
interpretation of the bridge melody for reference. 
 
 
Example 3.6, Brad Mehldau’s improvisation over the bridge of the first solo chorus with snare 
drum hits, and original melody for reference 
 
Prior to the bridge, Mehldau plays syncopated rhythms without a clear relation to the snare drum 
pattern. However, he shifts to a staccato dotted-quarter rhythm to align with the snare drum hits 
                                                 
41 Intriguingly, finding the bridge as a listener does not rely upon grouping smaller units 
(measures) together into larger units. You can know the bridge occurs without knowing where 
the downbeat is, for example. Of course, awareness of form would ideally involve both low-level 
beats and measures as well as the larger formal divisions. 
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precisely at the arrival of the bridge (or at least, as close to it as possible). That rhythmic shift 
itself aligns with the bridge, and includes a shift in pitch material, beginning with F# to highlight 
the D dominant harmony. Remarkably, Mehldau’s phrasing also indicates the location of the 
underlying bridge by using lines derived from the bridge’s melody. The improvisation offers a 
rhythmically augmented and altered version to fit the superimposed threes, but one which also 
stays true to the phrase lengths of the bridge melody. Some notes are expanded and others cut 
such that it does not stray from the eight-measure phrase length of the underlying form.42 
 
 
Example 3.7, Mehldau’s first chorus improvisation, annotated to show relation with original 
melody 
 
While it is clear that Mehldau manages to synchronize melodic shapes with the underlying form 
                                                 
42 The second measure of the bridge solo also employs the rhythm—albeit hypermetrically 
displaced—for the original melody of “I Got Rhythm,” the song from which “Anthropology” 
gets its harmonic changes. 
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and rhythmic figures with the superimposed triple feel, it is difficult to say exactly how. A 
possible strategy involves theoretical knowledge. One could theoretically know that the “threes” 
at the bridge of the first chorus will always align with the third beat of the first measure there. 
This need not be a conscious articulable sort of knowledge. It could instead emerge from 
extensive practice in a group context. However, this explanation is not very satisfying, given the 




Example 3.8, Mehldau’s improvisation and snare drum hits, and original bridge melody for 
reference 
 
As shown in Example 3.8, Mehldau’s improvisation in the third bridge of his solo again aligns 
with the snare drum hits (now in “double time,” with an accent on every second strike of the 
drum), but the relation of those hits to the underlying meter is different. In this third chorus, the 
snare pattern and Mehldau’s improvisation both align with the rhythm of the original bridge 
melody (an eighth-note pickup). This affords an opportunity to quote the original phrase in its 
entirety, with the first two pitches’ metric locations preserved. Interestingly, Mehldau’s phrase 
here also reproduces the bridge’s pitch content without cutting any notes. 
It is theoretically possible to find the rhythm of the superimposed pulse stream by 
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abstractly knowing that on the third chorus it will begin as it did in the original melody (i.e. with 
an eighth note upbeat). Again though, this explanation seems unsatisfying, because its 
applicability is so narrow, as though synchronizing requires knowledge only about very 
particular points in the form. Another possibility draws upon the fact that each of these examples 
is preceded by a full measure rest in the piano before the bridge begins. Perhaps that “breath” 
between phrases is strategic and allows Mehldau a moment to find the snare drum pattern, like 
the distracted musician looking for a conductor’s gesture to help. In that case, finding the other 
pulse rate does not involve a process of entrainment and projection with the snare drum. If a 
musician already knows the rate at which the drum strokes occur, they need hear only one drum 
stroke to know when the next will occur. (Later, I will explore additional strategies, drawing 
upon Ari Hoenig’s pedagogical method book.) 
In the fourth chorus of the piano solo, the bass synchronizes with the snare drum’s three-
beat groupings (again in “double time” dotted quarters). Removing the consistent foundation of a 
“walking bass” destabilizes the underlying 4/4 dramatically, more than just the soloist’s 
departure did. The entire chorus is transcribed in Example 3.9. 
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Example 3.9, fourth chorus solo section of “Anthropology” 
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In the first and last A sections, the bass gives up  “walking” to align with the snare drum strokes, 
but the shift is not as seamless as in the previous example of Mehldau’s piano playing. In 
measures 130-131 and 150-151, Mario Rossy first shifts to dotted rhythms which do not align 
with the snare drum hits. After one (m. 151) or two (mm. 130-131) adjustments, the bass and 
snare do line up and they then continue together until the bridge. These quick adjustments are 
revealing, as they indicate that the bassist may not have been precisely aware of the 
superimposed drum strokes before attempting the transition. If he were, we would expect him to 
have latched on right away. This supports the attending model's constraints on attentional 
entrainment. The bass player does, however, shift immediately to the correct rate, albeit not 
synchronized with the snare drum. Presumably, he already knew the relationship between the 
two periodicities that were occurring, even if he was not attending to the other one. 
The fleeting moment is admittedly very difficult to catch. I found it only with the aid of 
audio software to slow down the passage. Nonetheless, it shows that a process of entrainment 
with a superimposed cycle is possible. It is a “process” because there is evidently some trial and 
error involved. This may reflect the difference between the roles of piano and bass. Mehldau 
plays phrases separated by breaks (or “breaths”) on the piano, whereas Rossy provides a 
continuous texture. He does not stop playing for a measure before making the shift to 
synchronize with the snare drum pattern, as Mehldau had the luxury to do. On the other hand, 
both of Rossy’s transitions back to “walking” basslines demonstrate a knowledge of the 
underlying form. Each of these transitions takes place on the downbeat of the final measure of 
the section (at the end of the bridge, in m. 155, and at the end of the form, in m. 163). That 
shift—without any trial and error adjustments—implies awareness of downbeats in 4/4 as well as 
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formal delineations around eight-measure phrases. 
The entire solo builds to a climactic peak of tension at the end of the fourth chorus. In 
this final A section (mm. 150-157), the bass synchronizes with the snare drum’s dotted-quarter 
“double time,” to create tension with the “fast 4” of the song form. At the same time, the bass 
also builds tension harmonically with a dominant pedal for the entire duration of the final A 
section. This pedal point builds tension, because it occurs in relation to—and in this case in 
stubborn defiance of—the “changes,” whether or not those harmonies are acoustically sounded. 
These two tensions (of pulse stream against underlying, global meter, and of an F pedal against 
harmonic expectations) form what what Stefan Love (2013) termed “subliminal dissonance,” 
because the metric dissonance occurs against something you might not be actually hearing.43 
Add to this, the fact that the pedal is upon the dominant, and it all sets up a desire for resolution 
to tonic harmony. Multiple tensions find euphoric resolution at the start of the following chorus. 
In this example, the musicians could off-load temporal information to each other. Piano 
and bass offer pitch cues about when the bridge occurs in the larger harmonic form, while they 
needn’t always track the three-beat units, knowing that the snare drum will be articulating them. 
They could also use some abstract information about the mathematical relation between the two 
periodicities. It helps to know when the two rates align, or the fact that four groups of three will 
have the same duration as three groups of four. I also imagine this virtuosic group had 
experimented with this sort of temporal clash a lot before performing it here. Practice. Failure. 
Additional attempts. Perhaps they began with much shorter attempts that gradually grew more 
extended into what was recorded. 
                                                 
43 The underlying form is technically sounded in the hi-hat, though that pattern is relatively 
quiet. 
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 The recording fits into a larger set of rhythmically adventurous interpretations of 
standards. Certain standards lend themselves to this sort of treatment more than others. 
Performing such a superimposition in “Anthropology” brings out and develops syncopations in 
the “head” melody, which might not otherwise be such an obvious feature of it. At the end of the 
bridge, for example, the melody’s rhythm and peaks in contour offer a faint outline of a dotted 
quarter rhythm. 
 
Example 3.10, dotted-quarter syncopations in Brad Mehldau’s interpretation of “Anthropology”  
 
Other tunes also have this sort of syncopation built into their melody, and have received similar 
sorts of treatment in improvisations. The tunes “Oleo” and “Billie’s Bounce” for example, have 
an even more striking dotted-quarter syncopation built into their melodies, and likewise have 
inspired this sort of metric modulation in their interpretation. Curiously, “Oleo” is also another 
“rhythm changes” tune lending itself to rhythmic changes. (Bill Evans’s recording from the 
album Everybody Digs Bill Evans offers an excellent example in this regard.) Developing ideas 
upon dotted quarter-note rhythms may also reflect the rhythm of the original “I Got Rhythm.”  
What is remarkable about the Mehldau and Rossy trio’s version of “Anthropology” is the 
duration through which the alternate metric stream is sustained, and the virtuosic synchronization 
of piano, bass, and drums all around this alternate timeline. Snare and hi-hat provide cues about 
the locations of two different periodic cycles. Performing those patterns may constitute 
embodied awareness much like the foot stamps of Meredith Monk’s “Panda Chant II.” They also 
provide aural signifiers about the structure of those two cycles. This helps to off-load 
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information for other group members. Even if they are not constantly aware of the superimposed 
three-beat cycle—and the quick trial and error of the bass player’s synchronization with the snare 
drum suggest he is not—the snare drum hits both construct and signify that cycle. Additionally, 
pitch content of the bass and piano reflects and signifies the form of the global harmonic changes 
based upon the fast 4/4, particularly at the bridge. In order to multi-task as the musicians do, it 




3.3 Not-so-standard Time: Inconsistent Frameworks 
 
Wynton Marsalis’ Standard Time Vol. 1 is a tour de force exploration of standards from 
the great American songbook, full of imaginative arrangements and improvisations. The album 
title refers firstly to the collection as a time for playing standards (it is the first in long series). 
However, there is also a bit of irony in the title, as the “time” of the arrangements is anything but 
standard. The group manipulates normative (“standard”) timekeeping figures with virtuosity and 
refreshing variety. Generally, the rhythmic section’s manipulations are based upon defaults of a  
“walking” bass and “swing” drum pattern. The walking bass is a standard timekeeping strategy 
in which each note the bass plays corresponds with a beat of the meter. Normative drum patterns 
have more variety, but often include hi-hat on beats “2” and “4” as well as a ride cymbal pattern. 
An important feature in establishing (or reinforcing) the underlying meter, is not just that these 
patterns occur on the beat, but also that they occur together. 
Throughout the album drummer Jeff “Tain” Watts and bassist Robert Hurst often perform 
these patterns in synchrony together, not in synchrony with the beat of the song form upon which 
they improvise. For example, in “April in Paris,” they shift patterns to match the quarter-note 
triplet of the main melody. In this case, the drum pattern on which the interpretation is based is 
four beats long. It includes a “swing” ride cymbal pattern along with hi-hat backbeat, and 





Example 3.11, a common “swing” drum and bass pattern 
 
Bass and drums together modulate this pattern so that three beats of example 3.11 fit into two 
quarter-notes of the notated 4/4 meter, as shown in Example 3.12. 
 
 
Example 3.12, superimposed 6:4 version of “swing” drum and bass patterns as performed by 
Watts and Hurst in “April in Paris” from Standard Time, Vol. 1 
 
The idea to do something like this was no doubt inspired by the prominent quarter-note triplet of 
the main melody. The normative interpretation of the composition will have a sounded non-
alignment between the melody and the rhythm section. This arrangement shifts the rhythm 
section to align with that moment in the melody, creating “subliminal dissonance” by eliminating 
a sounding one. 
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Example 3.13, rhythm section 6:4 superimposition as designed to align with the “head” melody’s 
triplet 
 
Given the rhythm of the melody and the patterns of bass and drums, one could easily slip into a 
sense of phrase involving three groupings of four, as annotated with brackets in example 18. 
Until subsequent changes in feel, I am always surprised at how natural the alternate rate feels. 
The resolution of the lower chromatic neighbor figure (D#-E) lands on the beginning of a new 
grouping, and there is no large-scale conflict with the (notated) meter of the changes. The 
temporal relationship is simpler than in previous examples, because the 6:4 alteration aligns with 
every other measure of the song form’s 4/4 (and the hypermeter of the song form is duple). 
However, this interpretation cannot comfortably continue for the duration of their arrangement. 
The bridge and solo sections move to the 4/4 feel as reflected in my notated time signature, and 





Example 3.14, rhythm section feel for the A-sections in out-chorus (following solos) 
 
This change of feel is aligned with the underlying notated measure, but not with the groupings 
marked by brackets in Example 3.14. To feel only the superimposed pulse stream without any 
awareness of the form’s temporal structure would be easy, but the experience would feel 
insecure. There would not be a single unifying metric framework for the piece. Changes of feel 
would occur midway through phrase groups, and tempos would shift. Moreover, changes to and 
from 6:4 would not have the same sense of tension to be released with the arrival of the bridge. 
These temporal feints can engender other (better, I think) sorts of experience. One might 
grasp that there is another framework in operation, but not precisely be able to follow it. To 
understand the numeric relationships in previous examples but not follow them on the recording 
would be an experience of this type. The goal, however, which stems from an awareness of both 
frameworks, would be to follow the structure of the changes with precision without ignoring 
other periodicities as “noise.” Toward that end, it helps to know what’s going to happen next, 
and get to know this specific recording. Information I’ve gone over thus far ought to help, might 
further information, such as the fact that Marsalis later displaces the melody one quarter-note 
triplet later, as transcribed in the appendix. 
Other examples on Standard Time Vol. 1 manipulate the default patterns with less 
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consistency. Their arrangement of “Autumn Leaves” for example, begins by increasing the ratio 
of superimposed beats in each measure from 1:8, to 2:8, to 3:8, to 4:8, to 5:8, to 6:8 to 7:8 until it 
comes into alignment with the beats of the song form (i.e. 8:8). The final eight measures 
similarly decrease the ratio of superimposed beats, from 6:8 to 4:8 to 3:8 to 2:8. Here the critical 
point is that the underlying form is revealed primarily through changes of rate. Every change in 
rate corresponds with a new pair of 4/4 measures. The result may sound like an accelerando and 
ritardando over a songform whose tempo does not change. There is a tension between the 
melody with its harmonic rhythm (which sounds consistent) and the bass and drum note rates 
(which seem to speed up and slow down). Here, it helps to employ some theoretical knowledge, 
particularly around the “odd” groupings of 5-over-8 and 7-over-8. This might entail knowing the 
relationship between measures and these superimposed rates, or simply counting along with the 
knowledge that after five (or seven) events, two measures of the form have passed. 
The arrangement of “The Song is You” (composed by Jerome Kern and Oscar 
Hammerstein) involves more sorts of temporal inconsistency and presents an extraordinary 
temporal challenge which summarizes many of the resources in previous sections. Before 
explaining what occurs, I want to point out just how difficult it is to figure out what occurs 
without analytical guidance. In fact, I’m not sure if I would have been able to follow what 
occurred only by listening. I recall first reading about some of the recording’s features in John 
Riley’s Beyond Bop Drumming (1997) when I was a teenager. As in “April in Paris,” the band 
enters with a version of default “swing” patterns stretched out of alignment with the changes. 
However, in “The Song is You” the alterations deny various normative expectations. I 
recommend listening to the first chorus of the piece again each time new information, or new 
strategies for approaching it, are introduced. 
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The manipulated feel takes a typical jazz pattern and stretches the eighth-note triplets into 
duple eighth notes, as shown in example 3.15. 
    
 
Example 3.15, a typical “swing” drum pattern aligned with a walking bass line and version 
stretched to articulate dotted quarter-note pulses 
 
 
The idea is mathematically similar to the texture found in the Mehldau and Rossy Trio’s 
“Anthropology,” but Marsalis’ group texture fully commits to this superimposed rate of the 
dotted quarter, with the drums (including hi-hat), bass, and piano all articulating a dotted quarter 
pattern. Here, the metric dissonance is entirely subliminal, in contrast to the dissonance sounded 
in various ways in “Anthropology.” (Mehldau’s group had another sort of commitment to the 
alternate feel though, in that his trio sticks with the three-beat units far longer than Marsalis’ 
group does.) 
The piece begins with an intro vamp expressing the tempo that we will later come to 
understand as a superimposed one, with almost no evidence of the global meter of the song form. 
There is no song tune to offer outline phrase length. Still, there may be signs that the group is 
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doing something unusual. The fact that everyone is so synchronized might be a subtle red flag. 
Keyboard chords on every beat is quite odd indeed. Rhythmic tension might also be manifest 
through subtle timing nuances as well. Eventually the disruption of the pattern by “hiccups” (by 
which I refer to moments in which the duration of hits is not consistent with previous material) is 
a clue that the “hits” are not the beats (of the song) As shown in example 3.16, the stream of 
dotted quarter notes is not continuous. 
 
 
Example 3.16, superimposed hits in the intro vamp and beginning of melody for Wynton 
Marsalis’ arrangement of “The Song is You,” with circles indicating deviations from a pure 
“dotted quarter” superimposed rate 
 
 
Perhaps these perturbations work to provide a sense of tension, to destabilize a superimposed 
pattern that might otherwise be too easy to latch onto. The intro vamp is only six measures of the 




Example 3.17, intro vamp to “The Song is You” as two sets of eight hits 
 
Without any perturbations to the flow of dotted quarter, there might be insufficient evidence of 
any “subliminal dissonance” at the outset. And without any reason to believe something’s the 
matter, it might come off as awfully square, perhaps even amateurish. The perturbation also 
destabilizes the underlying (notated) meter, avoiding the first hit which would otherwise fall on a 
downbeat. 
I stated earlier that to hear the beginning without being specifically prepared for what 
occurs (such as by reading through my description and notation), there’s almost no way to realize 
the tempo of the song form until Marsalis enters with the melody. However, the track includes 
the musicians’ count-off to the tune, albeit quietly. If you turn the track up, you can faintly hear 
“1 …  2 …  1 . 2 . 1 2 3 4” with fingers snapping on “two” and “four.” Given what is to come, 
this is very useful, if you know how to find it. It provides a clear indication of the song’s meter 
and enough time to entrain to it. It’s also remarkable that the decision was made to include the 
count-off for this track, and not others. Clearly, someone was aware that it adds something 
valuable to the recording. I like that they left it rather quiet, as an Easter egg for listeners who 
were listening very closely, intent on figuring out what was going on. 
The arrangement includes other subtle alterations and inconsistencies as it moves through 
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the song form, beyond the “hiccup” of the opening vamp. Example 3.18 provides a lead sheet of 
the way the rhythm section hits lie against the song form. It is constructed to deny many possible 
expectations and maximize disorientation without altering phrase lengths of the song. The first 
A-section begins much like the opening vamp, with an analogous hiccup among the 
superimposed dotted quarter-notes. However, measures 10-13 continue the dotted quarter feel 
without the second hiccup. In the second A and the final A, the hits begin with an eighth note 
after the beginning of the section, allowing the hits to process as a continuous stream of dotted 
quarter notes without any hiccup. (Watts takes advantage of the continuity by playing a feel at 
double the rate of the dotted quarter note.) 
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In a way, these subtle changes and adjustments are in keeping with general aspects of the form. 
The song form, a 64-measure AABA structure, does not have identical A-sections. Each A 




Example 3.19, The beginning measures of “The Song is You,” as notated in The Real Book 
 
The difference between the A-sections is in the latter half. In the first A-section, the harmony and 
melody do not resolve to C major, but they do in subsequent A-sections. I might argue that 
altering the hits in the second A-section and final A-section to be a continuous series of dotted 
quarters constitutes a sort of resolution to a more continuous periodicity and that this parallels 
the harmonic and melodic resolution in those subsequent A-sections. 
Unlike the melody to “April in Paris,” the melody of “The Song Is You” is not 
particularly distinct in its rhythm. The arrangement adds rhythmic interest to an otherwise 
rhythmically boring melody. When Marsalis enters with the melody after six measures of 
introductory vamp, his is the only rhythm which aligns with meter of the changes, and this 
constitutes a reversal of roles. As the rhythm section performs the inconsistent superimposed 
hits, only the melody provides a clear indication of “the beat.” It is not a stable enough indication 
of the beat to take a timekeeping role, however. It includes phrases separated by rests as well as 
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ideas which do not perfectly align with every beat. At the bridge, there is another reversal of 
roles, back to something more conventional. When the rhythm section resolves to plays the 
song’s “time,” the trumpet plays syncopated figures in new groupings of five eighth notes. 
What I consider a satisfying experience of this piece—or, to be specific, of the intro and 
“head” of the piece—may use all of the preceding information in order to navigate the temporal 
framework. Presuming my chart accurate, it provides a lot of usable information, about when 
changes of feel happen in the form. My suggestion is that you start by listening for the quiet 
count-off and tapping (or moving) along in some meaningful way. Drawing upon the relationship 
to walking, I suggest alternating right and left foot taps, because they also provide some 
information about the duple hypermeter of the form. Whatever mechanism is chosen, the taps 
outline the meter of the song, even when it is unsounded, as is the case at the start of the piece. If 
you know ahead of time how the band hits lie within the meter (i.e. having read through example 
23), this is actionable information to aid in tapping along. It is helpful to know that your tapping 
will align with the rhythm section hits in measures 6 and 7, but not in measure 4. While tapping 
is likely the most secure way of following the changes, especially as a performer, it is not 
necessary to follow the structure. An easier, yet perhaps less secure possibility afforded to 
listeners is to simply allow oneself to entrain to the different pulse rates, while following along in 
the score. This may be a first step en route to preserving the underlying meter, but on the other 
hand, it might take away from the sense of resolution when the rhythm section moves to ideas 
which align with the meter. Regardless, following along in the score gives theoretical 




3.4 Ari Hoenig and Jean-Michel Pilc’s “Sinister” Temporal Games 
 
 Ari Hoenig and Jean-Michel Pilc are frequent collaborators finding and pushing the limits 
of temporal capacity in improvised jazz. Their original compositions—such as Hoenig’s 
“Birdless” discussed previously—toy with creative temporal relationships, and their 
interpretations of standards often include a barrage of conflicting signals and superimposed feels. 
I still recall from my personal drum lessons with Hoenig, that he referred to his bands as being 
“sinister.” They were “sinister” not only because their ideas might throw off listeners, but 
because musicians would go so far as trying to mislead each other! The goal was likely not to 
truly lose fellow bandmates, but to test each other’s limits. The two examples discussed in this 
section highlight these “sinister” traps in which musicians play around with sonic symbols of the 
form as well as false flags. And a meaningful aspect of experience here involves identifying 
which markers are false and which are true. Among these markers are not only stretched and 
manipulated default patterns, but also rhythmic and melodic symbols of form and meter. 
 Before exploring the Jean-Michel Pilc trio’s interpretation of “So What,” it is worth 
noting that in Miles Davis’s original recording on Kind of Blue, the upright bass takes the 
melody. The more typically “melodic” instruments follow each of the bass’s ideas with a pair of 
hits. The melody begins during a pick-up measure (a hypermetrically weak measure) such that 
the arrival of the tonic pitch falls on the downbeat of a strong measure (sometimes immediately 
followed by the fifth, A), and the hypermetrically weak measures emphasize diatonic neighbors 





Example 3.20, the melody of “So What” 
 
Given its well-known status, we may also consider that this melody provides metric information 
when it occurs. That temporal information involves two phases. First, the scalar portion signifies 
“here comes the downbeat,” and the arrival of the root (D and later Eb) signifies “here is the 
downbeat.” 
In the Jean-Michel Pilc Trio’s version (from the album Welcome Home, with François 
Moutin on bass and Ari Hoenig on drums) the piano begins with the melody in its low register 
(or “bass”) for the first A-section. Then, in the subsequent A-section, the bass takes the melody, 
while the piano interleaves rhythmically displaced versions of it. As shown in measures 10 to 17 
of the transcription in Example 3.21, the piano’s interjections land the tonic everywhere except 
the downbeat of strong measure. In so doing, they could imply “false” downbeats, or at the very 
least destabilize the meter. They generally fall between the melodic ideas of the bass, but also 
ratchet up intensity by reducing the space between each subsequent idea. Pilc is in a particularly 
good position to lay down these false signals in the second A-section, having just played the 
melody in its “true” form, aligned with the changes as expected. The play between piano and 
bass seems to continue an important thread in the composition, the question of who has the 
melody, or at least whose melody aligns with the meter in the original temporal context. It was 
an important moment to have the bass take the melody in Miles Davis’ original. Here the piano’s 









The other defining aspect of “So What” besides the melody are the pairs of chordal hits which 
follow each phrase. These hits occur in their original form (that is, like the Miles Davis version) 
in the first A-section. Each pair begins on the third beat of the measure, with the upper voice 
stepping down in pitch, with upper voice moving from B to A. Each also includes a tame 
syncopation. In each pair, the first hit is a sustained dotted quarter-note, whereas the second hit is 
attacked staccato, on an offbeat. Pilc plays with this idea of “dotted-quarter moving down a step” 
as he accompanies the bridge. There he constructs a pulse stream built around the rate of a 
dotted-quarter using pairs of notes moving down a whole step and then back (in the local mode 
of Eb Dorian). At a local level, these sustained “floating” dotted-quarters mask the beats and 
downbeats of the 4/4 meter, but at a larger level they highligh larger scale formal boundaries. 
They begin precisely at the start of the bridge and end just before the return of the A-section 
leaving time for the pickup measure that returns to D dorian. (The beginning of the solo section 
includes additional play with the chordal pairs placing them in still other metric locations.) 
 Hoenig and Pilc’s collaborations often use melodies to lead or mislead listeners (and 
fellow musicians) about the temporal framework. In their interpretations of “So What” and 
“Giant Steps,” the melodic symbols are sourced from the composition being interpreted, but this 
is not always the case. Melodic and rhythmic devices which indicate (as opposed to obscure) the 
form are not merely aids. Although of course they can help listeners in metric position-finding, 
they also provide aesthetically powerful evidence that—despite embarking on extraordinary 
tangents—the group is not lost (even if the audience is). This an important distinction: a 
perceiver need not follow the form to be aware that the group has done so. Of course, individual 
musicians may sometimes get lost, especially given the sinister brinkmanship which occurs. The 
Hoenig trio’s version of “Anthropology” from the album Inversations plays with its material in 
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this way during the latter half of the solo section. 
About three minutes into the recording, the group moves through a remarkable variety of 
superimposed frameworks, while highlighting the form using a rhythmic and melodic figure 
drawn from the bridge of the tune. Not only is this quotation a useful resource, its presence just 
when the form might seem lost adds to the awe of the piece. The formal marker has two 
components, both derived from the main tune. First, there is a trio of staccato notes on eighth-
note off-beats in the fourth measure of the bridge. Second, there is a quote of the melody in the 
sixth through eighth measures of the bridge. Example 3.22 situates the two ideas in the context of 
the rhythm changes form. 
To hear these figures without abstract theoretical knowledge to go with them is not very 
informative. They do not occur in a temporally “strong location” in the form, and the group does 
not play them on every chorus. At a local level, they do not align with the meter. The three 
staccato hits occur in metrically weak locations, and the melodic contour seems to emphasize the 
rate of a dotted quarter-note, as shown previously in Example 3.10. However, with the 
knowledge of their derivation, and hence their signification, they become a powerful resource 
about temporal structure at both a local and larger scale. In a general sense, the two figures 
signify “this is the middle of the bridge” and “this is the end of the bridge” respectively. To 
know in advance that the three staccato hits end just before the local downbeat also allows a 




Example 3.22, recurring “hits” and quotation during solo section of the Ari Hoenig Trio’s 




This type of information is very useful in contexts such as the final few choruses of the 
performance. These are extraordinary for the variety and complexity of superimposed pulse 
streams, but those superposed ideas still show links to the song form, based upon where they 
begin, end, or change structure. Figures of this sort could emerge over the course of a single 
recording, but in this case, the figure is part of their other versions of “Anthropology.” It is part 
of their arrangement, whether written down or simply developed through regular gigging. 
 Following the piano solo (3’04” on the recording), bassist Johannes Weidenmuller (who 
collaborated with Hoenig on a pair of books about metric manipulation) superimposes a pulse 
stream in groupings of 3/4, quoting the famous bassline of the song “Footprints,” by Wayne 
Shorter. Example 3.23 transcribes this chorus, annotated between staves with indications of 
superimposed meters. In this case, the familiar melodic contour adds to the subterfuge, and the 
piano doubling adds to the strength of its metric pull. The beginnings and ends of the line 
correspond with larger-scale formal locations: the bass line begins with the start of a new chorus, 
and stops during the bridge (perhaps also due to harmonic considerations), returning for the last 
A-section and ending with the chorus. This procedure is similar to those of Marsalis’s 
arrangements on Standard Time Vol. 1. While the superimposed pulses do not align with the 
local beats of the form, changes of feel do correspond with the boundaries of large-scale 
sections. This moment carries significant tension, despite the fact that sounded stimuli are in 
synchrony, pedaling F minor harmony in 3/4. The bass and piano are only “subliminally 
dissonant” with the unsounded 4/4 meter. (They are also subliminally dissonant with the 
unsounded harmonic changes, which the ostinato pedals over.) 
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Example 3.23, the first chorus after piano solo in “Anthropology” as performed by the Ari 




 The following chorus presents another temporal shift whose point of change corresponds 
with boundaries of the form. As shown in Example 3.24, Hoenig and Weidenmuller shift the rate 
of their “walking” and “swing” patterns with a ratio of 5:4. Although the shifted rate does not lay 
easily across the meter of the tune, the moment of change to this feel reflects the form. It occurs 




Example 3.24, the second chorus after piano solo in “Anthropology” as performed by the Ari 




Navigating the changes with this quintuplet shift is difficult without some preparation and 
a strategy for following along. With a score in hand (or equivalent knowledge), it is possible to 
know in advance when the shift will occur (i.e. at the second A section) and what sort of shift it 
will be (to five-over-four). This sort of preparation can help to avoid the (incorrect) feeling that 
the group sloppily increased in tempo. Part of the ease in simply sliding into a new tempo, is that 
the shift to five-over-four does not involve such a dramatic change of rate as does, say, three-
over-two. There is also little sounded material that might highlight groupings of five here. The 
hi-hat and bass both continue to construct ideas with duple groupings. However, if you know in 
advance when this shift will occur, you can allow attentional entrainment to slip into the new 
rate, while applying a symbolic or embodied counting strategy to track the groupings of five. 
This might mean vocally counting “1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,…” or coding the same information 
as a set of actions. (One could tap on every beat, but cycle through all five fingers to generate a 
cycle of five events, for example.) As if to offset the difficulty of the material, the quintuplet 
passage leads directly into articulation of the bridge hits described earlier, before moving on to 
other material. 
 The extraordinary climax leading to the drum solo (transcribed in example 3.24) 
simultaneously brings together many different pulse streams to ultimately release not at the top 
of the chorus, but at those same staccato hits which signify the fourth measure of the bridge. The 
multi-layered tension begins out of an idea in the bass: four-note groupings oscillating up and 
down a step at the rate of a dotted quarter-note. As with the “Footprints” quotation, the piano 
then latches on and synchronizes with the subliminally dissonant, superimposed 12/8. The drums 
also participate in the superimposed dotted quarter-note, but Hoenig’s pattern groups those units 




Example 3.25, climactic buildup to drum solo in “Anthropology” 
 
In keeping with previous discussion, the rhythmic figures do not align with low-level meter, but 
significant changes to those figures align with and demonstrate awareness of larger-level form. 
 137 
In this case, the dotted quarter feel ends at the start of the bridge. There, the melodic ideas gain 
momentum with an increase in rate and register. Brilliantly, this final lead-up occurs on off-beats 
to seamlessly connect with the offbeat hits which quote and signify the fourth measure of the 
bridge. The hits represent a release of tension by offering a clear indication of the form. The fact 
that the drum solo begins there, in the fifth measure of the bridge, is unusual yet revealing. More 
typically, transfers from one solo to the next occur at the beginning of the form, perhaps because 
it is a temporally strong and stable location. In this case, given the sinister traps laid out by the 
group, one could see this mid-bridge location, along with these hits, as the most stable location in 
the form. The hits provide information about both the local meter and large-scale structure, as 
long as you know how to read them! 
In this analysis, I have taken the perspective of both performer as well as an omniscient 
listener (with a score and a specific recording to work with). Some resources, such as the ability 
to know precisely when a shift will occur, are not available in improvised contexts. The 
performers may have managed to navigate the examples without needing the very resources I 
bring up. If that is the case, there are other resources and techniques at their disposal, which 
future research might aim to explore. Or perhaps they do utilize these resources in some sense. 
Knowing what’s coming next is still possible from the perspective of a performer in group 
improvisation. Performers can choose what to play next and also clue in bandmates about what is 
coming using any number of symbols, whether quoting a meaningful melody, making eye 
contact, or literally shouting out directives. 
Another possibility is that these performers do not need the expanded set of resources I 
discuss at all, or that they need them to a much more limited extent. Perhaps this reflects the idea 
that these resources serve as a stopgap for difficult tasks, not a permanent necessity. The tasks 
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for which they are required depend on the skill of the person in question. It likely takes me a 
good deal more focus (and perhaps “attention”) to track a form while performing ideas at another 
rate than it does for Jeff “Tain” Watts or Ari Hoenig. Rhythmic virtuosi may not need to slowly 
dissect a score or count beats with hand gestures in order to navigate a complex passage. At the 
other end of the spectrum, these sorts of strategies may also be beneficial for a middle schooler 
learning a comparatively easy task, like clapping on “2” and “4.” The point, and segue to the 
next section, is that these resources may serve a pedagogical function because they are purposed 
for situations that are difficult for the person experiencing the music at hand. And learning 





CHAPTER 4: TEMPORAL RESOURCES IN PEDAGOGY 
 
Needing to consider score information, numeric calculations, and encoded gestures as an 
additional (or “expanded”) set of resources may be a peculiarity of perspectives rooted in 
mainstream music theory and psychology. Some omissions in these disciplines were framed in 
Chapter 1 as byproducts of a listener-centric perspective at the expense of other possibilities. 
Pedagogy’s focal point, on the other hand, is not so listener-centric, nor is it so restrictive about 
the contexts and permissible resources involved in musical experience. The idea of music as 
something you do as well as perceive is central in pedagogy, as is the multi-modal perspective of 
performers. In the introduction to Rhythmic Training (1969), Richard Starer explains the priority 
he places upon developing musical literacy,44 and Suzanne Bloch’s foreword to his book praises 
his approach for its concern with music as “either read, performed or heard” (Starer 1969, 2). 
Several of the sources discussed previously as counterexamples to the mainstream trends in 
music psychology were also drawn from pedagogical journals. Persellin’s (1992) study 
discussing the effectiveness of visual, auditory, and kinesthetic strategies for rhythm was 
published for the National Association for Music Education, and McCoy and Ellis’ (1992) 
findings that large muscle movements provide the best aid in meter discrimination tasks was 
published for the Council for Research in Music Education. 
I associate pedagogy with two notions of “practice”: one, in the sense of doing something 
(i.e. praxis), the other, in the everyday sense of practicing, i.e. practicing a skill to improve it. 
Music theory does sometimes explore the former, by attempting description of performers’ 
                                                 
44 More specifically, “the ability to transform visual symbols of rhythmic notation in to time-
dividing sounds” (Starer 1969, 3). 
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experience. This is quite different from analyzing nuances of a particular performance, which is 
more common, but may erase the role of the musician playing it.45 The other category, what it is 
like to learn to perform such-and-such a piece, remains more or less the exclusive domain of 
pedagogy. With priority on learning and progress, pedagogical methods do not prioritize 
describing someone’s current abilities, or some status quo, as psychology generally does. 
Relatedly, notions about cognitive limits are not very productive topics either. After all (as Diana 
Deutsch explains in her introduction to the first issue of Music Perception (2004, 286)), it will 
remain unclear which mechanisms are shaped by experience and to what extent. In sum, 
pedagogy can avoid some foci and assumptions of mainstream music theory and psychology 
described at the outset of this project, because it highlights performers’ perspectives and values 
specific practice. 
In this section, I consider how an expanded set of temporal resources and strategies is 
already more present in pedagogy, as well as how it might be incorporated into pedagogy. The 
starting point here is that exceptional cases of metric multi-tasking motivate the extra techniques 
not only because traditionally conceived attentional entrainment is insufficient, but because the 
tasks are difficult. Anything challenging involving navigation between some events and their 
temporal framework may benefit from use of scores, transcriptions, mathematical calculations, 
                                                 
45 Nicholas Cook’s “Analysing Performance and Performing Analysis” (1999), points out 
this erasure of the musicians in Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s conception of music, and also criticizes 
theorists (Wallace Berry and Eugene Narmour in particular) for setting up a relationship in which 
“good” performances are supposed to reflect particular structural analytic points. In other words, 
the direction of ideas is too often from analysis to performance, leading to a general 
“authoritarian” tone of music-theoretical writing about performance (Cook 1999, 239-240).  
Suzanne Cusick’s (1994) discussion of what it feels like to play the chorale prelude on “Aus 
tiefer Not” from Bach’s Clavierübung is a prime example for attempting description of 
performers’ activities. She frames the analysis as something theorists should do more of (as part 
of what would constitute feminist music theory). And indeed, since her publication, that direction 
of inquiry has grown considerably. 
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embodied actions, and symbolic off-loading. Additionally, the usefulness of the resources 
depends on context including the person who uses them. I chose virtuosic temporal tasks to make 
the difficulties apparent for the expected readership of professional musicians. For a child, the 
same strategies will be needed for far easier tasks. To say that they are relevant to simpler 
musical tasks may require a reworking of concepts of meter, perception, and attention, a point I 
return to in the conclusion of this dissertation. 
The “expanded” set of temporal resources and techniques are not very unified beyond 
their omission from mainstream discussions, and the distinction between static and dynamic 
temporal resources is not one which pedagogues generally make. Similarly, pedagogy’s 
openness to more sorts of experience does not translate to an equal use of the many resources I 
have acknowledge. The use of scores and abstract theoretical knowledge, for example, comes 
with a greater degree of caution than the use of physical actions does. Score-based musical 
literacy is often considered critically incomplete without aural training, leading to “sound before 
symbol” approaches. The reverse is often true for physical actions, which often provide help for 
perceiving during early stages of learning. 
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4.1 Actions First 
 
 Practical texts on rhythm often involve exercises in which a rhythm is given with a metric 
context, along with instruction on how to articulate the meter. It is quite remarkable how closely 
some pedagogical designs mirror the patterns of the alto singers in Monk’s “Panda Chant II” 
discussed previously. (And vice versa.) Starer’s Rhythmic Training includes the beat of meter as 
a notated stream of quarter notes against a rhythm above it. As he explains, “the upper line may 
be sung, hummed or spoken on a neutral syllable; the lower line should be tapped by hand or 
foot, or it may be conducted” (Starer 1969, 4). As in “Panda Chant II,” one stream of activity is 
vocalized, and another embodied through other physical actions. However, the metric actions of 
tapping or conducting are only a first stage of learning. “Eventually the lower line should only be 
‘felt,’ that is, it should be done in silence” (Starer 1969, 4). The implication here is that 
physically embodying meter is easier than simply “feeling” meter internally, or at least 
developmentally prior.46 Learning to feel meter internally emerges after having physically 
performed it. Starer’s method, along with others, presents the experience of metric cycles as an 
action which is eventually “internalized.” 
 Anne C. Hall’s Studying Rhythm (1989) takes a similar approach with more explicitness 
about conducting patterns’ potential for off-loading. 
                                                 
46 The pedagogical preference for active, physical strategies to develop metric capacity seems 
to be inversely related to age (see Persellin 1992). This may be in part a practical solution to 
issues maintaining interest in younger children. Moving around simulates play, but having 
children learn about meter through visual symbols may be seem more like reading a book. 
Perhaps the point is not that younger-aged children are better at learning through movement, but 
that they are simply worse at learning through other mediums. (College-aged students also show 
improvement learning metric types through physical motions. See for example, McCoy and Ellis 
1992.) 
 143 
Conducting the meter both helps keep the beat steady and lets the hand take care of 
counting beats. We should conduct while singing…so that conducting becomes natural. 
Only when we can perform the beat patterns without thinking about them does 
conducting become a help. If beating time seems a hindrance rather than a help—one 
more thing to think about—then it should be practiced assiduously, for it is an essential 
tool for musicians. However, we must not grow dependent on our hands to keep the beat 
because they will, in many musical situations, be otherwise occupied we should therefore 
also practice the studies without conducting. (Hall 1989, 3) 
 
The idea that the hand takes care of counting beats without thinking about them gives the hand 
its own agency and suggests that information is encoded in the gestures. To say that they should 
be performed “without thinking” further supports an idea that it is involved in off-loading, that 
the lack of attention needed is an important facet of that conducting. Specific (“assiduous”) 
practice is also critical, as it reduces the attentional demands on these gestures. But if you have to 
think about them too much, they become a hindrance. Hall’s caution not to grow dependent on 
our hands for beat-keeping also underscores the productiveness of the gestures in counting beats. 
If they were not so helpful, there would not be a risk of becoming dependent on them. The 
progression from performing gestures to feeling meter without acting it out again suggests a 
notion of meter and beat (much like Starer’s) as an internalization of real actions. Hall’s and 
Starer’s books are typical in this regard. Other texts reflect the same method. Paul Hindemith’s 
Elementary Training for Musicians (1949) begins with exercises in which a beat is tapped, 
clapped, or walked. Those beats are subsequently grouped into measures by replacing taps with 
counting out loud. Then that counting out loud is replaced by counting “mentally.”47 Kazez 
(1989), for example, puts forth the option to “count the beat silently” as the last means of 
                                                 
47 Hindemith’s first chapter provides exercises given only a beat, which is tapped. The 
concept of measure is introduced in the second chapter by simply replacing tapped beats with 
verbally counted beats (and a certain cardinality at which to repeat). Then the instruction is given 
to “count mentally” (Hindemith 1949, 10). 
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tracking beats following “external” techniques such as tapping, conducting, and counting out 
loud (Kazez 1989, xxii). And Krueger (2011) sets up the goal of developing “an internal feeling 
of the pulse” by walking in place, shifting weight, or tapping the beat silently with large arm 
movements (Kruger 2011, 3). 
 The idea that silently counting or feeling a beat without moving is typically the last stage 
in a progression of exercises suggests that it is also the most advanced. In some ways, of course, 
it might be easier than doing it by moving. Not executing a physical motion is, after all, one less 
thing to keep track of. But, assuming gestures are properly practiced, why might taking them 
away make the task more difficult? One answer is that the motions, an observable counting 
activity are replaced by an imagined activity. It remains neurologically and experientially real, 
but takes away the advantages afforded by larger motions. The other difficulty of silently 
counting might have to do not so much with feeling a meter, but feeling it well (i.e. securely and 
steadily). Hall’s point that conducting “helps keep the beat steady” underscores that physical 
constraints on motions (as opposed to neuronal oscillations) may be a productive feature. The 
tempo of beats may be steadier when associated with physical actions, because durations depend 
on distinct properties of the action, such as speed of muscular contraction, acceleration of bones, 
etc. It becomes steadier still if a physical motion’s comfortable temporal range fits the 
periodicity it represents. A pattern of expectancies (i.e. “attentional entrainment”), by contrast, 
lacks such physical limits and is not steadied by consistency in physical exertion. Confronted by 
an odd stimulus, our expectancies can quickly shift and cut beats short. The inertia of embodied 
swinging and swaying resists rapid changes. This helps explain advice given in Carol Krueger’s 
Progressive Sight Singing (2011), in which she cautions that “clapping will not internalize beat 
because it doesn’t involve changing/shifting body weight” (Krueger 2011, 3). I take this 
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statement to mean that techniques that do involve shifting body weight are better at internalizing 
a beat, not that clapping is worthless in such a regard. (And it does involve changing body 
weight, after all, but not very much.) 
Robert Abramson’s Feel It! Rhythm Games for All (1998) also relies on a notion of 
temporal training as an internalization of real movements and aligns tempos with different types 
of action, using clock metaphors to describe the function of those actions. As is typical of texts 
aimed especially at younger learners, Feel It! offers more variety beyond conducting with the 
hand. For example, to “experience 3-beat movement,” Abramson suggests a modified marching 
pattern, involving (1) a bend at the knee, (2) a step onto the same foot, and (3) motion up onto 
the ball of that foot. Another exercise—one of the first ones in the book—involves turning 
oneself into a “pendulum clock.”48 Participants mimic a pendulum by swinging their arms across 
the body and up to shoulder height on one side, before similarly swinging to the other side. A 
teacher leads the group by speaking the word “Swing… swing” as he performs the motion, and 
all students synchronize with his accompanying words as well as his motions. The addition of the 
words spoken by the teacher takes advantage of the fact that aural stimuli provide easier cues for 
entrainment than visual ones.49 To adjust the tempo of the game, the teacher adjusts the 
construction of the human pendulum. For slower tempos, Abramson recommends a “grandfather 
clock,” which incorporates the torso and knee-bends. At faster tempos, the clocks become 
smaller. “Tiny clocks” use only wrists and hands, and “tiny-tiny clocks” use just four fingers 
(Abramson 1998, 7). 
                                                 
48 For Abramson, it is also important that these are not be exercises but games, in order to 
engage the participants. 
49 See, for example, Cameron and Grahn (2014, 114) 
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Dalcroze Eurhythmics is a more well-known embodied system of rhythmic pedagogy. 
Elsa Findlay constructs practical applications in her book Rhythm and Movement (1971) and 
similarly links physical actions to a more robust, steady feeling of meter. For Findlay, rhythmic 
experiences are made more reliable by the addition of physical movement. She charges that 
notational symbols bear “no relation to a real feeling for time” (Findlay 1971, 16). Her notion of 
“real” feeling of time likely critiques the static nature of scores and symbols of duration. Findlay 
also raises a worthwhile point regarding counting. For her, “time, however, cannot be measured 
by counting. At best counting can only mark the beat, not the time lapse” (Findlay 1971, 16). I 
have previously considered various methods of counting as ways of marking off time, but 
Findlay underscores that counting tracks a quantity of events which have passed and not 
necessarily the “space between.” However, counting strategies with more significant associated 
motions, such as the “grandfather clock” described in Abramson (1998, 7) do have activity 
between beat events (or as she calls it, the “time lapse”). I would not consider this a critique of 
time-marking strategies such as counting out loud or tapping, but a rationale for why physical 
activities can make time-keeping more robust. All these methods have a modest (though 





4.2 Sound before Symbol 
 
Visual notation’s lack of actual acoustic sound is both its asset and point for critique. In 
introductory pedagogy, where musical literacy is the goal itself, authors stress the importance of 
incorporating sounds in the process of learning the notational system. The goal of this move is to 
stress a sound experience, not just a fractional set of relationships. In texts where literacy is 
assumed (i.e. where notational literacy is not the goal itself), notation is nonetheless approached 
with care that its aural associations not be omitted. Peter Schubert’s (2008) book on Renaissance 
counterpoint (admittedly not a “rhythm” book), introduces printed scores as essentially 
incomplete—and boring—without the sounding music they represent (Schubert 2008, xii). His 
method is to focus training upon the “outer ear” over the “inner ear.” By this he means to stress 
activities with actual sounds such as composing at the piano or singing with colleagues, as 
opposed to only reading and writing at a desk (Schubert 2008, xvi). This type of 
recommendation seeks to solidify visual notation’s relationship with aural experience. Notation 
should not only represent a configuration of sounds, but also the experience of those sounds. 
That is Schubert’s goal, at least. 
The prioritization of aural training when teaching notational literacy often links with 
“sound before symbol” approaches. That sounds are “first” can be taken to mean aural training 
literally precedes abstract explanations of mathematical relationships in pedagogical 
progressions and also that it is given more weight overall either in class time or graded work. 
Micheál Houlahan and Philip Tacka’s From Sound to Symbol (2009, drawing upon the Kodály 
method) and Maureen A. Carr’s article “The Importance of Sound Before Symbol in Developing 
Intuitive College Musicians” (1989) are two good examples of this approach. Gary Karpinski’s 
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four sequential phases of melodic dictation from “hearing” to “memory” to “understanding” to 
“writing” offers as a more nuanced progression from sound to symbol. And Joshua Palkki (2010) 
explores the productiveness of rhythm syllables in those intermediary phases, referring to some 
general psychology of mnemonic devices. 
Rhythm syllable usage has not caught on to the degree that solfege has, but there are 
nonetheless many systems available, and Palkki offers a good survey. Some systems use existing 
words, some use numbers, and other use original syllables.50 The application of syllables may 
also be “beat-based” or “symbol-based.” Beat-based systems depend upon metric location (e.g. 
on a downbeat or not) whereas symbol-based systems depend on the type of note (e.g. quarter-
note, eighth note, etc.). Palkki’s preferred system is the “Takadimi” method, which is a beat-
based method constructed by Hoffman, Pelto and White (1996). It is closely related to the 
Kodaly method, but also “influenced by the authors’ extensive study of Indian music” (Hoffman, 
Pelto, and White, 1996, 14). 
In their advanced rhythmic pedagogy, Hoenig and Weidenmueller treat notation as a tool, 
but also a last resort. 
The text and book examples should be referred to if necessary, only after listening to and 
trying to absorb the musical examples by ear. The idea is that these musical examples 
should be learned primarily aurally, in an organic way. This will aid you in making 
musical decisions that are dictated by emotion and not mathematics. (Hoenig and 
Weidenmuller 2011, 4) 
 
I’ve previously considered scores as a useful resource which provides information about 
temporal relationships. The fact that they recommend using it only if necessary might reflect a 
                                                 
50 Cynthia Crump Taggart (1989) explains that rhythm syllables’ connection to vocabulary 
for audiation can make them more effective than numbers. Presumably this includes both 
systems with real words and ones with original syllables. 
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sound before symbol approach. Or it could intentionally construct a desirable difficulty. To 
withhold scores and examples forces work and engagement on the part of the reader-perceiver. 
Like a student forced to take dictation before seeing the solution, it solidifies an experience of 
sound, rather than providing abstract knowledge. It might also attempt to avoid the pitfall of an 
“artificial” sounding execution in real performance. Figuring out temporal relationships in a 
score and performing them can require abstract thinking which destabilizes the consistency of 
beats. As material becomes more difficult, the tempo may drag, for example. 
At the same time, Hoenig and Weidenmueller’s recommendations also seem like a 
preemptive defense of their aesthetic style. It allows the claim that they, although their book is 
quite mathematical, make musical decisions through “emotions.” It also set up an odd 
relationship to theoretical resources. They seem to be in the paradoxical position of wanting to 
students to learn odd temporal relationships, but not be seen as overly math-y. The book itself is 
organized by mathematical relationships. Perhaps the hope is to avoid excessive counting. To 
make decisions “dictated by emotions,” may be a bit romantic, but I think the ideas is that—
during musical improvisations—one ought not be thinking about mathematical relationships. 
With adequate practice their usage ought not require conscious calculation in the moment, just as 
a singer thoroughly prepared for an aria ought not be thinking about solfège syllables. It is one 
thing to know how a 5:4 rhythm will fall against beats of 4/4. But it is quite another to do it, to 
do it evenly, and to feel the tension between the two pulse streams.  
It’s easy to come away from sound-before-symbol approaches with the idea that notation 
is a problem. Hoenig and Weidenmueller imply that learning from notation is not “organic,” and 
that decisions based upon it may “lack emotion” or be “dictated by mathematics.” They do not 
actually say this, however. Instead, they minimize score reliance, because there are substantial 
 150 
benefits to avoiding it. The reliance on scores may be a product of my own position as a theorist 






4.3 Learning to Multi-Task 
 
Hoenig and Weidenmuller incorporate both action-first and sound-before-symbol 
approaches into their two-volume series (2009, 2011) on “contracting and expanding time within 
form,” along with stipulations which overwhelm attention. They begin from an idea that learning 
to feel a framework stems from an actual articulation of meter. However, they design exercises 
for advanced metric multi-tasking of the sort described in Chapters 2 and 3 (which they call 
“superimposed metric modulation”), and they begin with an expectation of musical literacy. 
Their system is designed to cover a very wide range of temporal relationships, so it is fitting that 
the actions are essentially claps and foot taps. These actions do not mark time-lapse as well as 
Findlay proposes, but their quickness facilitates versatility of tempo. And that quickness would 
be impeded by choices to use larger muscle motions. Those large-muscle movements could be 
enlisted, but Hoenig and Weidenmueller do not make such a suggestion. The other substantial 
difference between this and previous texts is the insistence on developing various actions which 
do not align with the form in straightforward ways. However, I will argue that the non-alignment 
of actions prepares the learner for situations in which meter is only indirectly referred to, or for 
times when attention spreads thin across many stimuli.  
In preparation for “real” improvisations, Hoenig and Weidenmueller’s exercises occur 
over actual song forms, rather than only a meter. Importantly, they often require that the tunes be 
sung. This starting point—the ability to accurately sing a melody without needing to tap out 
beats—is more or less the endpoint of the methods discussed earlier. To sing the form involves 
performing whatever syncopations are built into the song and takes for granted that the performer 
has a robust enough concept of the meter to “count silently” or “feel without tapping.” The 
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rhythms in most jazz tunes are not as complex as the final rhythms found in Hall’s and Starer’s 
methods. On the other hand, to take an entire song as a large-scale form goes beyond notions of 
temporal structure found in previous methods, which stop after grouping beats into measures. 
Hoenig and Weidenmueller use entire forms, because they provide “an opportunity to raise the 
intensity of your expectations for resolution” and “without a form over which to apply the new 
groove, you won’t achieve the same amount of tension nor the effect of any subsequent release.” 
(Hoenig and Weidenmueller 2011, 5). To play a superimposed three-beat pattern will align with 
a downbeat every three measures of 4/4, but only aligns every three choruses of a “rhythm 
changes” form, for example.  
The centerpiece of their strategy involves repeating patterns called “core rhythms” which 
are clapped over the song form. Core rhythms are designed to later constitute the a superimposed 
beats of a core groove. Core rhythms could be, among many possibilities, half notes displaced by 
an eighth-note triplet or claps every fifth eighth note. Example 4.1 offers two realizations, one 
for the tune “Well You Needn’t” with a core rhythm occurring every third eighth note, and 










Example 4.1, two possible realizations of exercises as proposed under “general practice tips” in 
Metric Modulations (Hoenig and Weidenmueller 2011, 6) 
 
As difficult as this may appear, it represents only the first stage of Hoenig and Weidenmueller’s 
method. The next step involves adding metronome clicks to fall on various metrical locations or 
at any other regular pulse rate.51 The metronome may be heard on off-beats, triplets, dotted 
quarter notes, etc. Figure 4.2 offers versions of the same exercises with the addition of one 
possible hearing of metronome clicks. 
 
 
                                                 
51 Hoenig and Weidenmuller also suggest performing foot taps as an intermediary stage 
before the metronome. I will focus on the metronome possibility, though, because the foot taps 
are essentially equivalent to clapping. The only difference is the body part doing the performing 




Example 4.2, two possible realizations of exercises as proposed under “general practice tips” in 
Metric Modulations (Hoenig and Weidenmueller 2011, 6) with added metronome clicks 
 
Each of these requires entrainment with a pulse that is not sounded. Actually, it’s difficult to say 
whether this ought to constitute entrainment, because there is not direct synchronization. The 
exercise requires—and helps develop—a great deal of self-conscious control over one’s own 
attention as well as theoretical knowledge of how the different pulse rates align with each other 
and with the meter. It puts also increased strain on attention, by increasing the numbers of 
musical balls to be juggled. Perhaps part of the point is to find some threshold of attention and 
push it to its limit. 
 As a whole, the exercises here combine (and hence help summarize) several pedagogical 
methods. (1) Given that they are designed to strengthen one’s ability to superimpose a pulse rate 
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on another, the claps could represent an “action first” approach. Each superimposed pulse is 
physically performed and practiced until it needs less concentration or attention, in order to be 
“felt.” In terms of pedagogy this is an obvious move: a regular action, through practice, becomes 
internalized, just as metric cycles are taught. In mainstream metric perception theory, however, 
this is a more radical move. It implies that some second pulse stream might possibly be felt, i.e. 
tracked without any external off-loading. (2) The requests from the authors to engage with 
recordings and videos before looking through book notation represents a “sound before symbol” 
approach. This may be an attempt to force more engagement, or allay fears that superimposed 
metric modulations are overly mathematical. (3) The idea of using a metronome to be heard in 
weak and odd locations helps make temporal navigation more robust. Considering the musical 
end goal, this addition would likely be good preparation for group improvisation of the sorts 
analyzed in Chapter 3, because the metronome is an external source of information for 
synchronization. However, the clicks themselves are not for direct synchronization. Given the 
common purpose of a metronome, the clicks convey a “false” sense of beat to be resisted. And 
that false sense of beat, and tension with the form, is one of the most defining characteristics of 






CONCLUSION: METER, PERCEPTION, AND WHERE TO DIRECT OUR 
ATTENTION  
 
 I have done my best to avoid the baggage associated with the term meter and perception 
by presenting the scope of this project with other terms: temporal “navigation” and “knowledge”. 
“Meter” nonetheless has been a part of the discussion throughout, especially through my use of 
the term “metric multi-tasking.” At the outset, I stated a preference for an “objective” definition 
of meter, where a particular sort of engagement is not required to count as meter. If I’ve done 
something dramatic with meter here, it is not in the definition. It is in the contexts relevant to 
discussion and strategies for perceiving, experiencing, or knowing about it. One of the most 
important points is that following periodicity and finding metric structure need not mean finding 
periodic events! Events may be periodic, but features other than that periodicity provide 
information (a symbolic melody, for example). I also made a point not to require that all 
strategies be “perceptual.” However, the idea of meter perception should be opened somewhat, to 
include active and multi-modal engagement with music, even if certain metric strategies are 
considered as more general forms of knowledge (and not perception). 
 Talking about perception generally (i.e. outside of music) involves sensory engagement 
with an object separate from the perceiver. I perceive an egg by seeing it, or feeling its shape, 
texture, and weight in my hand. I could also perceive an egg—and hopefully this hypothetical 
egg is cooked—by smelling it or tasting it. However, you do not always need direct sensory 
information to know about the egg. In a supermarket, I can identify eggs by reading the word 
“eggs” on a carton, but I probably would not consider that as “perceptual.” (It does involve 
sensory information to see the written words, but the important information is presented as 
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linguistic symbols). I can also read about structural or biological properties of eggs—about how 
they have a rough shell and ovoidal shape—without being anywhere near them. This too can 
provide useful information, but—without a direct sensory encounter—I would be unlikely to 
claim it as perception. 
Talking about music perception often involves an added limitation which stems from the 
notion of music as sound (i.e. its “primary medium”) and the assumption that sensory encounter 
means listening. On the other hand, recent work in embodied cognition (Godøy 2003, Noë 2004, 
Goldin-Meadow and Beilock 2010) offers an avenue of challenging this notion by also including 
actions as constituting perception, and that notion works particularly well in describing temporal 
perception in music. It also aligns with the recurring idea put forth in this dissertation that 
navigating periodicity begins with real actions that eventually become “internalized” (as opposed 
to some “internal” processor which is somehow prior to, and facilitates, the actions). As long as 
actions may constitute perception, active strategies (e.g. automating foot stamps, tala gestures) 
can too. By discussing active, gestural strategies that symbolically encode and off-load metric 
information, I hope to add a sense of what we can literally do to make notions “embodied 
cognition” and “active perception”—which are often presented metaphorically in music theory—
more concrete. 
Other resources and strategies for tracking periodicity—extensive specific practice 
yielding a memory of the piece, score-like knowledge, abstract calculations, and other symbolic 
indicators—also constitute forms of temporal knowledge, but they fail to fit the notion of 
perception. And they do so in different ways. One difficulty in subsuming all these possibilities 
under a broad concept of perception is the “indirectness” of the strategies. For example, akin to 
reading the word “egg” in the opening example, the ascending fourth C# F# signifies the end of 
 158 
the song form to the Jean-Michel Pilc Trio’s interpretation of “Giant Steps” discussed previously 
(example 2.1). And the three staccato hits signify the fourth measure of the bridge in Ari 
Hoenig’s interpretation of “Anthropology” (example 3.22). In these cases, information about 
temporal cycles of a musical object is transmitted, without actually being a patterned cycle. The 
signifiers do not need to be periodic themselves to provide that information so long as when they 
do occur, they occur in their significant location. That might be a roundabout way of getting at 
temporal structure. On the other hand, the information is part of the musical sound object, 
making it more perceptual than other options. 
When looking to a conductor or seeing someone else’s tala hand gestures, the same sort 
of signifiers are transmitted through a medium other than sound (in this case, visually through 
gestures). Literally looking for information would constitute a problem for the approach found in 
London’s early work (2009) in which listening to music’s primary medium (sound) was a 
requirement for perception. His more recent work, on the other hand, explores music perception 
without limiting stimuli to sounds.52 If we allow perception to involve any form of sensory 
information—and I think we should—another sort of indirectness remains at issue, in addition to 
the fact that information is presented symbolically. Do those gestures constitute a part of the 
musical object? And, does that really matter? In other words, does it count as perception if the 
information comes from a source other than the percept? In Western contexts, we might not want 
to include the conductor’s gestures as a part of the musical object. In South Indian music the 
gestures seem more easily subsumed as part of “the piece.” Either way, to exclude resources 
from “perception” on this basis still seems rather arbitrary. Better perhaps, would be to expand 
                                                 
52 London et al 2016 explores the way visual stimuli of a dancer affect judgements of music, 
for example. 
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the notion of the piece based on resources which come into play. If seeing a conductor’s gestures 
helps, then it should constitute part of “the music.” 
The idea that we come to know something about a temporal object’s structure through 
scores and abstract calculations is the most difficult to subsume within a category of “meter 
perception,” and I advocate against doing so. Even if we expand the notion of music beyond 
sound and open modalities through which perception occurs, this knowledge is abstract and 
static. It is, however, useful knowledge which is actionable in time, and perhaps it is best to 
describe it as just that: useful knowledge. Constructing a category for knowledge (or “knowing”) 
might be the best way to expand discussion without inflating perception beyond its meaningful 
capacity. I would like to lay out a conceptual landscape in which temporal knowledge forms the 
broadest category with no stipulation other than usefulness. Various modes of perception form a 
subset of that knowledge, but I remain unsure of where to draw the line around what constitutes 
perception. I am also unsure, if doing so is very productive. After all, excessive focus upon 
conceptual bounds may translate to restrictions or the sort outlined in the first chapter of this 
dissertation.  
Another reason why the expanded set of temporal resources might not sit very well in 
“perceptual” terms—or, conversely why a perceptual starting point obfuscates those resources’ 
existence—is the performer’s perspective I often invoke. Perception generally involves a 
perceiver and some external percept. Performers, by contrast, do not have such a simple 
separation from the object. They do not simply discern properties of their musical objects. They 
create them! However, I would like to argue that, just as performers are often listeners, so too 
can listeners be performative. For example, in Meredith Monk’s “Panda Chant II” I described 
strategies a performer could use in order to coordinate stamps, claps, and vocalizations. I avoided 
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the listener’s perspective, because it does not require following both the notated 6/8 and 11/8 
with the same urgency as the performer’s perspective does. Yet the performer’s strategies remain 
available to listeners. If you want to follow “Panda Chant II,” it may help to have extensive 
practice automating the foot stamps and to actually do them along with the piece as it occurs. 
This does not constitute listening in any conventional sense, but listeners need not limit 
themselves to only listening! To be a resourceful listener means employing modes of perception 
beyond the listening-and-attending paradigm. It means seeing and moving and abstractly 
calculating. 
How should future research continue with the paradigm of metrically-modulated 
“attention” for navigating periodicity? Instances of metric multi-tasking highlight some 
awkwardness in “attentional” theory. If we have only one “attention” for periodic events, what 
do we do with instances in which actions outline an additional temporal hierarchy for which 
attention is not available? When do periodic physical actions such as tapping reflect “attending,” 
and when do they not? And, can we have periodic actions which substitute for peaks in 
attention? By considering many possible temporal resources and strategies, the concept of 
“attention” is likely more difficult to pin down now than at the outset of this project. I have been 
admittedly loose with “attention” throughout, using it in both the colloquial sense and its 
psychological definition involving periodic peaks in expectation. I could attempt more precision 
in using the term—or attempt to avoid the concept entirely—but perhaps being a bit loose and 
disorganized with “attention” is a move in the right direction. Attention is messy and constitutes 
substantially different sorts of awareness. 
 In this project, I described trends and attempted in order to break free of them. I did this 
by focusing on multi-modal active experiences and experiential possibilities rather than existing 
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norms. I also linked notions of embodied cognition to real actions in an attempt to make those 
ideas concrete and executable, rather than metaphorical. Because this project is about possibility, 
I hope readers take away new ideas for approaching music, including the freedom to look for 
information, to physically act with music. It is important not to let “cognitive limits” stifle 
potential. We must realize that those very limits are only limits given a specific context and a 
particular strategy. And I hope the analyses presented here provide reason enough to seek out 
those extra strategies and more. 
Active strategies may also help artificially construct hearings of music. If a writer 
proposes that a piece should be heard “in 3”—and I had not been approaching that way 
already—counting “1, 2, 3” and tapping associated downbeats help the desired hearing. In other 
cases, a downbeat (for example) may be difficult to hear, because it lacks any associated sound. 
To help emphasize it, we can create an event in our body by swaying or tapping. Feeling that 
structure begins with the actions in order to manipulate how it is experienced. 
 One attractive avenue for future research could be to explore active perception, symbolic 
encoding, and abstract calculations as strategies applicable for dealing with pitch. When I first 
hear a note, I generally do not have an immediate idea of its pitch, because I do not have absolute 
pitch. However, I learn something by singing it (by embodying it). I feel generally where it fits in 
my range by the degree of tension in my chest and throat. I know theoretically where the limits 
of my range are. I can sing up or down to find how close the pitch is to those limits. I am not 
particularly good at this, but I get better the more I have been singing. More capable singers are 
much better at this. The point is that actively embodying a note provides information, and 
practice improves the quality of that information. 
Expanded theoretical resources are also productive in dealing with melodic-harmonic 
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material. I recall as an undergraduate, I excelled at part-writing exercises yet struggled with ear 
training and dictation exercises. (I would argue that this related to my trouble singing. Since I 
struggled to do it—by singing—I struggled to not hear it.) One of the most difficult tasks I was 
given involved taking down a passage in four-part harmony. At the time, I could hear the melody 
rather well, but could not “hear” the inner voices. However, I often succeeded at correctly 
notating them, by knowing that the part-writing followed established norms of Western common 
practice. With only a few clues, such as the spacing of a starting and ending chord, or hearing a 
close vs. open position, I could make educated guesses about those voices. It is difficult to say 
whether that should constitute hearing and perception, but I want to make room for this (abstract 
theoretical) strategy to be legitimate. Consider another case. A pianist plays something, but there 
is an unusual interval which is hard to place. Or, perhaps you want to identify the tonic pitch-
class. Presuming you don’t have perfect pitch, literally looking at which keys were depressed can 
help. If you know the relation of piano keys to the sounds they usually produce, seeing which 
keys constitutes a symbolic resource. 
Incorporating these expanded techniques and resources for temporal periodicity into 
psychological experiments may be challenging. It requires finding participants who are 
professional musicians, giving them access to scores, and providing long-term specific practice 
with stimulus and task. Finding virtuosic professional musicians as participants is more difficult 
than using a class of undergraduates. And engaging those professionals in a long endeavor 
requiring specific practice is even tougher. It is also very difficult to set up controls for an 
experiment which allows participants a full palette of strategies. I would also worry that running 
laboratory tests may simply come to the banal conclusion that the various resources and 
strategies discussed here improve performance. I think the more important information is what 
 163 
sorts of resources and strategies help in temporal navigation, and that would be an experimental 
input. A more productive route should find new temporal resources and strategies as its output. 
Case studies involving individual the development of temporal strategies for difficult tasks will 
likely yield more intriguing results. Studying particular people, rather than groups, is also in 
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